156 Mich. 419 | Mich. | 1909
This is an application for the writ of mandamus to require respondent to vacate an order dissolving a preliminary injunction.
Relator filed its bill of complaint, alleging that it had acquired all of the property rights and franchises of the Central Michigan Railroad Company, organized and incorporated on the 27th day of August, 1888; that after its organization said Central Michigan Railroad Company entered upon the construction of its road in good faith, surveyed its route, etc., made a map thereof, which was approved by the board and filed in the offices of the registers of deeds of the counties of Calhoun, Branch, and
“For the reason that the action on the part of the defendant, which is sought to be restrained pending the determination of the cause, is not such as will work an irreparable or even a serious injury to the complainant. At least it is not more serious than the injury-would be which the perpetuation of it would work to the defendant.”
“ Ordinarily this court does not review the action of the circuit judge in injunction cases.” Ionia, etc., Ins. Co. v. Ionia Circuit oudge, 100 Mich. 606 (32 L. R. A. 481).
“ This court does not sit for the purpose of granting injunctions, except it be on final hearing, when we are vested with jurisdiction on appeal. Aside from the power which we exercise in such cases, we can only interpose, if at all, in a case of a plain and gross abuse of discretion. Nor is it an abuse of discretion if the circuit judge should*422 reach a different conclusion than we might, if authorized to sit in his place. The granting of a preliminary writ of injunction is a discretionary power vested in the courts of original jurisdiction. 1 High on Injunctions (4th Ed.), §§ 11, 15. Such a writ is not a matter of right, particularly in cases in which the parties may be fully protected by a final decree, or by a suit at law.” Detroit, etc., Plank-Road Co. v. Wayne Circuit Judge, 98 Mich. 141.
While the defendant’s answer does not deny all of the material facts alleged in the bill of complaint, the denials of alleged facts and the affirmative assertion of other facts are incompatible with complainant’s right to a decree. We do not find such an abuse of discretion as to warrant our interference by the discretionary writ of mandamus, and we are satisfied that complainant’s rights can be fully protected by the final decree.
The application is denied.