48 W. Va. 164 | W. Va. | 1900
M. L. Gray on the 10th day of December, 1897, filed her hill in the circuit court of Kanawha County against the Baltimore Building and Loan Association, alleging that she borrowed the sum of eight hundred dollars from siich association on the 8th day of March, 1895, and the association for the pur-‘ pose of evading the usury laws required her as a mere shift and device, to become the ostensible owner of eight shares of stock in such association of the par value of one hundred dollars each and execute a bond and a deed of trust on her property to secure the same. She was also required to pay fifty cents each per month for dues, interest and premiums per share, and ten cents per month per share for expense fund, making her monthly payments twelve dollars and eighty cents, in addition to one dollar per share as a preliminary tee. On failure to pay up her clues, interest and premium, the whole sum was to become clue and her property liable to sale. That she paid into the association the sum of one hundred and thirty-two dollars and interest to March 30, 1896, and stopped pajdng when the association claimed a balance due from her of nine hunclerd and thirty dollars and forty-five cents, and had her property advertised for sale the 11th day of December, 1897. She prayed an injunction, and that the claim be purged of its usury. The injunction was granted, the defendant appeared and demurred to the bill. The circuit court sustained the demurrer, and dismissed her bill, and thereupon she appealed.
The sole question presented to this Court is as to whether the circuit court erred in sustaining such demurrer. The defendant insists that while the bill alleges that the plaintiff was only an ordinary borrower and the whole transaction was under a building form merely as a device to evade the usury laws,- that the exhibits filed clearly refute this allegation, and show the bona fides of the transaction as the usual, ordinary building association arrangement exempted from the operation of the statutes against usury. The association is a corporation of Maryland doing business through agents in this State, and ordinarily its contacts between itself and stockholders would be subject to the laws of Maryland, at least to the extent they are not repugnant to the laws of this State. It has been held by the court of appeals of Maryland that to exempt building associations from
Since writing the foregoing I have been furnished the decision of the court of appeals of Maryland in the case of White v. Williams, assignee of this same defendant, holding that prior to chapter 321, Acts of the Legislature of Maryland, 1894, in effect April 6, 1894, that to fix the premium in shape of a percentage was usurious, thus adhering to the case of Geiger v. The Eighth Ger. Building Association, cited. The court did not pass on the effect the act would have on cases arising after its passage,
It is eminently proper in this case that the laws of Maryland should prevail, as they are in no wise repugnant to the laws of this State, and all borrowers and share-holders of such association should be placed on the same footing, and only required to settle with the association on the same basis. Nor could a different conclusion be reached under the statutes of this State. Section 26, chapter 54, Code, provides that, “Every such association shall have the power to provide by its by-laws for selling to the stock-holders who shall bid the highest premium therefor the money in the treasury, or in defualt of bidders at or above a Trnm'rmrm premium, may award to a member the value of any
The question then being whether the association had the’right to fix a minimum premium to be paid in installments, the answer was in the affirmative. ’ The present question is, has the association the right to fix a minimum premium at a certain percentage on the amount borrowed payable indefinitely at fixed periods? In other words, under the name of premium to increase the rate of interest ? If such is the case the association could not be guilty of taking usury, it matters not how high its rate of interest might be fixed so the word “premium” is substituted for the word “interest.” To demand twelve per centum interest would be usury, but to demand six per cent, interest and six per cent, premium would not be usury. Such an evasion is too transparent to escape condemnation, and cannot for a moment be upheld. And if there is any language in the Archer case that
The decree is reversed, and the demurrer to the bill is overruled and the cause remanded.
Reversed.