Gray v. Kaufman Dairy & Ice Cream Co., 162 N.Y. 388

Gray v. Kaufman Dairy & Ice Cream Co.

162 N.Y. 388 | NY | 1900

Lead Opinion

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[EDITORS' NOTE: THIS PAGE CONTAINS HEADNOTES. HEADNOTES ARE NOT AN OFFICIAL PRODUCT OF THE COURT, THEREFORE THEY ARE NOT DISPLAYED.] *392 This controversy arises out of the conventional relation of landlord and tenant under circumstances governed by fixed principles of law. The first and most important question in the case is whether the plaintiff's reletting of the premises described in the lease, after the defendant's attempted surrender of the same, changed or affected the legal status of the parties under the original lease. It is so well settled as to be almost axiomatic that a surrender of premises is created by operation of law when the parties to a lease do some act so inconsistent with the subsisting relation of landlord and tenant as to imply that they have both agreed to consider the surrender as made. It has been held in this state that "a surrender is implied, and so effected by operation of law within the statute, when another *395 estate is created by the reversioner or remainderman with the assent of the termor incompatible with the existing state or term." (Coe v. Hobby, 72 N.Y. 145.) The existence of this rule has been recognized in this state in Bedford v. Terhune (30 N.Y. 463), Smith v. Kerr (108 N.Y. 36), Underhill v.Collins (132 N.Y. 271), and in other jurisdictions in Beall v. White (94 U.S. 389), Amory v. Kannoffsky (117 Mass. 351), Thomas v. Cook (2 Barn. Ald. 119), Nickells v.Atherstone (10 Ad. El. N.R. 944), Lyon v. Reed (13 M. W. 306), and Washburn on Real Property (v. 1, pp. 477, 478). It is conceded that defendant's offer of surrender was declined by the plaintiff, and that after the defendant's abandonment of the premises the plaintiff relet the same in his own name to one Mary Ann Keogh for a term of three years and five months. Such a situation, unqualified by other conditions, would create a surrender by operation of law. We must, therefore, ascertain whether the conduct of the parties takes this case out of the operation of this rule.

It is urged by the learned counsel for the plaintiff that the reletting was done with the consent of the defendant under circumstances which bring the case directly within the rule laid down by Judge HAIGHT in Underhill v. Collins (132 N.Y. 270). In that case the landlord and tenant had a conversation a few days before the latter vacated the premises. The tenant asked the landlord to take the same off his hands. This the landlord declined to do, insisting that he would hold the tenant for the rent and would lease the premises for his benefit. In the case at bar there was also a conversation before the premises were vacated; but in this conversation there was nothing said about a reletting. The plaintiff simply said that he would hold the defendant for the rent. On the 2d of November, 1893, a day or two after defendant's removal, the plaintiff received the keys of the premises. He returned them with a note stating that he would relet on defendant's account and hold it responsible for any loss that may be sustained. To this note the defendant made no reply. On the 17th of November, 1893, the plaintiff and his son *396 went to Kingston and saw Kaufman and Spore. In the conversation which took place between them and the plaintiff there was no suggestion of reletting. The plaintiff made a demand for the rent which was unpaid, and the defendant made an offer of compromise, under which it agreed to take the cellar of said premises at fifty dollars per month if the plaintiff would cancel the lease as to the store. This offer the plaintiff agreed to consider. On the 27th of November, 1893, the plaintiff wrote to the defendant that he had an offer for the store of $1,500 per year to the first of the next ensuing May, and $1,600 per year for three years thereafter. He requested the defendant to let him know if it would keep the cellar and pay the difference between the rent fixed by the lease and the amount offered by the intending tenant. To this letter the defendant made no reply. It will be observed from this brief resumé of the facts that there are several distinct features in which this case differs from theUnderhill case. In the latter case there was a personal interview before the tenant had vacated, in which the subject of reletting the premises was discussed. Here the subject of reletting was not mentioned until after the tenant went out, and then the suggestion came in a letter to which the defendant made no reply. Obviously the only theory upon which defendant can be held to have assented to the reletting of the premises is that by its silence it acquiesced in the act of the plaintiff. We may assume, although we do not decide, that if the communications upon the subject of reletting had been made verbally in the course of conversation between the parties, even after the tenant had vacated the premises, the rule as to agreements by implication laid down in the Underhill case might be held to apply. But here, as we have seen, the landlord's proposal to relet was in the form of two letters. In the first of these, dated November 3rd, he makes the unequivocal assertion that he will let the premises on defendant's account, and will hold it for any loss that may be sustained. Defendant's failure to reply to this letter is followed by a personal interview on the 17th of November, in which there is no reference to a *397 reletting of the premises, and in which defendant's president, after denying any liability for rent, tells the plaintiff to do what he likes with the premises. Then follows the letter of November 27th, informing the defendant of the offer which the plaintiff had received from an intending tenant, and asking defendant if it would pay the difference between the amount offered and the rent reserved in the original lease. It will be observed that, even if we were to give these written communications the same force and effect as verbal statements made in personal interviews between the parties, the facts here are easily differentiated from those in the Underhill case. There the tenant vacated the premises upon the offer of the landlord to relet for his benefit and under such circumstances as to permit the inference that he accepted the offer. Here the landlord's statement to that effect, made after the tenant's abandonment of the premises, is followed by negotiations in which the tenant expresses a willingness to keep the cellar at fifty dollars per month if the landlord will cancel the lease as to the rest of the premises. These steps are succeeded by a communication from the landlord, in which he requests the tenant to decide whether it will keep the cellar and pay the deficit which will arise by an acceptance of the offer which the former then had under consideration. It may well be doubted whether verbal declarations made in personal interviews between the parties, under the circumstances above narrated, would support the plaintiff's theory of this action. To create a contract by implication there must be an unequivocal and unqualified assertion of a right by one of the parties, and such silence by the other as to support the legal inference of his acquiescence. But it is clear, both upon principle and authority, that we have no right to indulge in the assumption that the letters above referred to have the force and effect of verbal statements made in the presence of the defendant's officers. The rule is precisely to the contrary. It is well expressed in Learned v.Tillotson (97 N.Y. 12) as follows: "We think that a distinction exists between the effect to be given to oral declarations made by one party to another, *398 which are in answer to or contradictory of some statement made by the other party, and a written statement in a letter written by such party to another. It may well be that under most circumstances what is said to a man to his face, which conveys the idea of an obligation upon his part to the person addressing him, or on whose behalf the statement is made, he is at least in some measure called upon to contradict or explain; but a failure to answer a letter is entirely different, and there is no rule of law which requires a person to enter into a correspondence with another in reference to a matter in dispute between them, or which holds that silence should be regarded as an admission against the party to whom the letter is addressed. Such a rule would enable one party to obtain an advantage over another and has no sanction in the law." To the same effect are Bank ofB.N.A. v. Delafield (126 N.Y. 418) and Thomas v. Gage (141 N.Y. 506).

It is manifest, therefore, that the act of the plaintiff in reletting said premises under the circumstances referred to operated as an acceptance of the defendant's offer to surrender. The judgment herein can be supported upon no theory that is consistent with the established rules of law. As the views above expressed are decisive of the case, it is unnecessary to discuss the other questions raised by the defendant.

The judgment of the court below should be reversed and a new trial granted, with costs to abide the event.

Dissenting Opinion

The trial court found as facts that "Plaintiff refused to accept a surrender of the premises, and did not accept it, and the premises were at no time surrendered to the plaintiff. The letting of the premises was done with the assent of the defendant." The order of affirmance by the Appellate Division does not state that it was unanimous, but that is not important here, for the record contains evidence tending to support the findings. The evidence tends to show that the defendant intended by its conduct to threaten the plaintiff with the loss of his rent, and thus to coerce him to relet the premises, and then deny its *399 assent, notwithstanding after its receipt of the plaintiff's first letter, it told the plaintiff he could do as he liked with the premises. The defendant thus replied to the plaintiff's letter, at least so the trial court, in view of all the circumstances, might find, and did find.

PARKER, Ch. J., GRAY, O'BRIEN and HAIGHT, JJ., concur with WERNER, J., for reversal; LANDON, J., reads dissenting memorandum; CULLEN, J., not sitting.

Judgment reversed, etc.