Grant v. FarnsworthGrant v. Farnsworth
Roger W. Stone, Cedar Rapids, Iowa and David E. Brown, Iowa City, Iowa, for appellees.
Before LAY, Chief Judge, JOHN R. GIBSON, Circuit Judge, and NICHOL*, Senior District Judge.
JOHN R. GIBSON, Circuit Judge.
Joseph Grant appeals from an adverse judgment and an order awarding attorney‘s fees against him in his
On October 1, 1982, Joseph Grant attended the University of Iowa homecoming parade to protest in front of a float for Roxanne Conlin, an Iowa gubernatorial candidate at that time. While demonstrating, Grant used profanity and threatened to harm one of the parade participants. In response to a report of Grant‘s activity, Iowa City police officer Gerald Knock approached Grant and asked for identification. Officer Knock testified that Grant then swore at him and attempted to punch him. When Officer Knock attempted to arrest Grant, he violently resisted. During the struggle, Officer Knock requested the aid of Robert Farnsworth, an onlooker at the parade, in detaining Grant. Farnsworth assisted the police by helping hold Grant down until he could be handcuffed. Many witnesses testified that Grant was “out of control” and that he continued to struggle as the police removed him from the premises. Grant, however, contends that he did not take the first swing at the police officer, that he was choked to the point of losing consciousness by one of the police officers, and that the police used excessive force and acted unprofessionally during the incident.
On April 7, 1983, Grant was tried in a state court and found guilty by a jury of the misdemeanor of interfering with official acts. Eighteen months later Grant brought this section 1983 action against Farnsworth, the city of Iowa City, and several police officers, alleging violations of his first, fourth and fourteenth amendment rights. He specifically asserted that he was subjected to arrest on less than probable cause while lawfully exercising his right of expression. At the close of the evidence, the district court directed verdicts against Grant on his first and fourth amendment claims. The jury then returned a verdict for the defendants on the fourteenth amendment claim. Following the jury verdict, Farnsworth moved for the allowance of attorney‘s fees and costs under
Grant further argues that the district court erred in directing verdicts against him on his first and fourth amendment claims. The district court‘s rulings were based on its determination that Grant‘s prior conviction collaterally estopped him from making the constitutional claims, and that no proximate causal relationship existed between any violation of the first and fourth amendment rights and Grant‘s alleged injuries. We affirm. Tyler v. Harper, 744 F.2d 653, 655 (8th Cir.1984), holds that “collateral estoppel can bar relitigation of constitutional claims in a section 1983 action when they were fully and fairly litigated and decided in a prior state criminal proceeding.” Here Grant attempted to retry the validity of his arrest, for a crime of which he was convicted in state court. The state court jury decided beyond a reasonable doubt that he was guilty of the crime charged. This necessarily entails that the officers acted lawfully in removing Grant from the parade site, and that his interests in remaining at the parade and in exercising first amendment rights were terminated upon his arrest. Until Grant took a swing at Officer Knock, there had been no interference with his first amendment rights. After the swing there was no wrongful interference with these rights because he was lawfully arrested. Further, the district court properly determined that because the arrest was proper, any interference with Grant‘s first amendment rights was not the proximate cause of his alleged injuries.
Next, Grant argues that the district court erred in excluding the testimony of his chiropractor concerning his treatment of Grant for injuries he sustained from the parade incident. “The admissibility of expert opinions lies in the sound discretion of the Trial Court,” Hayes Bros., Inc. v. Economy Fire & Casualty Co., 634 F.2d 1119, 1125 (8th Cir.1980). We conclude that the district court properly excluded the testimony of Grant‘s chiropractic expert. The chiropractor testified at trial that he could not state with a reasonable degree of certainty the extent and the causes of Grant‘s disability. Further, he admitted that he could only guess as to the effects of the parade incident because he lacked the necessary medical history of Grant before the incident. Thus, the expert‘s testimony would not have assisted the jury in determining the extent of injury attributable to the parade incident.
Grant also argues that the district court erred in its instructions to the jury by failing to instruct the jury on his first and fourth amendment claims and by restricting the claim of excessive force to a fourteenth amendment claim, which requires a “shock the conscience” standard. We need not address the validity of the instructions pertaining to the “shock the conscience” standard (Instructions 12-14), because Grant‘s attorney failed to make objections to the instructions during trial in a timely and specific manner. See
Because the district court directed verdicts on Grant‘s first and fourteenth amendment claims, there was no issue to submit to the jury on these claims. Thus, the instructions pertaining to such claims were properly refused. Further, this refusal did not prejudice Grant‘s remaining fourteenth amendment claim.
Finally, Grant asserts that the district court improperly awarded attorney fees and costs to Farnsworth. By post-trial order, the district court ruled that Grant‘s case against Farnsworth was frivolous and groundless, and that Farnsworth was therefore entitled to the attorney fees and costs expended for his defense. See
Accordingly, we affirm the district court‘s decision.