Grand Rapids & I. R. v. Sparrow

36 F. 210 | U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Western Michigan | 1888

Severens, J.,

(after stating the facts as above.) Respecting the argument that the act of the legislature of Michigan (Laws 1887, No. 260, p. 387)-extending the jurisdiction of the court of equity to quiet titles to cases where the lands are unoccupied, is unconstitutional, because it deprives the defendant of the right to trial by jury, secured by the constitution of Michigan, (article 6, § 27,) I think it must be held that this constitutional provision extends only to cases where by the common law a trial by jury was customary. It does not roach those cases where the remedy is given by statute. At common law, ejectment did not lie where the defendant was not in possession, and it is sustainable in such a case only by virtue of the statute in Michigan. The objection, therefore, cannot be sustained. Tabor v. Cook, 15 Mich. 322, and eases cited. It is further suggested that the federal court in equity will not take cognizance of such a case, because there is an ample remedy by ejectment at law'. But this court will administer the remedies given by local statutes, whore it can be done without violation of the principles it is accustomed to regard in the exercise of its jurisdiction. It is argued by the defendant that one of those principles is that the court will not take jurisdiction where there is a plain remedy at law; and it is said that ejectment is such a remedy. But, when-the act defining the jurisdiction of the federal courts in equity was-passed, and suits were forbidden when a plain, adequate, and complete remedy at law existed, (Rev. St. U. S. § 723,) it was the remedy furnished by the common law which was thereby intended. Supplementary statutes, giving new legal remedies, do not disturb the original equitable jurisdiction, nor supplant it. The courts in equity of the United States-have undoubted cognizance of bills quia timet when the complainant is in possession. They may also take cognizance where he is not in possession, if local legislation gives the remedy in such a case, and the defendant is not thereby deprived of his right to a jury trial, according to the course of the common law. According to the case of Holland v. Challen, 110 U. S. 15, 3 Sup. Ct. Rep. 496, the circumstance of the complainant’s being in possession is not essential to the jurisdiction of courts of equity in such cases, and may bo dispensed with. That being so, a bill inequity is maintainable, if there was not by the common law a plain, adequate, and complete remedy. There was no such remedy where the defendant was out of possession. The demurrer must be overruled, and leave be given to answer.