Grange Mutual Casualty Company (Grange) appeals from the judgment entered on the jury’s verdict in favor of DeMoonie, the named insured under a homeowners insurance policy issued by Grange. Grange denied coverage, contending that DeMoonie was required to reside in the insured premises and did not at the time of the intentionally set fire, 1 which substantially damaged the house, and that the property had been vacant for more than 30 days, precluding coverage under the policy.
1. Although Grange’s brief specifies seven enumerations of error while only two argument headings are contained in the brief, we exercise our discretion to consider the two main arguments presented, to the degree that we discern the enumerated errors discussed.
2
Finch v. Brown,
2. Grange complains of the denial of its motion for summary judgment on the issues of the residency and vacancy clauses. The trial court denied the motion, and immediate review was denied by this Court. The same grounds were raised by motions for directed verdict at trial, which were also denied. “ ‘After verdict and judgment, it is too late to review a judgment denying a summary judgment, for that judgment becomes moot when the court reviews the evidence upon the trial of the case.’ (Citations and punctuation omitted.)
Brown Realty Assoc. v. Thomas,
3. The standard for review of denial of a motion for directed verdict requires Grange to show that there was no conflict in the evidence as to any material issue and “the evidence introduced, with all reasonable deductions therefrom,” demanded the verdict sought. OCGA § 9-11-50;
Pendley v. Pendley,
(a) “ An insurance contract is governed by the ordinary rules of construction and should be construed to ascertain the intention of the parties. [Cits.] In discovering the intent of the parties, the whole instrument should be considered together, along with the surrounding circumstances. [Cit.]’
Progressive Preferred Ins. Co. v. Brown,
The motion for directed verdict regarding residency was premised primarily on the definitions section of the policy. That section is, in pertinent part, as follows: “6. ‘Insured premises’ means (a) the residence premises; (b) any other premises acquired by you during the term of this policy which you intend to use as a residence premises; (c) the part of any other premises where you reside and which is shown in the Declarations; (d) part of a premises not owned by an insured person where the insured person may be temporarily residing. ... 10. ‘Residence premises’ means the one or two family dwelling where you reside, including the building, the grounds and other structures on the grounds and which is described in the Declarations.”
Considering the entire contract, we note the declarations page which shows the “Named Insured and Address Jennie C DeMoonie 501 Dunbar Road . . . ,” and states that “[t]hese declarations with policy provisions, applications, forms, and endorsements, if any, are issued to form and complete the above numbered policy.” Immediately following is this paragraph: “The premises covered by this policy is located at the above address. Rating information-dwelling number 0, the owner occupied primary residence. . . .” (Emphasis supplied.)
“The declaration page of the policy of insurance constitutes a part thereof and the provisions therein must be construed with the remainder of the insurance contract. [Cits.]”
McGee v. Southern Gen. Ins. Co.,
The trial court, in denying the motion for directed verdict, relied
*814
upon
Hill v. Nationwide &c. Ins. Co.,
Such exclusions from coverage do not negate the requirement that the insured reside in the insured premises.
First, the definition of “residence premises” in the policy at issue in
Hill
is different from that of the Grange policy. The Grange language is much more similar to and, we conclude, controlled by
Epps v. Nicholson,
We also disapprove of the strained reading of the exclusions provisions in
Hill
to create an “exception to the exclusions” which provides coverage for rental property not otherwise provided by the policy. Such a reading “ignores the whole for an overly strict consideration of each part standing alone.”
Edwards v. Atlantic Ins. Co.,
“ When the language of an insurance policy defining the extent of the insurer’s liability is unambiguous and capable of but one
reasonable
construction, the courts must expound the contract as made by the parties. Courts have no more right by strained construction to make an insurance policy more beneficial by extending the coverage contracted for than they would have to increase the amount of coverage.’ . . . [Cit.]”
Southern Fire &c. Co. v. Jamerson,
Looking at the policy as a whole, we conclude that it is governed by
Epps,
supra, rather than
Hill
and that the definition of “residence premises” is in no way ambiguous, nor does it conflict with the exclu
*815
sions section. Compare
Roland v. Ga. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co.,
Therefore, Grange was entitled to a directed verdict based on the residency requirement of the policy.
(b) Also included as a basis for the motion for directed verdict was the intentionally set fire exclusion referenced above, which states: “[w]e do not cover loss resulting directly or indirectly by . . . vandalism or malicious mischief, including intentionally set fires, if the dwelling has been vacant for more than 30 consecutive days immediately preceding the loss.”
Having concluded that Grange was entitled to a directed verdict premised on the residency requirement, we need not address Grange’s alternative basis premised on this clause. OCGA § 5-6-34 (d).
Judgment reversed.
Notes
Although Grange contended that DeMoonie was responsible for the arson, it was unable to prove these allegations. No one had been charged with the arson at the time of trial.
No argument is presented regarding the third enumeration, and it is deemed abandoned. Court of Appeals Rule 27 (c) (2).