Case Information
*1 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA STATESBORO DIVISION
ADAL GRAZETA,
Plaintiff, CIVIL ACTION NO.: 6:16-cv-141 v.
HOMER BRYSON; WARDEN ROBERT
TOOLE; DOUG WILLIAMS; ERIC
SMOKES; DERIC GODREY; and MRS.
WATKINS,
Defendants.
ORDER and MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiff’s failure to comply with this Court’s Order to keep the Court apprised of any change in his address and to return his prison trust fund account statement. For the following reasons, I RECOMMEND that the Court Plaintiff’s Complaint, (doc. 1), for Plaintiff’s failure to prosecute and failure to follow this Court’s Orders. I further RECOMMEND that the Court DENY Plaintiff leave to appeal
BACKGROUND On October 24, 2016, Plaintiff, proceeding pro se , filed a Complaint contesting certain conditions of his confinement while housed at Smith State Prison in Glennville, Georgia. (Doc. 1.) On December 16, 2016, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Proceed in Forma Pauperis . (Doc. 14.) On December 29, 2016, the Court granted Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis . (Doc. 16.) In that Order, the Court instructed Plaintiff to furnish the Court with the *2 statement of his prison trust fund account and the consent to collection of fees from that account pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). (Id. at pp. 2–3.) The Court explained that, if Plaintiff failed to respond to the Court’s Order by January 30, 2017, the Court would dismiss this case. (Id. at p. 4.) Although Plaintiff returned his consent to collection of fees form, he failed to return his prison trust fund account form. (Doc. 21.) Plaintiff averred that he “forwarded the Prisoner Trust Fund Account Statement to the Prison’s business/accounting office for completion on January 6, 2017”, but that “form has yet to be returned to me.” (Doc. 21-1.) Accordingly, by Order dated March 22, 2017, the Court gave Plaintiff an additional opportunity to submit his properly completed prison trust fund account statement. (Doc. 32.) The Court ordered Plaintiff to return his prison trust fund account statement within fourteen (14) days of that Order and warned that, if Plaintiff failed to do so, the Court would dismiss his case for failure to prosecute and failure to follow a Court Order.
Additionally, in the Court’s December 29, 2016, Order granting Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma papueris , the Court ordered Plaintiff to immediately inform this Court in writing of any change in his address. (Id. at p. 3.) The Court emphasized that, should Plaintiff fail to comply with this directive, the Court would dismiss his case. Id. The Clerk of the Court mailed its March 22, 2017, Order to Plaintiff at his last known place of residence, Smith State Prison in Glennville, Georgia. However, the mail was returned as undeliverable. (Doc. 33.) Plaintiff has not notified the Court of his change of address or made any effort to inform the Court of his whereabouts.
DISCUSSION
The Court must now determine how to address Plaintiff’s failure to comply with this Court’s directives. For the reasons set forth below, I RECOMMEND that the Court Plaintiff’s Complaint without prejudice and DENY Plaintiff leave to appeal I. Dismissal for Failure to Prosecute and Failure to Follow this Court’s Order
A district court may dismiss a plaintiff’s claims sua sponte pursuant to either Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) (“Rule 41(b)”) or the court’s inherent authority to manage its docket. Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626 (1962); [1] Coleman v. St. Lucie Cty. Jail, 433 F. App’x 716, 718 (11th Cir. 2011) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b) and Betty K Agencies, Ltd. v. M/V MONADA, 432 F.3d 1333, 1337 (11th Cir. 2005)). In particular, Rule 41(b) allows for the involuntary dismissal of a plaintiff’s claims where he has failed to prosecute those claims, comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or local rules, or follow a court order. Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b); see also Coleman, 433 F. App’x at 718; Sanders v. Barrett, No. 05-12660, 2005 WL 2640979, at *1 (11th Cir. Oct. 17, 2005) (citing Kilgo v. Ricks, 983 F.2d 189, 192 (11th Cir. 1993)); cf. Local R. 41.1(b) (“[T]he assigned Judge may, after notice to counsel of record, sua sponte . . . dismiss any action for want of prosecution, with or without prejudice[,] . . . [based on] willful disobedience or neglect of any order of the Court.” (emphasis omitted)). Additionally, a district court’s “power to dismiss is an inherent aspect of its authority to enforce its orders and ensure prompt disposition of lawsuits.” Brown v. Tallahassee Police Dep’t, 205 F. App’x 802, 802 (11th Cir. 2006) (quoting Jones v. Graham, 709 F.2d 1457, 1458 (11th Cir. 1983)). *4 It is true that dismissal with prejudice for failure to prosecute is a “sanction . . . to be utilized only in extreme situations” and requires that a court “(1) conclud[e] a clear record of delay or willful contempt exists; and (2) mak[e] an implicit or explicit finding that lesser sanctions would not suffice.” Thomas v. Montgomery Cty. Bd. of Educ., 170 F. App’x 623, 625–26 (11th Cir. 2006) (quoting Morewitz v. West of Eng. Ship Owners Mut. Prot. & Indem. Ass’n (Lux.), 62 F.3d 1356, 1366 (11th Cir. 1995)); see also Taylor v. Spaziano, 251 F. App’x 616, 619 (11th Cir. 2007) (citing Morewitz, 62 F.3d at 1366). By contrast, dismissal without prejudice for failure to prosecute is not an adjudication on the merits, and, therefore, courts are afforded greater discretion in dismissing claims in this manner. Taylor, 251 F. App’x at 619; see also Coleman, 433 F. App’x at 719; Brown, 205 F. App’x at 802–03.
While the Court exercises its discretion to dismiss cases with caution, dismissal of this action without prejudice is warranted. See Coleman, 433 F. App’x at 719 (upholding dismissal without prejudice for failure to prosecute Section 1983 complaint, where plaintiff did not respond to court order to supply defendant’s current address for purpose of service); Taylor, 251 F. App’x at 620–21 (upholding dismissal without prejudice for failure to prosecute because plaintiffs insisted on going forward with deficient amended complaint rather than complying, or seeking an extension of time to comply, with court’s order to file second amended complaint); Brown, 205 F. App’x at 802–03 (upholding dismissal without prejudice for failure to prosecute Section 1983 claims, where plaintiff failed to follow court order to file amended complaint and court had informed plaintiff that noncompliance could lead to dismissal). With Plaintiff having failed to update the Court with his current address, the Court has no means by which it can communicate with Plaintiff. Thus, the Court is unable to move forward with this case. *5 Moreover, Plaintiff was given ample time to follow the Court’s directive to submit his prison trust fund account statement, and Plaintiff has again failed to do so.
Thus, the Court should DISMISS Plaintiff’s Complaint, (doc. 1), for failure to prosecute and failure to follow this Court’s Orders, and this case should be CLOSED II. Leave to Appeal in Forma Pauperis
The Court should also deny Plaintiff leave to appeal in forma pauperis . Though Plaintiff has, of course, not yet filed a notice of appeal, it is proper to address these issues in the Court’s order of dismissal. See Fed. R. App. P. 24(a)(3) (trial court may certify that appeal of party proceeding in forma pauperis is not taken in good faith “before or after the notice of appeal is filed”).
An appeal cannot be taken in forma pauperis if the trial court certifies that the appeal is not taken in good faith. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3); Fed. R. App. P. 24(a)(3). Good faith in this context must be judged by an objective standard. Busch v. Cty. of Volusia, 189 F.R.D. 687, 691 (M.D. Fla. 1999). A party does not proceed in good faith when he seeks to advance a frivolous claim or argument. See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 445 (1962). A claim or argument is frivolous when it appears the factual allegations are clearly baseless or the legal theories are indisputably meritless. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989); Carroll v. Gross, 984 F.2d 392, 393 (11th Cir. 1993). Or, stated another way, an action is frivolous and, thus, not brought in good faith, if it is “without arguable merit either in law or fact.” Napier v. Preslicka, 314 F.3d 528, 531 (11th Cir. 2002); see also Brown v. United States, Nos. 407CV085, 403CR001, 2009 WL 307872, at *1–2 (S.D. Ga. Feb. 9, 2009).
*6 Based on the above analysis of Plaintiff’s action, there are no non-frivolous issues to raise on appeal, and an appeal would not be taken in good faith. Thus, the Court should DENY Plaintiff in forma pauperis status on appeal.
CONCLUSION For the above-stated reasons, it is my RECOMMENDATION that the Court this action and DIRECT the Clerk of Court to enter the appropriate judgment of dismissal and to CLOSE this case. I further RECOMMEND that the Court DENY Plaintiff leave to proceed on appeal.
The Court ORDERS any party seeking to object to this Report and Recommendation to file specific written objections within fourteen (14) days of the date on which this Report and Recommendation is entered. Any objections asserting that the Magistrate Judge failed to address any contention raised in the Complaint must also be included. Failure to do so will bar any later challenge or review of the factual findings or legal conclusions of the Magistrate Judge. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985). A copy of the objections must be served upon all other parties to the action. The filing of objections is not a proper vehicle through which to make new allegations or present additional evidence.
Upon receipt of Objections meeting the specificity requirement set out above, a United States District Judge will make a de novo determination of those portions of the report, proposed findings, or recommendation to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the Magistrate Judge. Objections not meeting the specificity requirement set out above will not be considered by a District Judge. A party may not appeal a Magistrate Judge’s report and recommendation directly to the United *7 States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. Appeals may be made only from a final judgment entered by or at the direction of a District Judge. The Court DIRECTS the Clerk of Court to serve a copy of this Report and Recommendation upon Plaintiff.
SO ORDERED and REPORTED and RECOMMENDED , this 3rd day of May, 2017. R. STAN BAKER
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
[1] In Wabash, the Court held that a trial court may dismiss an action for failure to prosecute “even without affording notice of its intention to do so.” 370 U.S. at 633.