47 P. 712 | Or. | 1897
Opinion by
And the court also found, as conclusions of law, that upon the death of Nancy Williams the real property of which she died seized descended to her heirs in equal shares, and that the shares of Milton B. and Wiley C. Williams descended in equal shares to the children of Nancy Williams, and that the share of John Henry Childs therein descended, upon his death subsequent to the death of John A. Williams, to the other remaining heirs of Nancy Williams; that the statute of limitations did not begin
In Spencer v. Haug, 45 Minn. 731 (47 N. W. 794), the Supreme Court of Minnesota, in construing a statute which provided that “the time within which an act is to be done shall be computed by excluding the first day and including the last. If the last day is Sunday, it shall be excluded,” held that this section applied as well to the construction of a statute as to matters of practice, and that ten years from May 19, 1862, extended to and included May 20, 1872, the preceding day having been Sunday. So, too, in Cowan v. Donaldson, 95 Tenn.” 327 (32 S. W. 457), the Supreme Court of Tennessee, in a suit to-revive a decree, say: “Decree having been rendered November 20, 1883, a suit upon it is in time if brought November 20, 1893, under section 46, Mill. & V. Code,, which provides that the time within which any act is to-be done shall be computed by excluding the first and including the last day.” We conclude, therefore, that where the statute prescribing the method of computing time does not limit its application to any specified period, it applies to all divisions of time. Whether the day of the-happening of a certain event should be included as a basis-from which to compute time has been a' vexed question for many centuries, and in consequence of a spirited controversy as to whether it should be included or excluded, and to remove any doubt upon the subject, Gregory IX, in his decretals, introduced the phrase “a year and a day,”'
Modified.