Grant v. Spellman
664 P.2d 1227
Wash.
1983
Check Treatment

*1 16, 1983.] En Banc. June 47441-9. [No. Appellant, Spellman Grant, John Leon G. al, (Randall Revelle*), et Respondents. pur Spellman party John defendant was substituted as * Randall Revelle 3.2(f) County King Executive.

suant to RAP as successor *2 George Haynes Peter and Cleve of the Amer- Greenfield appellant. Foundation, ican Civil Liberties Union for Maleng, Prosecuting Attorney, Norm and Richard W. Deputy, respondents Spellman, Elliott, Senior for et al. Cassidy respondent Hafer, Burns, & Price and John Safety Employees Union, Public Local 519. Eikenberry, Attorney General,

Kenneth O. and Richard respondent Employment Heath, A. Assistant, for Public Relations Commission.

Robert W. Nixon and David R. Duncan on behalf of Seventh-Day Adventists, General Conference amici appellant. curiae for Bryant, Scully,

David T. John C. Bruce N. Cameron and Right Legal on behalf of the National To Work Defense Michael Far- Jerry B. Edmonds and Foundation, Inc., ris, appellant. amici curiae for v. Spellman, In Grant Wn.2d J.

Dolliver, held (1981), Supreme Court Washington P.2d 1071 belong to a employee requires public to claim a union dues religious body church RCW 41.56 The court ruled upon religious beliefs. free exercise of .122(1), does not violate the interpreted, Grant the First Amendment. Plaintiff religion clause of for a writ of petitioned Supreme the United States Court plaintiff's petition Supreme granted Court certiorari. court, of this certiorari, opinion vacated the for a writ of to us "for further consideration and remanded the case Larson L. Ed. U.S. light of [456 Empl. Pub. Washington Grant (1982)]." S. Ct. 1673 Comm'n, 479, 102 S. 72 L. Ed. 2d sergeant King as a employed G. Grant Leon *3 County, a Safety. King County Department of Public 41.56.030, Safety and Public "public employer" under RCW (Local 519) parties to collective Employees Local 519 the terms and conditions bargaining agreement which sets Safety of the Public employment employees for certain bargaining is included the Department. Sergeant Grant 519. represented by unit Local clause, security a union parties' The includes contract by affected bargaining members of the unit requires which union as to the periodic payments the to tender agreement does not employment. The clause a condition of continued There of Local 519. anyone to become member require membership, might flow from requirements are no which adopt unit affirm or bargaining nor must member of the to employee pay is required All that is policies. union by representing the union a share of the costs incurred per month. unit, instance $11.20 in this bargaining the nonmem- to ensure procedure 519 has a dues rebate Local to the support activities unrelated required bers are not costs of collective bargaining. security union clause provides:

[Ejmployees with a bona fide religious objection to union membership tenents or association on the bona fide and/or teachings religious body a church or employee which such to tender those required a member shall not be .

dues initiation fees to the Union . . The clause further provides employees such with may objections pay charity to a equal an amount to the required payment assessment in lieu of to the union.

Plaintiff asked Local 519 rule he came within the exemption the security union clause. Local rejected request the grounds on that plaintiff's objection to tender- money the ing union was based on the fide bona religious tenets or of a teachings body. church or religious petitioned Plaintiff then Employment the Public (PERC) Commission to direct Local his grant request. petition, denying PERC plaintiff's stated "objections personal are based beliefs" and were thus scope outside the of the found in the collective bargaining agreement.

Although suggest it does seem to to our adherence earlier interpretation of RCW would violate see Larson v. clause, supra, establishment statement on remand of this case the United States Supreme delphic Furthermore, beyond Court at best. agreement some further consideration of the case mandated, opinions parties was as to what that consideration should were entail varied and con- tradictory. go astray Rather than perhaps the uncertain- ties the First Amendment further engender Bd., see Thomas v. Review confusion, L. Ed. 2d J., S. Ct. 1425 (Rehnquist, dissent- *4 ing), prefer to decide the case on other grounds. duty of is give the court to ascertain and effect to the purpose intent and of the as Legislature, expressed Lehman, re the act. Wn.2d P.2d 948 (1980). presume legislatures integrity Courts to act with keep purpose limits. constitutional a to within and with (1964). Seattle, 503, 392 P.2d 453 v. 64 Wn.2d Tembruell every presumption interpreting statute, favors a When validity Legislature, all must doubts of an act of the support act, and it will be declared of the resolved clearly appears so. Lenci v. to be unless it unconstitutional Sands, 2A C. Seattle, 388 P.2d 926 63 Wn.2d (4th 1973). among Statutory If, ed. § 45.11 Construdion serious constructions, more would involve one or alternative doing difficulties, court, without violence constitutional reject interpretations legislative purpose, will those to the will constitu which sustain the favor of a construction Morgan tionality Kinnear, State ex rel. statute. 400, 402, 494 Wn.2d P.2d principles us we examine the statute

With these before 41.56.122(1) question. states: RCW security provisions [Agreements involving union must safeguard public employees right of nonassociation teachings religious of a on fide tenets or based church bona employee religious body public or of which such a member. susceptible apparent

It is RCW conjunctively, require meanings. If would read it two body religious public employee belong to a church or to exemption religious beliefs. If dues claim a union person disjunctively, the statute would allow read either bona dues based on claim the union (2) teachings religious tenets, of a church or fide Mary body person is a See dissent of which the member. Employment Krug, Ellen of The Public Chair Grant, Commission, of the Petition of Leon In the Matter Decision 591-A PECB. per- personal, plaintiffs the evidence is are

While beliefs they deeply beliefs. Grant also held suasive Spellman, supra disjunctive reading at 457. Under a 41.56.122(1), pay plaintiff an by authorized would be charity provided equal dues to his union amount duty uphold Bearing the consti- in mind our the statute. *5 if tutionality of a statute possible, plaintiff hold does 41.56.122(1) come under the terms of RCW and that Local by security either or rewriting reinterpreting the union clause the agreement King County, between it must and him to allow contribute his union charity. dues to a (1) Two further comments: Whether an individual is to be granted RCW exemption from a union security dependent agreement upon proof is of the bona religious fide beliefs of the individual or the religious group. Valente, See Larson v. 456 U.S. at 255 n.30. The is not history automatic. While there is some legislative to the an exemption effect that on personal religious beliefs was not contemplated Legislature, see brief of amici curiae behalf of General of Conference Sev- Adventists; enth-Day Bar- Employees Public Collective Report 1969-71 Biennial Comm., (2d gaining rev. ed. 1971), we find it not controlling, particularly view of our comments as to the presumption the valid- favoring ity and legislative of If constitutionality acts. the Legisla- ture does wish to distinguish personal between and beliefs, course, denominational religious may, it amend statute, although questions as might arise to the consti- of that action. See Larson v. tutionality supra; Bd., supra; Thomas v. Review Seeger, United States v. See also U.S. L. Ed. S. Ct. 850 Kurtzman, Lemon v. 29 L. Ed. 2d 91 S. The decision of this court in Grant v. Spellman, supra, vacated. The judgment the trial court is reversed. Plain- tiff is entitled to an exemption under the terms of RCW 41.56.122(1). JJ., and concur. Dore,

Rosellini (concurring specially) agree C.J. with the Williams, —I majority's religious exemptions uniform extension I employees regardless affiliation. believe that compelled such a conclusion both federal and state law. constitutional 41.56 original opinion interpreted its from union secu only religious exemptions

.122 granting with churches other rity persons affiliated clauses Spellman, Grant 96 Wn.2d recognizable religious groups. (1981) (Grant I). interpre this Noting 635 P.2d 1071 persons being made between tation and the distinction per from such affiliation spring whose beliefs any group, organized sons beliefs exist outside whose *6 remanded reversed and Supreme United States Court Valente, Larson 456 Grant I for action consistent with See Grant 33, 102 (1982). 228, S. U.S. 72 L. Ed. 2d Comm'n, 456 Washington Pub. Empl. U.S. (1982). 479, be L. 102 S. Ct. 2028 It should Ed. Valente only to those laws applies initially noted that one class granting preference interpreted as preference to other classes. beliefs and that same denying Valente, Court was Supreme at United States 252.1 The original interpretation the statute. bound this court's Thus, court, action, case brought this its has this own Yet, fear of Valente. for squarely within the ambit of the First Amend becoming lost the "uncertainties Valente ment", analysis. majority rejects Majority us become mired opinion, causing at 818. Rather than Valente presents a sound and eas bog, a First Amendment case. ily upon basis which to decide this More manageable Amendment issues over, First presents this case as such. importance and should addressed paramount result as Valente analysis I would reach the same Using the only I that result. majority. therefore concur Valente, enacted Legislature In the Minnesota contribu of charitable the collection legislation regulating registration rigorous contained rather tions. law granted religious later Minnesota reporting requirements. religions interpreted affording all are tested uniform benefits to 1 Statutes Kurtzman, 3-part of Lemon v. 403 U.S. constitutionality under the test S. 29 L. Ed. 2d 91 Ct. organizations receiving at percent least 50 of charitable contributions from members from these requirements. Holy Spirit Members of the Association for (Unification the Unification of Christianity Church), World which received far less than percent of its contributions members, from sued claiming that the legislation violated the establishment clause of the First Amendment. issue, deciding the the United States Supreme Court noted: "The clearest command of the Establishment Clause is that one religious denomination officially preferred cannot be Valente, Further, over another." at 244. the establishment clause is so inextricably intertwined with free exercise that equality of impossible exercise is in an atmosphere of offi- cial such, denominational preference. As long it has been established may pass that no state laws which aid one reli- one religion over another. Everson v. Board gion prefer Educ., 330 U.S. 91 L. Ed. 67 S. Ct. A.L.R. 1392 Since this freedom is so important, Valente held that governing bodies must show Court laws which distinguish religions necessary between to serve a compelling governmental interest and that narrowly statute is drawn to achieve that end. at Vincent, Widmar v. 246-47 (citing 263, 269-70, *7 440, (1981)). L. Ed. 2d See also State v. 102 S. Ct. 269 Meacham, 735, (1980). 93 Wn.2d 612 P.2d 795 Indeed in religious exemption cases there must be a close fit between preference and the interest. at 247. These same principles apply should in a labor setting.

In the interests addressing advanced regulating labor operations union religion, and a court must in 2- engage First, step process. it must determine the legitimacy of union security clauses secondly propri- determine the See ety of allowing religious exemptions from these clauses. Capitol Eng'rs State, Association Powerhouse 89 and Grant 177, 180, I, Wn.2d 570 P.2d 1042 at 461. Abood v. In step, this first upon courts have relied Educ., Detroit Bd. 209, L. 52 Ed. 2d 97 S. Abood, the Court noted that union labor- peace industrial and stabilize clauses foster security Abood, Further, such clauses at 219. relations. management confusion which so often have to avoid the been found collective attempts enforce or more from to two results terms. Because differing with bargaining agreements Abood, compel benefits, to there exists according these Thus, the United clauses. ling allowing interest for these of finan requirement that Court has held Supreme States by all who agency bargaining cial of a collective support First does not violate the of its work receive the benefits Hanson, Dep't v. Railway Employes' U.S. Amendment. 238, 100 L. Ed. 76 S. Ct. in interest compelling states have recognition that does not mean that should security union clauses recognize allowing exemp- nature of equally compelling in decision upon religion. tions based Even its first Grant, upheld exemptions for church Grant Also, I dissenting as stated in originally members. I, Legislature's evinces our intent require to "make accommodation to employers reasonable Grant (Wil- I, employees." beliefs of at 463 Yott v. North Am. Rockwell liams, J., dissenting) (citing (9th 1974)). Corp., 501 F.2d Cir. by the

Accommodating religion recognized was also Verner, in Sherbert v. Supreme United States Court (1963). There, U.S. 10 L. Ed. S. Ct. 1790 reversing rights unemployment a state's ben decision efits, modify unemploy held the Court that states must ment accommodate compensation laws order working on nontra persons religiously opposed needs of ditional sabbaths. Sherbert has been read commen one standing proposition tator "failure religion government could sub accommodate when the legitimate goals granting while reli stantially achieve its religion hostility toward exemptions gious [results in] neutrality." the essence [epitomizing] rather than Tribe, American Constitutional omitted.) (Footnote L. Sherbert then, *8 Law upon Based agree should the First Amendment commands vigilant protecting religion. State to be the freedom of way Accommodation clauses are in no diminished when security Granting used in concert with union clauses. exemptions security from clauses serves the same ends as provisions employees the clauses themselves. With such are placed having in a of situation choose reli- between gious employment beliefs and as in This Sherbert. unbur- dening religious only of conscience serve can enhance employer-employee relationships. Similarly, and stabilize exemptions peace", such "foster industrial an interest held compelling any benefits, in Abood. Because of these deci- striking exemptions religious sion down would amount to hostility religion. toward merely

But, in this case we are not to determine whether exemptions compelling. Rather are to determine County compelling whether the can show a interest for religious denying exemptions to nonchurch members. In its County suggestions brief, the offers no as to the interests it protect. arguable County However, seeks to it is that the avoiding has an interest burden administrative processing requests exemption more numerous for the avoiding spurious requests. burdens, These added imagined, rights whether real or should not affect the of the appellant Employment in this case. Public (PERC) already accepted sincerity Commission has any burden, his beliefs. As future PERC is free require would-be users of the make a fac- showing legitimacy tual of the of beliefs. requirement proof

Such a of true sentiments aptly was Kuch, handled court in United States (D.D.C. 1968). Supp. F. There, defendant, in a drug possession case, claimed to minister ordained the Neo-American Church. of the Members "church" were supposedly marijuana LSD, allowed to use "con- and other expanding" sciousness substances. She therefore moved for charges. determining dismissal all criminal whether religious beliefs, the defendant asserted true the court *9 stated: and courts delicacy is a matter of

Obviously question this own moral and permit not to their must be ever careful implications religious the ethical standards determine ... of beliefs be, it though may inquiry the Subtle and difficult . . reasons . be avoided convenience. should not for . . immunity . . society In . . those who seek complex very at least must the demonstrate religious grounds on spiritual discipline. and a ethical standards adherence to Kuch, (Italics mine.) at 443-44. More- applied by be PERC. principles

These can same against exemptions over, addressing arguments in similar Sherbert stated: in beliefs, the Court "[E]ven dilute spurious if claims did threaten to possibility the ., upon . incumbent the plainly the fund . it would be that no alternative forms body] to demonstrate [governing Sherbert, at 407. would combat such abuses". regulation County In no this case the offers such alternatives. Further, requirement factfinding of additional was this Valente. In held not to insurmountable the Court be holding grant exemption must an to the that Minnesota Church, "Nothing opin- Unification noted: in our the Court attempt compel suggests appellants ion that could not . . . register the Unification Church to under the Act the its fides put proof the Church to bona . . . . . . from organization. [N]othing disables State proved denying exemption persons organizations ... Larson v. upon public." have engaged frauds Valente, n.30, 33, 72 L. Ed. 2d 102 S. Ct. 456 U.S. 255 (1982). Also, possi- speculative arguments concerning 1673 justify should ble administrative burdens used is that constitu- of individual It well settled rights. denial for administrative protections cannot be denied tional Illinois, v. L. Ed. Stanley 2d 405 U.S. 31 expediency. (1972). S. 92 Ct. County that the has therefore conclude This court should appel- deny need to compelling to demonstrate a failed vio- thus RCW 41.56.122 and has exemption under lant lated the establishment Accordingly, clause. I would hold Valente appellant cannot be denied a religious exemption.

Apart compelled from this is court also our own constitution appel to extend the to the lant this case. instances state where constitutional language substantially from different federal constitu tional language, recognized efficacy has See granting upon independent relief based state grounds. White, State 92, 108, 97 Wn.2d P.2d See also PruneYard Shopping Robins, Ctr. v. 447 U.S. 81, 64 L. Ed. (1980); Cooper S. Ct. 2035 California, 58, 62, 17 L. Ed. 2d S. protection lesser No of religious available cases *10 constitution, 1, freedom. Unlike the federal art. 11 Const. § provides, in part: relevant Absolute freedom in of conscience all matters of reli-

gious sentiment, worship, guaranteed belief and shall be [njo every individual, to . . . qualification and shall be required any public employment or office (Italics mine). sheriff, deputy

As a the appellant is most definitely within the public employ. As this court originally inter preted 41.56.122, RCW to continue in that employment, the appellant required would have to been denounce his reli gious either joining beliefs some organization established up giving his altogether. beliefs Either of these alter natives would constitute denial the absolute freedom of conscience in guaranteed Moreover, our own constitution. since continued employment with the County condi tioned upon union membership, County the would also be placing qualification upon employment viola tion 1, of Const. art. 11. Such a violation cannot be § allowed constitution, to stand. Even under the federal which outlines minimum protection the available indi viduals, persons "may not be compelled choose between of a right exercise First Amendment participation

827 v. program." Thomas public in an otherwise available 624, Bd., 707, 716, L. 2d S. Review 67 Ed. 101 Ct. 450 U.S. pre- holding this case majority's 1425 new choice. necessity vents the such a Valente with only comports This new result not constitution, with estab keeping also and our own but concepts majority construction. As statutory lished acted "with notes, presume Legislature that keep within integrity purpose and with constitutional Tembruell (citing at 818 Majority opinion, limits." Seattle, (1964)). Stemming Wn.2d 392 P.2d 453 64 pre is the presumption legislative integrity from the Shep Seattle v. sumption that statutes are constitutional. herd, This court 93 613 P.2d 1158 Wn.2d authoritatively con presumptions has used these two constitutionally invalid. strue attacked as being statutes n.3, Distribs., Inc., See State v. J-R 584, 601 Wn.2d Reels, v. 12 United States (citing P.2d 1049 200-ft. (1973)); State L. Ed. S. Ct. (1982). Therefore, Regan, 640 P.2d 725 Wn.2d to show a failure County's though arguable it is denying appellant compelling interest for strike down this invalid, we need renders the statute construction, of authoritative statute. the principle Under 41.56.122 such may construe legitimately infirmity. The constitutional any a manner as to cure provides such a I this case cure. majority's reassessment therefore concur. *11 Brachtenbach, JJ., Pearson, Utter,

Stafford, con- Williams, C.J. cur with (concurring) agree with Chief Justice J.

Dimmick, —I except his concurrence discussion our state Williams' (concurrence, 826) at which I feel is constitution unneces- sary.