224 Wis. 654 | Wis. | 1937
On this appeal the plaintiff George F. Grasser, as special administrator of the estate of Lucy M. Grasser, deceased, contends that the court erred in changing certain answers of a special verdict and then erred in so far as its judgment, entered upon the verdict as changed, dismissed the plaintiff’s cause of action, under secs. 331.03 and 331.04, Stats., for damages for the death of the deceased by wrongful act; and also denied recovery for hospital, medical, and burial expenses, and the perpetual care of a cemetery lot, as damages sustained by the estate of the deceased.
All of the damages in question were sustained as the result of a collision at 11:30 p. m. on May 29, 1936, between automobiles operated by George F. Grasser and the
The jury found that the collision was caused by Anderson’s negligence as to speed, lookout, management, and con
The primary question on this appeal is whether the court erred in substituting its determination that Anderson was not negligent, in respect to yielding the right of way, for the jury’s finding that he was. The latter’s finding on that issue was clearly inconsistent with its finding that there was also causal negligence on the part of Grasser in not yielding the right of way. Both findings could not be approved. But could the court hold, as a matter of law, — in view of facts established by uncontradicted evidence, together with facts specifically found by the jury in findings which, upon ap
“. . . The driver of a vehicle approaching but not having entered an intersection shall yield the right of way to a vehicle within such intersection and turning therein to the left across the line of travel of such first-mentioned vehicle; provided, the driver of the vehicle turning left has given a plainly visible signal of intention to turn as aforesaid.”
That requires a driver who intends to turn left to give, even though he is first in the intersection, a plainly visible signal of his intention to turn to his left, in order to be entitled to have an approaching driver, who has not entered the intersection, yield the right of way. In other words, in so far as that provision is concerned, even though the approaching driver has not entered the intersection, he is not required to yield the right of way to another who first entered the intersection and then makes a left turn, if the latter has not given a plainly visible signal of his intention to turn to his left. The “plainly visible signal” required by that provision is evidently a signal by a motion of the hand, or which in some other manner unequivocably indicates the intention to turn to the left. That Grasser gave no such signal is undisputed. Merely fluctuating rays of his headlights as he may have turned somewhat toward his right or left were insufficient, under the evidence herein, to constitute the plainly visible signal required under sec. 85.18 (1), Stats., Consequently, in so far as there was no compliance by Grasser with
“The operator of a vehicle within an intersection intending to turn to the left across the path of any vehicle approaching from the opposite direction, may make such left turn where it is permitted only after affording a reasonable opportunity to the operator of such vehicle to avoid a collision.” (Substantially the same as sec. 23.13 (2), Ordinances of Kenosha.)
In view of that provision, Grasser should not have turned left into the west lane until after he had afforded Anderson, as the driver of an approaching car, a reasonable opportunity to avoid a collision, upon realizing that Grasser would enter the pathway of Anderson’s approaching automobile in that lane. In other words, because of Grasser’s failure to first give Anderson a plainly visible signal of his intention to turn left into the latter’s pathway, Grasser was entitled to make the turn only after first affording a reasonable opportunity to Anderson to avoid a collision, as he approached, under the existing and apparent circumstances. Consequently, if Gras-ser, before finally turning left to cross the west lane, did not afford Anderson the reasonable opportunity to avoid a collision, to which he was entitled, then Grasser’s failure in that respect was the most significant and controlling ultimate fact involved in the determination of the important issue of who’ was guilty of causal negligence in respect to yielding the right of way. The conclusion that Grasser did negligently fail to afford Anderson a reasonable opportunity to avoid the collision is well warranted in view of the facts, — which were found and specifically stated by the jury on its own initiative in its verdict, — fhat, (1) Grasser was negligent in respect to lookout because he “should look before crossing
Furthermore, as Anderson was not obliged to yield the right of way, under the statutes, and as the court approved the jury’s findings that Grasser was guilty of causal negligence in respect to not yielding the right of way, to lookout because he “should look before crossing the westerly lane,” and to making the left turn “because he should have stopped before his approach to the intersection,” the court was likewise warranted in holding that the collision was attributable to Grasser’s negligence to as great an extent as it was attributable to Anderson’s negligence in relation to speed, lookout, and management and control. Even though the evidence admitted of the jury’s finding as to causal negligence in those respects on Anderson’s part, as his speed and the proximity and movements of his approaching automobile were observable by Grasser in the exercise of ordinary care, the trial court’s final determination that Grasser suddenly and “without visible sign or signal, other than the lights indicating a turning from lane to lane, . . . turned sharply to his left to enter a short crossroad . . . and directly across the path of the Anderson car,” is entirely in accord with the
Appellant also contends that the court erred in denying recovery' for the benefit of Lucy M. Grasser’s estate of amounts which were paid by George M. Grasser for his wife’s medical, hospital, and funeral expenses, and the perpetual care of the cemetery lot on which she was buried. As it appears from receipts, which are in evidence, that he personally paid the funeral expenses and perpetual-care charge, and he states in his brief that he paid all of those expenses, and as he was personally liable therefor, as a matter of law, there was no obligation on the part of his wife’s estate, because of which there could be any recovery therefor for its benefit. However, even if the husband had not personally paid those expenses, the only possible obligation on the part of the wife’s estate would be for her. funeral
By the Court. — Judgment affirmed.