122 Ga. 342 | Ga. | 1905
It remains now to dispose of that ground of the motion to dismiss which alleges that this was the second bill of exceptions signed by the judge in this case. When the judge has signed a bill of exceptions in a case, he has exhausted his statutory power with reference thereto so far as concerns the party tendering the bill of exceptions; he can not subsequently certify another bill of exceptions at the instance of that party. Perry v. Central Rail
.No sound reason occurs to us why this rule should not be applicable to cases of trespass in cutting timber. Indeed, it was held in Griffin v. Sketoe, 30 Ga. 300, that “ Injunction is a proper remedy to stay waste in cutting down and selling from the lot the valuable timber thereof.” In the present case the defendant had been for some time cutting the timber. It stood squarely upon a supposed right to do so. It threatened to continue to cut the timber from day to day until lawfully prevented from so doing. An action at law for damages would have been a complete remedy for the injury sustained prior to the suit, but it would not have prevented further trespasses. Ought the plaintiff to be harassed and annoyed by being required to bring a new suit every day as long as the trespasses continued, when the whole controversy could be settled in one suit ? As has been shown above, the code expressly authorizes the judge, in his discretion, to grant an injunction to restrain a trespass in any case where under equi
It follows from what has been said, that the judge properly granted an injunction as to the cutting of cypress timber upon the land described in the Timmons lease, but that he erred in enjoin
Judgment, on bill of exceptions sued out by the Gray Lumber Go., affirmed in part, and in part reversed ; the other hill of exceptions dismissed.