14 F. 83 | U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Western Missouri | 1882
1. The court finds from the evidence that the deeds from Sweeny to Sullivan, from Sweeny to DeBow, and from DeBow to Bowen, mentioned in the bill, were not executed as they purport to have been by the respective grantors, but were forged, and upon the fact so found the court holds as matter of law that the purchasers from the grantees in said deeds acquired no title which a court of equity can protect. Sampeyreac v. U. S. 7 Pet. 222.
2. As to several of the tracts of land claimed by complainants, the point is made that they are not described in the certificates of location, which are the foundation of the action. The point is well taken and must be sustained. The complainants must make out their case by positive competent proof, and this is not done by showing that defendants have no title. A certificate of location, calling for land in section 20, does not entitle the holder to a decree for land in section 21; nor will a certificate, calling for the W. of a particular tract, support a claim for the E. J of the same tract. There is no mistake apparent upon the face of the certificates, much less anything to show that some other and different tract was intended; and there is no allegation or mistake in the bill, and no prayer for relief on that ground, or by way of reformation of the instruments. There is nothing on the face of the papers to put a purchaser of property not de
3. As to all the lands correctly described in the certificates of location, the assignment of the certificates by the locator, Sweeny, to James S. Phelps vested in the latter all the right, title, and interest of the former, so that when the patents were subsequently issued in the name of Sweeny, he took in trust for the owners of the equitable title. A certificate of entry or location under a military land-warrant vests in the holder an equitable title to the land, and gives him a right to the patent when issued. If the holder of such a certificate conveys the land, or assigns the certificate, before the patent issues, and a patent is afterwards issued to him, he becomes, upon the plainest principles of equity, a trustee for the person to whom he had previously sold or assigned. By statute all warrants for military bounty land, and all valid certificates of the same, were made assignable, “so as to vest the assignee with all the rights of the original owner of the warrant or location.” Rev. St. § 2414. Sweeny had made a location and entry of the land-warrants held by him, which vested the equitable title in him and entitled him to the patent. Wirth v. Branson, 98 U. S. 121. And under the statute, as well as upon general principles, the assignee of the certificates succeeded to all Sweeny’s equities, and when the patents issued in Sweeny’s name he took in trust for his assignee. Landis v. Brant, 10 How. 348; Massey v. Papin, 24 How. 362; Moore v. Maxwell, 18 Ark. 469; Key v. Jennings, 66 Mo. 366.
4. The equitable title is in complainants and Stephen E. Jones, assignee in bankruptcy of James S. Phelps. The proof shows that the land was purchased and paid for by complainants and said Phelps, and the interests of the several parties, as established by decree of the United States district court for the district of Kentucky in the year 1872, (which, as between the parties, must be taken as final,) is as follows: The heirs of Young are entitled to one-half, S. M. Bernard to one-fourth, and Stephen E. Jones, assignee, to one-fourth. The parties are therefore entitled to recover in these proportions, unless the respondents have succeeded in establishing a good defense.
6. It is insisted that the complainants are barred by the statute of limitations or by laches, and that the respondent Stephen E. Jones, assignee, is barred by the two-years’limitation provided by section 5057 of the Revised Statutes of the United States. Some of the patents were
6. Whether said assignee is barred by the provisions of said section 5057 of the Revised Statutes which bars a recovery by an assignee in bankruptcy unless suit be brought “within two years from the time when the cause of action accrued.” The same rule prevails under this statute as under the general statute of limitations, — the cause of action is deemed to have accrued when the hostile claim is asserted by adverse possession. Banks v. Ogden, 2 Wall. 57. It is admitted that the lands claimed by defendant Allen in Holt county were held by him adversely for more than two years prior to the commencement of this suit. As to those lands, therefore, the right of action of the assignee is clearly barred. As to the lands claimed by defendant Musser there was clearly no adverse possession prior to July, 1879, which was less than two years prior to the commencement of this suit. There is no evidence of adverse possession of the lands claimed by the other defendants, and it follows that, as to all the lands except those claimed by defendant Allen, the defense of the two-years’.statute of limitation fails.
7. It is insisted that the bill should be dismissed for the reason that the complainants cannot maintain this action unless they are in the lawful and peaceful possession of the land sought to be recovered. The doctrine here sought to be invoked has no application to the case. The complainants, holding the equitable title, bring their bill to compel a conveyance of the legal title by those who hold it in trust for them. In such a case the jurisdiction in no wise depends upon possession. Branch v. Mitchell, 24 Ark. 431; Smith v. Orton, 21 How. 241.