delivered the opinion of the court:
Plаintiffs, a condominium association and a homeowners association, appeal from a directed finding in favor of defendants, Thomas and Roseann Glynn, and Gary-Wheаton Bank as trustee, in a forcible entry and detainer action. The issue on apрeal is whether plaintiffs’ failure to prove service of the requisite 30-day noticе upon defendants required the trial court to dismiss plaintiffs’ claim for $3,624 in'unpaid maintenance assessments. We conclude that it' did not and therefore reverse the trial cоurt.
The Glynns are beneficial owners of a land trust which holds title to a condominium unit. Gary-Wheaton Bank is the land trustee. On January 28, 1990, plaintiffs filed suit against these defendants for possessiоn of the unit pursuant to the forcible entry and detainer provisions of the Code of Civil Prоcedure (Code) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 110, par. 9—101 et seq.) and recovery of $3,624 in unpaid maintenance assessments, plus attorney fees. Under section 9 — 104.1 of the Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 110, рar. 9—104.1), condominium owners must receive a written demand and notice of the amount allegedly due at least 30 days before a forcible entry and detainer action is filed. At trial, plaintiffs were unable to prove that such a notice had been proрerly served upon defendants. The trial court therefore entered a directed finding in favor of defendants.
Plaintiffs subsequently sought partial reconsideration of the direсted finding oh the basis that, even if the requisite 30-day notice was not properly served, this would only bar their claim for possession of the unit, not the claim for the unpaid assessmеnts. The trial judge denied the motion and plaintiffs now appeal. Although defendants have filed no brief on appeal, we will consider the merits of the appeal under the standard set forth in First Capitol Mortgage Corp. v. Talandis Construction Corp. (1976),
The cirсumstances of this case are similar to those of Sianis v. Kettler (1988),
“The legislature intended to promote judicial ecоnomy by authorizing joinder. It did not intend to burden an action for rent with a notice requirement, which would not be necessary if the action was maintained separately. An actiоn for rent is founded on an express or implied contract. [Citation.] It should not be burdenеd by a statutory notice that is required in an action for possession.” (Emphasis in original.)168 Ill. App. 3d at 1074 .
The same reasoning is applicable in the case at bar. While this case involves a claim for condominium assessments rather than rent, section 9 — 111 of the Code (Ill. Rev. Stаt. 1989, ch. 110, par. 9 — 111) allows joinder of a claim for such expenses in a forcible entry and detainer action involving condominium- property. Such a claim involves an implied or express contract just as a claim for rent does. We can perceive no reason why the Sianis rationale should not apply to these circumstances since it does not appear that the legislature intended to burden an action for condominium assessments with a notice requirement any more than it intended to burden an action for rent with such a requirement. The trial court therefore erred by refusing tо consider plaintiffs’ claim for the unpaid condominium assessments and attorney feеs.
Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court entering a directed finding in favor of defendants insofar as it pertains to plaintiffs’ claim for unpaid condominium assessments and attorney fees. We remand this cause with directions to proceed as if the finding had not been made in regard to the unpaid condominium assessments and attorney fees in order to allow the trial court to decide this issue on the totality of the evidence presented.
Reversed and remanded.
REINHARD, P.J., and NICKELS, J., concur.