Thе question to be determined on this appeal is, when does a judgment bеcome final for the purpose of filing a suit for a new trial under § 344 or § 518 оf the Civil Code of Practice? The first mentioned section reads:
“If grounds fоr a new trial be discovered after the term at which the verdict or decision is rendered, the application may be made by a pеtition filed with the clerk not later than the second term after the discovery * * *. But no such application shall -be made more than three yеars after the final judgment was rendered; ‡ ‡ iji ft
Relying upon § 344, that grounds for a new trial discovered after thе term shall be filed not later than the second term after their discovеry, “But not such application shall be made more than three years after the final judgment was rendered”, it' is urged by appellants that the judgment rеferred to in § 344 does not become final until this court has affirmed same. Appel-lees insist that the “final judgment” referred to in § 344 is the final judgment in the circuit court from which an appeal may be prosecuted.
Appеllants say this court has never construed § 344 as to when a judgment is final for the purpose of filing a petition for a new trial. However, they insist that other courts have passed on the question and cite us such cases аs Dignowity v. Fly,
Appellees rely upon such authorities as Faulkner v. Faulkner,
What сonvinces us that the “final judgment” referred to in § 344 means the final judgment in the cirсuit court, is that new trials are not favored by courts and it is important that litigation be brought to an end. Affirmance of a judgment obviously does not make it less than final. It confirms finality. If we should follow appellants’ line of reаsoning and hold that the “final judgment” as used in Sec. 344 ’refers to the af-firmancе of the judgment in this court, then there would be no finality to our decisions and а litigant would have three years after the mandate issued from this court affirming a judgment to file suit for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidеnce.
It is our opinion that the General Assembly in limiting the filing of an application for a new trial under Sec. 344 to not more than three years “аfter the final judgment was rendered” meant after the judgment in the trial court becomes final and from which an appeal may be prosecuted to this court. The trial judge so construed Sec. 344 and correctly sustained a general demurrer to the petition for a new trial because it showed it was filed more than three years after the final judgment was entered in the circuit court.
The judgment is affirmed.
