5 Mont. 556 | Mont. | 1885
This action was originally brought in the justice court of Meagher county. The facts were as follows, viz.: The complaint — after alleging in substance that the appellant is now, and was at the time of the injury complained of, a corporation organized under the laws of the United States, and the owner of a certain railroad running through the territory of Montana and a portion of Meagher county, in said territory; and that the respondent was the owner of a certain mare, of the value of $160, running in an inclosure adjoining the track and ground occupied by the railroad of the appellant, in-the county of Meagher; and that on or about the 7th day of October, 1883, without the fault or neglect of the respondent, the said mare strayed upon the ground occupied by the railroad of the appellant; and that the appellant, at the time and place above stated, so carelessly and negligently run its locomotives and cars that the same ran over the mare and killed her, to the damage of the respondent in the sum of $160 — contains the following averment:
“That heretofore, to wit, on the 12th day of October,
The answer was in substance as follows: It denies that the respondent was the owner of the mare, or that she was of any greater value than $80, or that it was through the negligence of the appellant that she was killed, or that she strayed upon the railroad without the fault of the respondent. It affirmatively alleges that the animal was killed through the fault and negligence of the respondent in permitting it to depasture in a field through which the appellant’s railroad runs, which was not fenced, so as to prevent it from straying upon the track; and that it was while the appellant was carefully operating its road, and running locomotives and cars' thereon, as it might lawfully do, that the animal strayed upon the track of the appellant, and in consequence-thereof, and without the fault or negligence of appellant, was accidentally run over and killed.
The replication denied that the animal was killed through any negligence of the respondent. It admits that the inclosure was not fenced at the railroad, and
Judgment was rendered in the justice court against the appellant, and in favor of the respondent, for the sum claimed in the complaint and the costs of suit. Prom that judgment there was an appeal to the district court, which, upon motion of the respondent for judgment on the pleadings for the sum claimed in the complaint, rendered judgment for said sum, with costs. Prom that judgment there is this appeal.
The questions presented relate to the validity of the act of the legislature mentioned in the complaint. The provisions of this law, necessary to be stated, are as follows: The first section of this act makes railroad companies operating any railroad in the territory liable for damages for damaging or killing any domestic animal by running its engines or cars over or against said animal. Section second was amended so as to read as follows:
“ If the owner of the animal or animals so killed, or his or her authorized agent, shall make affidavit before some officer authorized to administer oaths, that he or she was the owner or authorized agent of the owner of the recorded brand found upon the animal or animals so damaged or killed at the time of such killing or damaging, and such person shall, within six months after such killing or damaging, deliver such affidavit to the agent or an officer of such company or corporation, or shall make affidavit that the animal damaged or killed as aforesaid had no recorded mark or brands, and that he or she is the owner of such animal, describing it; and
It will be observed that the animal alleged to be killed in this case did not belong to any of the classes set forth in the above schedule. Also, that the pleadings show that, before the commencement of the action, the respondent had complied with the provisions of the above law relative to the appointment of appraisers; and that said appraisers had assessed the value of the animal alleged to be killed, and fixed the value thereof at $160. The section of the law under which the appraisers were appointed provides that “the findings of such appraisers shall be taken and held to be conclusive evidence of the value and ownership of, and injury to, such stock.” The court in rendering judgment upon the pleadings must have done so in pursuance of this law, for the value of the animal alleged in the complaint was denied in the answer. The law prevents the railroad company from exercising its right of appeal from the findings of the appraisers; thus depriving it of the right of trial, by jury. This provision of the law in relation to the appointment of appraisers is not in accordance with the constitution and laws of the United States, and is, therefore, invalid.
The judgment is reversed, with costs, and the cause remanded for a new trial.
Judgment reversed.