378 Pa. 294 | Pa. | 1954
Opinion by
The Act of June 20, 1947, P. L. 745, as re-enacted and amended, 24 PS § 582.1 et seq., provides that, beginning with the year 1948 and annually thereafter, every school district of the first class shall issue mercantile licenses and levy and collect an annual mercantile license tax at the rate of one-half mill on each dollar of the volume of the annual gross business transacted by wholesale vendors and brokers. The School District of the City of Pittsburgh accordingly levied such tax for the year 1948 and for subsequent years and adopted regulations for the administration of the impost. The Graybar Electric Company, a New York corporation, was engaged in business as a wholesale vendor and broker of electrical supplies and equipment and, for such purposes, had an office within the School District of the City of Pittsburgh. Graybar seasonably obtained mercantile licenses, made tax returns and paid taxes on account thereof for the years 1948, 1949 and 1950.
On October 23, 1950, following an examination of G-raybar’s books, the school district made additional tax claims for the years 1948, 1949 and 1950 and also claimed penalties at the rate of .1% per month and interest at the rate of y2ffo. per month from the due
Within the period limited therefor, the school district appealed to this court. In the meantime, the taxpayer had paid the additional taxes, as found by the court below to be due and owing, with interest thereon from the date of the court’s final order. Graybar moved to quash the appeal, principally, on the alleged ground that the matter involved was moot. The payment did not, however, constitute an accord and satisfaction of the whole of the school district’s claim nor could it have been so intended, as evidenced by the taxpayer’s accompanying. letter of transmittal. Neith
No question is here involved with respect to the determination of the principal claim on its merits. The sole issue presented by this appeal is whether the learned court below erred in relieving Graybar from liability for interest on the unpaid taxes from the due date thereof to the date of the court’s final order and from liability throughout for the additional penalty.
Notwithstanding some seeming contrariety of opinion in our cases with respect to the power of a court to relieve a delinquent taxpayer from liability for statutorily prescribed interest and penalties on unpaid taxes, we think the question has been definitely settled, adversely to the present taxpayer’s contention (so far as the School Mercantile Tax Act of 1947, as amended, is concerned) by our decision in Goldstein v. Pittsburgh School District, 372 Pa. 188, 199-200, 93 A. 2d 243. Section 9 (b) of the Act of 1947, supra, 24 PS § 582.9 (b), in presently material part, provides that, — “If for any reason the tax is not paid when due in each year, interest at the rate of six per centum (6%) per annum on the amount of said tax, and an additional penalty of one per centum (1%) of the amount of unpaid tax for each month, or fraction thereof, during which the tax remains unpaid, shall be added and collected” (Emphasis supplied). This statutory language is clear and unambiguous. It specifies that taxes not paid on the due date automatically become subject to interest and penalties-regardless
The cases cited. by. the appellee are not presently germane, Phipps v. Kirk, 333 Pa. 478, 5 A. 2d 143, was not concerned with the mandate of the Mercantile Tax Act of 1947 imposing, the • duty to collect interest and penalties on overdue taxes.- The delay in payment in the Phipps-, case was due, to. the. fact that the taxpayers’, triennial.-.real, estate, assessment was. not definitely settled and the, correct- tax .determinable until the taxpayers’ assessment, appeal had. been disposed of by the court.- which -.made .a . substantial- reduction in the
The case of H. J. Heinz Company v. School District of Pittsburgh, 170 Pa. Superior Ct. 441, 87 A. 2d 85, is in direct conflict with the express statutory requirement that penalties and interest be imposed when for any reason the mercantile tax is not paid when due. The ruling in the Heinz case cannot, therefore, be approved. The statement in Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Company v. Hines, supra, upon which the court below relied in the instant case, was considerably modified by the opinion of Chief Justice Stern for this court in the Keystone Metal case, supra, as follows: “It is true that in Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co. v. Hines, [supra], we said that "harsh penalties or
The order of the court below is amended so as to include penalties and interest on the unpaid taxes from their due date and, as so amended, is affirmed at the appellee’s costs.
The due dates were March 31, 1948, for the 1948 tax; March 15, 1949, for the 1949 tax-; aid. March 15; 1950, for the l950'-ta'x.'