90 U.S. 471 | SCOTUS | 1874
GRAND TOWER COMPANY
v.
PHILLIPS ET AL.
Supreme Court of United States.
*477 Messrs. T.G. Allen and W.M. Evarts, for the company, plaintiff in error; Mr. H.S. Green, contra.
Mr. Justice BRADLEY delivered the opinion of the court.
The court below was of the opinion that the plaintiffs were entitled to the actual damages sustained by them, by the non-delivery of the quotas of coal for October and November, 1870.
*478 The question whether this view was right or not depends upon the true construction of the agreement made by the parties, and we are of opinion that the view taken by the court below on this point was correct. It is evident, from an inspection of the contract, that the election given to the plaintiffs to receive in the following month the coal which they were entitled to receive and did not receive in a particular month, was a substitute for the liquidated damages of twenty-five cents per ton. With regard to that particular amount of coal the rule of liquidated damages was at an end. The agreement did not carry it forward to the following month. It imposed upon the defendant the obligation, if the plaintiffs so elected, to furnish the coal itself instead of paying the liquidated sum. If not so, what was the option worth? It amounted to nothing more than the right of giving to the defendant another month to furnish the coal. Surely they would have had that right without stipulating for it in this solemn way. Had not this option been given to the plaintiffs the defendant would have had the option either to furnish the coal or to pay the twenty-five cents per ton for not furnishing it a sum which they could very well afford to pay upon a slight rise in the market prices. It was evidently the very purpose of the option given to the plaintiffs to avoid this oppressive result. They could require the coal to be furnished at all events, and, if they elected to do this, it was the duty of the defendant to furnish it. The contrary construction would make the stipulation worse than useless. The plaintiffs might continue to exercise their election to receive the coal, month after month, without avail, and, at the end, find themselves exactly at the point they started from forced to accept the twenty-five cents per ton.
The law affords many analogies in accordance with the views we have taken. Thus, by the common law, a gift of property to several in common, and when either of them dies a gift of his share to the survivors, does not subject that share to further survivorship unless it is so expressly provided. So, a condition not to underlet without license does *479 not extend to a sub-tenant. Instances of this kind might be multiplied at will.
But whilst we concur with the court below on this point, which is the most important point in the cause, there are certain assignments of error which seem to be well taken and will require a reversal of the judgment. These relate to the admission of evidence which may have affected, and probably did seriously affect, the amount of the verdict.
In regard to the measure of damages, the plaintiffs were allowed to show the prices of coal during November and December, 1870, at all points on the Mississippi below Cairo even to New Orleans. And the court charged the jury against the exceptions of the defendant, that the true measure of damages was the cash value during those months of the kind of coal mentioned in the contract, at Cairo, or points below it on the Mississippi River, after deducting the contract price of the coal and the cost and expense of transporting it thither, and making due allowance for the risk and hazard of such transportation. Now although it is probable that the plaintiffs could have got the prices which the evidence showed were obtained for coal at and below Cairo, had their coal been furnished according to the agreement, yet the rule of law does not allow so wide a range of inquiry, but regards the price at the place of delivery as the normal standard by which to estimate the damage for non-delivery. It is alleged by the plaintiffs that this rule would have been a futile one in their case, because no market for the purchase of coal existed at Grand Tower, except that of the defendant itself, which, by the very hypothesis of the action, refused to deliver coal to the plaintiffs, and which had the whole subject in its own control. This is certainly a very forcible answer to the proposition to make the price of coal at Grand Tower the only criterion. It is apparent that the plaintiffs would be obliged to resort to some other source of supply in order to obtain the coal which the defendant ought to have furnished them. And it would not be fair, under the circumstances of the case, to confine them *480 to the prices at which the defendant chose to sell the coal to other persons. The true rule would seem to be, to allow the plaintiffs to show the price they would have had to pay for coal in the quantities which they were entitled to receive it under the contract, at the nearest available market where it could have been obtained. The difference between such price and the price stipulated for by their contract, with the addition of the increased expense of transportation and hauling (if any), would be the true measure of damages. To this is properly to be added the claim (if any) for keeping boats and barges ready at Grand Tower for the receipt of coal.
But the prices of coal at New Orleans, at Natchez, and other places of distribution and sale, although they might afford a basis for estimating the profits which the plaintiffs might have made had the coal stipulated for been delivered to them, cannot be adopted as a guide to the actual damage sustained so long as any more direct method is within reach.
Another point in which the court erred in the course of the trial, was in the admission of the letters of Oliphant, the president of the Grand Tower Company, containing his private instructions to and correspondence with the local agent at Grand Tower. This evidence was clearly inadmissible under the issue, and should have been excluded. The particular reasons or motives which the company or its officers may have had in not furnishing coal to the plaintiffs were not in issue.
JUDGMENT REVERSED, and
A VENIRE DE NOVO AWARDED.