85 U.S. 623 | SCOTUS | 1874
GRANT
v.
STRONG.
Supreme Court of United States.
*624 Messrs. W.A. Meloy and F. Miller, for the appellant.
Mr. W.A. Cook, contra.
Mr. Justice MILLER delivered the opinion of the court.
We have much argument in the case as to the effect of the note as a negotiable security operating as a release of the mechanic's lien. We think this has but little pertinency to the case. We admit that when a lien has once attached, the taking of such a note does not of itself operate as a release. The question whether a lien is obtained, or is displaced when it once attaches, is largely a matter of intention to be inferred from the acts of the parties and all the surrounding *625 circumstances. In the case before us, much conflicting testimony as to what was said and done by the parties, is found in the record. We need not consider this, for in our view the decision of the case must rest on the written agreements we have mentioned, and from them we are forced to the conclusion that the appellee always relied wholly upon other security than a mechanic's lien for his pay, which he deemed sufficient, and which he voluntarily agreed to surrender.
It is very clear that under the first contract, the one under which the larger part of the work was done, he was to take his pay, not in money, but in the lot on which one of the houses was built; and that to secure the completion by Grant of the sale when the work was done, the deed was made and placed in the hands of Totten. Under these circumstances no lien could accrue for the work on that, or on the other buildings. When the second contract of November 27th was made, Strong did not give up this security, but still retained and relied on it, and it was made a part of the new contract, that the escrow should remain in the hands of Totten, and should be in full force until the work was completed, measured, and the sum due on it paid by the promissory note of Grant. Now with this security in Totten's hands during all the time the work was going on, looked to and relied upon by Strong, how can it be said that Strong relied upon a mechanic's lien, or that Grant intended in addition to that deed for one lot to allow Strong to obtain a lien upon all the others? And so much reliance was placed on this escrow by Strong, that only after all was settled, the work measured and paid for, as the parties had stipulated by Grant's note, did Strong sign the order for the delivery to Grant of the deed. During this time all the facts repel the idea of a lien.
We do not think that the giving up of the escrow, and the taking of the note in its place, according to the terms of an agreement previously made, and which obviously did not look to a mechanic's lien as part of the transaction, would create a lien where none existed before.
In short, we are of opinion that these agreements show an *626 acceptance and reliance by Strong on another and very different security for the payment for his work, inconsistent with the idea of a mechanic's lien, and that no such lien ever attached in the case.
DECREE REVERSED, with directions to
DISMISS THE BILL.
Mr. Justice SWAYNE dissenting.
