Aрpellant was charged with first degree murder pursuant to Ind. Code § 85-13-4-1 (Burns Code Edition) repealed effective October 1, 1977. He was found guilty of second degree murder in the shooting death of one Charles Rilеy following a trial in Marion Criminal Court, Division One, and sentenced to fifteen to twenty-five years. Permission was granted for the filing of a belated motion to correct errors and this appeal follows thе overruling of the belated motion to correct errors. Appellant raises four issues:
(1) Sufficiency of the evidence that appellant fired the fatal shot and did so with the intention to kill.
(2) Failure оf the trial court to sustain an objection to a question posed by the prosecutor.
(3) Admissibility of three photographs of the victim.
(4) Admissibility of a spent bullet and two shell casings.
(1)
The evidence tending to support the verdict of guilty may be summarized. The State's witness Williams testified that on the аfternoon of September 15, 1975, he was present in the hallway of the Shalimar Club near the corner of 22nd Street. and Central Avenue in Indianapolis when he overheard appellant Graves say thаt he was going to stick Riley up for some stuff and money. State's witnesses Calvins and Huston testified that at about midnight on the 15th they were driving north on New Jersey Street near the corner of 22nd and Central when they observеd appellant and Riley standing on the right hand side of the street adjacent to a vacant lot arguing. As they passed by the two men, two shots rang out and Riley fell into the street. Appellant ran off a short distance then returned and bent over Riley searching his pockets. He was then seen holding something in his hand. Appellant then ran across the street, stopped behind a car which was parked undеr a street light, and peered out at Calvins and Huston who had stopped their car when the shots were fired and backed up to give aid to the fallen Riley. Calvins and Huston got a good view of apрellant as he peered out from behind the car under the street light. Appellant then ran from the scene. A police officer, having also heard the shots, arrived on the scene moments lаter. Two spent .832 caliber cartridges and a slug were found in the vicinity of the wounded Riley. He died of a gunshot wound to the back of the head.
The State's witness Williams testified further that he had seen appellant and Riley together near the corner two hours be *141 fore the shooting, that appellant carried a pistol all the time, and that three or four days after the shooting appellant told him that he had shot Riley but that it had been an accident.
Appellant complains that the evidence is insufficient to sustain a verdict of guilty of second degree murder. As a reviewing court we do not weigh the evidence nor resolve questions of credibility but look to the evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom which support the verdict. Smith v. State, (1970)
The crime of second degree murder was defined as follows:
"Whoever, purposely and maliciously, but without premeditation, kills any human being, is guilty of murder in the second degree .." Ind. Code § 35-1-54-1.
Appellant complains that there was insufficient evidence that he fired the fatal shot or that the fatal shot was fired intentionally. There was no direct testimony that appellant fired a gun at the shooting site or that he was seen with gun in hand at the time. However, the state did present cireumstan-tial evidence tending to prove the elements of the crime as charged, and such evidence can warrant an inference of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Bruce v. Stаte, (1978) Ind.,
(2)
During direct examination by the trial prosеcutor the witness Williams testified that appellant had admitted killing Riley, but the witness added in apparent surprise to the prosecutor that appellant had also stated that the killing had been an accident. Thereupon the following occurred:
"Q. How come you didn't tell Sergeant Ohrberg that he thought it was an accident?
A. I did tell him that.
Q. Not according to your statement.
Mr. Alsip: Judge, this is the prosecutor's witness, I don't think he ought to be allowed to confuse him.
The Court: Is that an objection?
Mr. Alsip: That is an objection, yes.
The Court: It will be overruled."
Here the trial court was called upon to deal with the specific objection posed. Howard
*142
v. State, (1921)
(8)
State's exhibits numbered 8, 9, and 12 consisted of three photographs of the naked corpse of Charles Riley at thе morgue in its natural state. Number 9 shows the wound to the back of the head where the fatal bullet entered. Number 8 and number 12 show the wound beneath the chin where the bullet exited. Appellant's objection to the introduction of these photographs was overruled. In Brandon v. State, (1978) Ind.,
"Without a clear showing of prejudicial imbalance between relevance on the one hand and the tendency to appeal to passion and prejudice on the other, the trial court's determination will nоt be disturbed."374 N.E.2d at 507 .
These photographs were relevant as aiding in proof of the identity of the victim, the fact of death, the cause of death, the distance from which the fatal shot had been fired, the intent with which the shot was fired, and the fact that the slug did not lodge in the body but passed through it. The tendency of the photographs on the other hand to inflame the passions of the jury to the detriment of the аccused was minimal for such photographs as the body had not yet been subjected to any alterations by an autopsy and was not posed in any manner which would create an inordinate or gratuitous sympathy for the victim. There was no prejudicial imbalance between the relevance of the photographs and their tendency to appeal to passion and prеjudice. Their admission over the objection made was not error.
(4)
State's exhibits 5, 6 and 7 consisted of a spent .82 caliber slug and two spent .82 caliber shell casings found in the street near the body of Charles Riley. Appellant's objection on relevancy grounds was overruled. Appellant points to the following colloquy regarding the exhibits as indicative of the absence of any link between the еxhibits and the crime or the accused.
"Q. You don't have any knowledge of where their things came from or whether they are even connected with this case, do you?
A. No sir."
This isolated question and answer dоes not have the effect contended for by appellant. The witness did know and testify that the exhibits came from the location where the body of Riley was found and where there had just been a shоoting. Two shots had been reported and appellant was then present under the circumstances summarized above. The cause of death was determined to be a bullet 'passing through the head.
"Relevancy is the tendency of the evidence to establish a material proposition." McCormick, Evidence, § 185.
In Magley v. State, supra, we said:
"The fact that a piece of evidence makes an inference slightly more probable suffices to show its relevance."263 Ind. at 641 ,335 N.E.2d at 825 .
The exhibits were therefore relevant as forming a link in the chain of cireumstan-tial evidence tending to establish the material proрosition that appellant fired his *143 handgun striking Charles Riley, and supporting the inference that he did so consciously and deliberately. There was no error in admitting these exhibits over the objection made.
The conviction is affirmed.