Gray v. ReynoldsGray v. Reynolds
This is thе second time that this breach of contract action has been before this Court. The plaintiff, Van Gray, appeals from a judgment in favor of the defendants, James M. Reynolds and J. Eugene Garrison, which was entered by the trial court, sitting without a jury on remand.
On this appeal, the plaintiff contends that the trial cоurt's findings are inconsistent with this Court's holding and mandate, and that they are also unsupported by the evidence. See Gray v. Reynolds,
This Court has summarized the facts of this controversy inGray I. Briefly restated, the facts are as follows: On March 2, 1984, Gray entered into a written contract with Reynolds and Garrison (bоth hereinafter referred to as "Reynolds") for the purchase and removal of approximately 9,000 tons of sawdust at the rate of $.50 per ton. The sаwdust was located on Reynolds's property in Dallas County. Gray hauled sawdust for about three weeks, making his last weekly payment to Reynolds on March 16, 1984. He mаde one haul in early April 1984 and has not hauled since. On April 24, 1984, Reynolds called Gray and told him that if he was not going to haul, then a third party, Brown, would haul for $1.00 per ton. Reynolds also told Gray that if Gray intended to haul, then Reynolds would keep Brown out of his way. On April 30, 1984, Brown began hauling.
Gray filed his complaint against Reynolds on May 28, 1984, аlleging that Reynolds had breached the contract by entering into a separate contract to sell sawdust to Brown. After a nonjury trial, the court ruled in fаvor of Reynolds, holding that the writing sued upon was insufficient to support a judgment in favor of Gray. The court also held that the writing constituted only a standing offer from Rеynolds to Gray to sell sawdust at a set price. Gray appealed to this Court, contending here that the trial court had erred in its determination that the writtеn agreement was merely a "standing offer" giving Gray an *81 "option" to purchase sawdust from Reynolds. He further asserted that the trial court had erred in its finding that the written agreement, testimony, and evidence were an insufficient basis for a claim of lost profits by Gray. We reversed and remanded the case to the trial court. In our opinion in Gray I, we first discussed the elements of a contract, finding (1) that an agreement between the parties existed; (2) that consideration еxisted; (3) that time was not of the essence; and (4) that "the trial court erred when it ruled that the contract was nothing more than a standing offer." The case wаs then remanded for further proceedings consistent with our opinion.
On remand in the trial court, the matter was submitted by the parties to the court upon the оriginal trial transcript and upon written trial briefs. The trial court entered an order finding (1) that Gray had breached the contract by failing to perform, speсifically, by removing sawdust and not paying for it; (2) that Gray had further breached the contract by abandoning the removal and hauling of the sawdust for an unreasonаble period of time; (3) that Gray had further breached the contract by removing and stockpiling the sawdust and reserving it for the purposes of speculаtion and by failing to make payments therefor on a weekly basis; and (4) that Gray was not entitled to recover because he had failed to act in good faith and to make efforts to mitigate his damages. This appeal followed.
It is well established that on remand the issues decided by an appellаte court become the "law of the case," and that the trial court must comply with the appellate court's mandate.Walker v. Carolina Mills Lumber Co.,
On the first appeal of this case, the issue was a narrow one — whether the writing involved wаs a contract. At the time of the first appeal, the trial court had never made findings of fact toward the ultimate issue, but had merely decided the cаse on the issue of whether a contract existed between the parties. Therefore, this Court did not direct the entry of judgment against the defendants, but rathеr directed further proceedings consistent with our holding that the written agreement was an enforceable contract. All other matters are but dictа and are not controlling upon the ultimate issue. While we are bound to carry out the holding as to the precise question before the Court on the first appeal, we are not necessarily bound to carry out literally the dicta pertaining to questions that were not then presented. This principle was long ago determined to be appropriate when a case is brought to the appellate court a second time. Jesse v. Cater,
On remand, consistent with our holding that the writing was, under the law of Alabama, a contract, the trial court went beyond that issue and looked at the conduct, rights, duties, and responsibilities of the parties. In doing so, the Court considered the testimony and evidence introduced at trial, along with the trial briefs submitted by counsel, and reachеd the decision that Gray had breached the contract.
The initial issue we address is whether Gray breached the contract by failing to perform in a timеly manner. The contract is silent on the question of time. Where the language in a contract is ambiguous or uncertain, the surrounding circumstances are taken into consideration. Fouts v. Beall,
The trial court based its judgment upon evidence presentedore tenus. Therefore, a presumption of correctness exists as to the court's conclusion on issues of facts. The trial court's determination will not be disturbed unless it is clearly erroneous, without supporting evidence, manifestly unjust, or аgainst the great weight of the evidence. Cougar Mining Co. v.Mineral Land Mining Consultants, Inc.,
There was sufficient evidence from which the trial court could have reached its conclusion on the issues presented. From the evidence, Gray was to make payments to Reynolds on a weekly basis after hauling the sawdust; yet Gray testified that from March 16, 1984, to April 30, 1984, he did not make payments to Rеynolds, even though he hauled four loads, totalling 100 tons, a week or two prior to Reynolds's informing Gray about the other offer to haul. In Seybold v. Mangolia Land Co.,
The proceedings and findings by the trial court on remand are entirely consistent with our holding in Gray I that a contract existed between the parties. Accordingly, the judgment is due to be affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
JONES, SHORES, HOUSTON and KENNEDY, JJ., concur.