176 N.W. 1019 | S.D. | 1920
Trial to the court without jury. Judgment for plaintiff. Appeal from the judgment and from an order denying a new trial.
Respondent occupied a shop under a written lease, dated May 7, 1917, and running for three years, conditioned, among other things, that, if the monthly rental was not paid when due, or in case of the sale of said premises, “the said lessee does hereby authorize and fully empower said lessor or his agent to cancel and annul this lease at once, and to re-enter and take possession of said premises.” After the making of this lease, respondent was drafted into army service. Respondent thereafter failed to make any payment on said lease. At the end of some six months, the owner sold the property to appellant, who entered into possession thereof. Appellant knew of the lease, its conditions, and that respondent was in the military service. Upon his return from service, respondent demanded possession of the building, and, possession being refused, brought this action for possession and to recover the rental value of said premises fronn dhte possession -was taken by appellañt.
It is too clear to admit of discussion that, unless some reason exists why the said lease should not bind! respondent in accordance with the terms thereof, he was not entitled to the relief granted by the trial court. It is apparent from the whole record, including the allegations of the complaint, that respondent bases his right to recover the leased property upon the fact that he was in the military service of the United States during the late war. It is therefore evident that he bases bis claim for relief either on our “moratorium” law (chapter 55, Laws 19x8) or upon the federal “moratorium” law (Act of March 8, 1918 [¶] S-. Cómp. St. 1918, Comp. St. Ann. Supp. 1919, §§ 3078i4a-3078í4s'S] )• Appellant assumes, and undoubtedly correctly, that respondent relies upon ‘the state law:; and appellant challenges said law as unconstitutional in that, among other things, it impairs the oblgations of contracts. Section 10, art. 1, 'Federal Constitution; section 12, art. 6, State Const.
In all the above and in other cases based upon such laws enacted during the Civil War, no contention was ever made that, because of any emergency, a state would have a right to enact any law- which would impair the obligation of an existing contract — -in fact the unconstitutionality of such a law -was conceded in every case. What the courts were called upon to determine was whether the laws under consideration did impair the obligations of contracts, or whether they merely affected the remedy, and to what extent remedies might be suspended or altered The following propositions seem to be fully recognized and established:
The obligation of a contract originates in, and is therefore coeval with, the contract itself; and, resulting from the contract, it is brought into being by the parties thereto.
A legal remedy is the means or method by which one may recover his rights or redress his wrongs — in other words, the means or method of enforcing the obligation of contracts.
Remedies are the creatures of legislation and the power that creates may suspend, modify, or change the remedy as to existing contracts, at least where the former remedy has not become a part of a contract, or -where the parties have not contracted as to the remedy.
The -power -to suspend, modify, or -change a remedy does not authorize the enactment of a law which. would so modify or change an existing remedy or suspend a remedy for such-length of time as to, in effect, deny a remedy to one seeking to enforce a right or redeem a wrong growing out of a contract -existing at the time of the enactment of such law. In support of these propositions, we cite the above cases, and! also that of Breitenbach v. Bush, 44 Pa. 313, 84 Am. Dec. 442.
That they do impair the obligation of this contract is perfectly apparent. As said by the court in Edmonson v. Ferguson, supra:
“If the General Assembly were to pass an act declaring * * * that a contract for -the payment of any stipulated sum of money within one year * * * should not be due and payable for five years, it would be readily seen that the obligation of the contract was impaired — the contract would be lessened in value.”
The judgment and order appealed from are reversed.