Great Falls Manufacturing Co. v. Attorney General

Feb 6, 1888

605

Versions:

Me. Justice HablaN,

аfter stating the case as above reported, delivered the opinion of the court.

The bill alleges that the land and water rights described hi the published notice of the Attorney General are substantially-those which would have been taken if the United States had adopted and executed Plan A, as described in the report of the arbitrators in 1863. In respect to that plan, the arbitrators decided that if it were adopted and executed the plaintiff would be entitled to receive $63,766, and, in addition, to retain the right of using the remainder of the water, by means of proper canal and bulkhead appliances on the Virginia shore of the river. While the company contends that its enjoyment of the right so reserved cannot lawfully be interfered with, it is not clear that it means to insist upon the award of 1863, in respect to said amount, as absolutely binding upon the United States in proceedings had under the act of 1882. It. will be remembered that the award of 1863 covered four alternative plans for the Potomac dam of the Washington aqueduct. The United States adopted and executed only Plan 4, and thereby manifested its ‍‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‍purpose not to adopt and execute Plan A. Neither the Government nor the company is bound by that award, so far as it relates to plan.® which the United States did not adoрt and execute. The present inquiry in respect to land or water rights taken from the plaintiff must, therefore, be conducted with reference to their value — not in 1863, when the Government declined to take them, but — in 1883, at the time of their being condemned for public use. undеr the act of 1882. It is, consequently, an immaterial circumstance that the award of 1863 reserved to the company, as against the United States, the right to maintain a canal and bulkhead across and upon the land of the United States, on the Virginia shore of the Potomac. No such reservation is made by the act of 1882, and the officers charged with its execution were not required to concede any such right, though, of course, the United-States are bound to make just compensation to the company for prоperty rights of whatever description taken from it for, and appropriated to, public use.

Much stress seems to be laid upon the allegation in the bill —which the appellant'insists must be taken as true- — -that the Secretary of War, by his servants and agents, took possession of' lands of the plaintiff, which are “ not within any description made, surveyed, or traced.” by him, and has used the same for the purpose of constructing the proposed dam across Conn’s Island and to the Yirginia shore. As the act of Congress provided that thе Secretary of War, upon the publication by the Attorney General of the required notice, “ may take possession of the premises embraced in the survey and map,” it is contended that his possession of the company’s land and water rights is without authority of law, and constitutes a mere' trespass; in which case, it is ‍‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‍argued, the United States are not legally bound to make compensation to the plaintiff. It is clear that the allegation that the lands taken for the purposes of the dam in question are not embraced by the survey, is not to be literally construed. The plaintiff surely does not mean that all the lands taken by the Secretary are outside of the survey made under his order; but, only that such lands are not entirely within its limits, and that the survey was not sufficiently accurate “to be the foundation of passing the title to .the land and water rights ” of the complainant “ necessary to be taken for the purposes of said act.” The plaintiff admits that a survey was, in fact, made, and that the Attorney General published a notice based upon it. And therе is no suggestion that the Secretary has taken any land other than that intended to be embraced within the survey, of which the Attorney General gave notice by publication. Taking all the allegations of the bill together, we understand the complaint only to be that the survey and notice were not such as in law justified the Secretary of "War in taking possession'of the lands upon which the proposed dam was being constructed when the suit was brought. But even if it be true that some part of the land actually occupied by the Government is not within the survey and map, still the United States are under an obligation imposed by the Constitution to make just compensation for all that has been in fact taken and is retained for the proposed dam. While Congress supposed, that a survey and map could be made with such accuracy as to embrace all the land necessary, under any circumstances, for the purposes indicated in the act of 1882, and while provision is made whereby the owners of lands, covered by such survey and map, can obtain just сompensation, the act also opens the Court of Claims to every person who, by the construction of the works in question, has been injured in any property right, provided that, within a given time, such person file his petition in that court, setting forth his right or title and the amount claimed by him as .damages. So that if the Secretary of War, who was invested with large discretion in determining what land was actually required to accomplish in the best manner the object Congress had in view, found it necessary to. tyke, and has. taken and used, and still holds lands of thе plaintiff1 for'the proposed dam, which happen not to be covered by the survey and map, the United States are as much bound to make just compensation therefor as if such lands had been actually embraced ‍‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‍in that survey and map. Of course, we are not to be understood as saying that the Secretary of War could, by any act of his, bind the United States to pay for lands taken by him which, manifestly, had no substantial connection with the construction of the dam across Conn’s Island to the Yirginia shore. It- is sufficient to say that the record discloses nothing showing that he has taken more land than was reasonably necessary for the purposes described in the act of Congress, or that he did not honestly and reasonably exercise the discretion with which he was invested; and, consеquently, the Government is under a constitutional obligation to make compensation for any property or property-right taken, used, and held by him for the purposes indicated in the act of Congress, whether it is embraced or described in said survey or map, or not. United States v. Great Falls Manufacturing Co., 112 U. S. 645, 656.

In reference to the allegation that the survey and map made by the Secretary were not sufficiently accurate, and that the notice published by the Attorney General was materially defective, it may be further said that all such objections were waived by the company when, proceeding under the act of 1882, it invoked the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims to give judgment against-the United States for such compensation as it .was entitled to receive for its land and water rights. Even if the Secretary’s survey and map, and the publication of the Attorney General’s notice did not, in strict law, justify the former in taking possession of the land and water rights in question, it was competent for the company to waive the tort, and proceed ‍‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‍against the United States, as upon an implied сontract, it appearing, as it does here, that the Government recognizes and retains the possession taken in its behalf for the public purposes indicated in the act under which its officers have proceeded.

It is, however, contended that the act is, in all of its parts, unconstitutional and void. The grounds upon which the plaintiff rests this contention 'are: that the act makes no provision by which compensation for property taken under it can be constitutionally adjusted and determined; that it does not рrovide for the ascertainment of such compensation by the verdict of a jury; that it compels the plaintiff to have recourse to the Court of Claims, which is a court unknown to the Constitution, being neither a court of equity such as was known at the adoption оf that instrument, nor a court of law proceeding according to the rules of the common law, but only a board of referees, constituted by one party to hear such cases as another party will consent to submit to its determination, and without • power tо enforce its judgment against the party by whom it is created; and- that it directs property to be taken and the owner thereof dispossessed, without making provision for just compensation.

These are questions of much interest, and their examination, in the light of the authorities, might not be altogether unprofitable. But this opinion need not be extended for the purpose of such an examination; for the questions propounded are not material in the determination of the present case. They have become immaterial by the act of the plaintiff in instituting suit ‍‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‍against the United States in the Court of Claims. In that suit compensation was sought for its property taken for public use, while the present suit proceeds upon the ground that it has not been lawfully taken, and that it is entitled to be plаced in possession thereof.’ Congress prescribed a particular - mode for ascertaining the compensation which claimants of property taken for the purposes indicated in the act of 1882 ■ were entitled to receive. It gave thеm liberty to proceed by suit against the United States before a designated tribunal, which, since the passage of the act of March 17, 1866, 14 Stat. 9, has exercised “all the functions of a court,” from whose judgment appeals regularly lie to this court. United States v. Klein, 13 Wall. 145; United States v. Jones, 119 U.S. 477; Gordon v. United States, 117 U. S. 697. The plaintiff, by adоpting that mode, has assented to the taking of its property by the Government for public use, and has agreed ;to submit the determination of the question of compensation to the tribunal named by Congress. By the very ac]b of suing in the Court of Claims, under the statute of 1882, it has not only waived ’ the right, if such right it had, to compensation in advance of . the taking of its property, but the right, if such it had, to • demand that the amount of compensation be determined by a jury.- By the same act it has estopped itself from suggesting that no judgment obtained in the Court of Claims can be en-, forced against the United States, but must await an appropriation for its payment. When it resorted to that court, it knew that its judgments against the United States could only be paid out of money appropriated for that purpose by Congress. In short, the plaintiff has voluntarily accepted the provisions of the act of Congress in respect to the mode of ascertaining the compensation to be made to it. This view cannot work any permanent injury to the plaintiff; for that act expressly dеclares that the absolute title to the premises in question shall not vest in the United States until the owner receives payment therefor; that is, the Government holds the premises for public use, subject to the condition imposed by the Constitution, and by the act of Congress, that it will, without unreasonable delay, make such compensation therefor as may be awarded by the tribunal to which the whole subject has been submitted. It is to be assumed that the United States is incapable of bad faith, and that Congress will promptly make the necessary appropriation, whenever the amount of compensation has been ascertained in the mode prescribed by the act 'of 1882. ,

It is scarcely necessary to say that it is immaterial that the plaintiff invoked the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims from fеar that, if it did not file its petition in that court within the time limited,, it might lose the right to demand compensation for its property. If the act of the Secretary of War in talcing possession of the property was in violation of law, neither he nor his agents could rightfully hold possession against the plaintiff; in which case, the plaintiff might have stood upon its rights, under the Constitution, and invoked judicial authority for such protection as the law would afford against the unauthorized acts of public officers. But the plaintiff chose to acquiescе in the taking of its property for public use, and to accept the offer of the Government to have the amount» of compensation fixed by the Court of Claims, according to its peculiar modes of procedure. The reasons inducing it to adopt such a course can have no influence upon the action of that court, nor affect its power to ascertain and award' just compensation for the loss of the property.

Upon the case as presented to us, and without intending to еxpress doubt as to the constitutionality of the act of July 15, 1882, we are of the opinion that there is no obstacle in the way of the plaintiff’s securing, by means of its suit in the Court of Claims, and without unreasonable delay, just compensation for all of its property taken for the public use indicated in the act of Congress; and, consequently, the decree dismissing its bill is

Affirmed.