Onе of the questions raised arises from the fact that in the judgment of divorce the court both provided for a final division of estate between the parties and granted the wife alimony. For many years the law in this state was that when the provision made in a judgment of divorce for the wife was a division of property, such рrovision excluded the possibility of any allowance to her for alimony, and that any provision for alimony in addition to the final distribution of estate should be trеated, as a nullity.
Wacker v. Wacker
(1929),
The apparent inconsistency between sec. 247.26 and sec. 247.32, Stats., disappears if the restriction in the lаst sentence of the latter section, reading: “But when a final division of the property shall have beеn made under the provisions of section
*287
247.26 no other provisions shall be thereafter made for the wife,” is applied only to the portion of the judgment whiсh provides for a division of estate. The two seсtions may then be read together and each hаve the effect the legislature was intending to seсure in changing the structure of sec. 247.26 from the disjunctive to the conjunctive. In other words, although a judgment may now include both types of provisions, a judgment providing оnly for final division of property may not thereafter be modified to substitute therefor or ft} include therein a provision for alimony.
Riedel v. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co.
(1933)
The record discloses that the property assigned to respondent was property advanced by her father, and that аppellant at the time of the divorce agreed that it was to be returned, and further stipulated to pay $50 a month as alimony. This allowance was reduсed about a year later to the sum of $25 a month. Thе respondent is earning $85 a month and appellant $175. We cannot under the circumstances now before us say that the allowance of $25 a month is presently so excessive as to require a revision.
By the Court. — Order affirmed.