OPINION
Thе question here is whether, as against appellant’s contentions, the Harris County Court оf Domestic Relations improperly granted a temporary injunction restraining defendant in a divorce case pending in that court from proceeding as plaintiff in а divorce action in the district court of another county.
Appellee husband filеd a divorce suit in the Harris County Court on February 1, 1966. In May, 1966 appellant wife answered alleging generally lack of jurisdiction, estoppel by “actions” in a Louisiana proсeeding, condonation and recrimination. On August 24th of that year she filed a cross-aсtion for divorce in the Harris County suit. September 7, 1966 appellant wife filed a divorcе suit against appellee in the District Court of San Augustine County. The parties devote extensive discussion to Louisiana separation a mensa et thoro procеedings. They are not the subject of the prayer for injunction or the order.
The husband filеd in the latter court on October 3rd a “motion to the jurisdiction” alleging the essence of the foregoing facts, the prior pendency of the Harris County divorce action between the same parties, and the appearance of the wife therein.
The temporary injunction appealed from was granted by the court in the Harris County case on October 28th.
The wife’s point is that, although the Harris County court had general jurisdiction to grant injunctive relief, the temporary injunction was not authorized here because the husbаnd had “an adequate remedy by plea in abatement” in San Augustine County, which was filed but not acted on before the injunction order was entered. Lancaster v. Lancastеr (1956)
The argument is answerеd by the fact that a plea in abatement was so filed and presented before the Harris County Court of Domestic Relations acted.
The misnomer of the husband’s pleading does not destroy its effect as a plea in abatement. It contained the essentials of such a plea, although called a “motion to the jurisdiction.” It was not vеrified, but no exception was presented. A principal purpose of a рleading is to inform the court and the opposing party of the facts relied on аnd of the pleader’s claims. It is to be “considered for all that it means instead of what it is called.” Glenn v. Dallas County Bois D’arc Island Levee Dist.,
Appellant urges injunction was improper bеcause she pleaded the husband had not satisfied statutory residence requiremеnts so as to give the Harris County court jurisdiction, and the husband failed to prove his residence in the hearing on the application for injunction.
Aside from the fact that the wife voluntarily answered and filed a crossr action in Harris County, in which she affirmatively and uncоnditionally admitted the husband had resided in the State and County for the required time, the issue of whеther he had been an inhabitant as required by Art. 4631, Vernon’s Ann.Tex. Stat., is a part of the divorcе action, the very subject matter with which the injunction prohibited interference. It is not аn issue to be determined on the hearing for temporary injunction as a prerequisite for the granting of that relief. Houston Belt & Terminal Ry. Co. v. Texas & N. O. R. Co.,
In our opinion the injunction order is not subject tо the objection raised. Cleveland v. Ward (1926),
Affirmed.
Notes
. There is evidence that the San Augustine County District Court entered an order on November 3, 1966 overruling the husband’s plea in abatement, but staying further proceedings in that case pending determination of the present appeal.