57 So. 54 | Ala. Ct. App. | 1911
The appellant is a wholesale shoe merchant residing at Atlanta, Ga., and appellee is a retail merchant who resides in Coosa county, Ala.
The appellee became indebted to appellant for shoes sold him, and, being unable to pay the account,
It appears from the undisputed evidence that appellee was a man of small means, and that his assets consisted principally of a'stock of goods worth, according to his testimony, from $1,000 to $1,500, and a tract of land, consisting of 280 acres, which appears to have been sold by appellant under a venditioni exponas, and which brought at the sale $105.
It further appears from the undisputed evidence that the appellee was, prior to the time when the claim was placed in the hands of an attorney, and up to the time the attachment was sued out, pressed for money. He was writing to his creditors that times were hard with him, and asking for indulgence.
It further appears from the undisputed evidence that after .the attorney received the claim for collection he received information that appellee was attempting to dispose of his land, and thereupon he prepared an affidavit, stating that appellee was about to fraudulently dispose of his property; that appellee was indebted to appellant in the sum of $366.44; and that the attachment was not sued out for the purpose of vexing or harassing the appellee, or for any other improper motive, and forwarded it, along with the customary attachment bond, to his correspondent in Atlanta for the signature of appellant, and stated, at the time he sent the papers, “that Parker was trying to sell his real estate; that the real estate was the only property out of which the indebteedness could be realized; and that the attachment was necessary and proper.” Thereupon appellant made the affidavit, which had been so prepared and forwarded, before a notary public in Ful
It appears that appellant did not send its claim against appellee direct to the attorney in Coosa county, but delivered it to a collection agency or some attorney in Atlanta, who forwarded it in the usual course of business, for collection, to the attorney in Coosa county; but this fact has no bearing upon any question involved in this case.
This suit was brought by appellee against appellant for damages, both actual and vindictive, for the breach of said attachment bond. A judgment was rendered in favor of the appellee against appellant in the court below, and this appeal is prosecuted to reverse that judgment.
1. The law requires a party who desires to engage in the practice of law to undergo special training, and to be examined by certain specified officers, before he is permitted to engage in the practice of the profession, and he cannot then do so until he receives a license from certain designated courts. A lawyer is an officer of the courts, and as such is tinder oath to perform his duties in the manner required of him by the law. It would be difficult for justice to be administered through the courts without the aid of such officers, and as they are presumed to be learned in their professions, and are permitted by the law to hold themselves out to
For the same reason, “if a claim in a distant locality be intrusted to a reputable attorney for collection, and that attorney informs his client that there is ground for suing out an attachment, and the creditor thereupon, at the attorney’s request, furnishes sureties to him to make bond, in the absence of other knowledge or information, vexatiousness or malice cannot be imputed to the creditor, and he is not responsible for exemplary or vindictive damages. In the absence of an actual ground for the issue of the attachment,. the creditor would be liable for the actual damage done, but he would not be without probable cause for believing he had grounds for suing out the attachment, and therefore would not be liable for vindictive damages.”—City National Bank v. Jeffries, 73 Ala. 183.
It is evident from all the evidence in this case that this attachment was sued out because the attorney of appellant- in Coosa county, who was on the ground and, presumptively, knew the law of the state of Alabama, advised appellant that the attachment “was- necessary
2. In the present case, the levy was not made upon the stock of merchandise or any of the personal property of appellee, and there was therefore no interruption, by reason of such levy, of his business as a merchant. The attachment was only levied upon land. For this reason, we are unable to see how appellee, under any phase of the testimony, was entitled to any damages which it is claimed were suffered by him by reason of his loss of customers on account of the issuance of the attachment.
It is true that the complaint alleges, as one of the elements of dam age to appellee, the consequent loss to him of customers in his business; but that does not aid appellee in the matter. A plaintiff can derive no right to recover for consequences which cannot legally enter into his damages, although they are stated in the complaint.—Goldsmith, Forcheimer & Co. v. Picard, 27 Ala. 119.
' It seems to us that where there is no levy of an attachment upon the merchandise of a merchant, or any other sort of interference with his business as a merchant, it would be the broadest sort of speculation for a court to undertake to determine whether such merchant had lost customers on account of the issuance of such attachment.
3. If it be true, as claimed in the complaint, that appellant suffered damage to his credit by the wrongful suing out of the attachment, he is entitled to recover such damage, although the levy of the attachment was only upon land. The credit of a merchant, his stand
The court on the trial of this case permitted the jury to consider, in passing upon appellee’s damages, the subject of vindictive damages, and also the question as to whether the suing out of the attachment had resulted in loss of customers to appellee, and, in our opinion, the court erred in so doing.
For the error pointed out, the judgment of the court below is reversed, and the cause remanded.
Reversed and remanded.