OPINION
The claimant appeals from a judgment denying his claim for workmen’s compensation benefits. On September 14, 1964, the claimant sustained an accidental injury arising out of and in the course of his employment while operating a self-propelled agricultural machine known as an “ensilage cutter.” The cutters and rollers of the machine became clogged with weeds causing the machine to stop cutting. As appellant attempted to kick the weeds from the machine, his foot and ankle were severed from his leg. The trial court found that the employer was a farmer and not engaged in any extra-hazardous occupation. Judgment was entered accordingly and the claipiant appeals.
There is no substantial dispute in the evidence. Appellee was rather an extensive farmer and produced ensilage on his own farm for the purpose of feeding cattle in his own feeding operation and also supplied ensilage under contract to other persons in the business of feeding cattle. He farmed 120 acres, usually cutting from 10 to 20 tons of ensilage per acre therefrom annually. In addition to cutting crops of his own raising, appellee from time to time purchased crops of other farmers and cut them in the field for use in his ensilage business. The crop that was being cut at the time of the accident had not been grown by the employer and the ensilage was being sold to other feeders. While claimant was primarily employed to tend the employer’s machinery on the farm, he did the usual farm duties about the premises, such as operating the ensilage cutter when necessary.
Appellant contends that appellee was engaged in a commercial enterprise separate from his farming operations and, therefore, was not excluded from coverage under the act as an employer of farm laborers pursuant to § 59-10-4, subd. A, N.M.S.A, 1953. See
Appellant, however, argues that ensilage cutting comes within the definition of “milling,” a statutorily designated extra-hazardous occupation. Section 59-10-12(c)', N.M. S.A.1953, then in effect, reads:
“ ’Mill’ means any plant, premises, room or place where machinery is used, any process of machinery, changing, altering, or repairing any article or commodity for sale or otherwise together with the yards and premises which are part of the plant, including elevators, warehouses and bunkers, saw mill, sash factory or other work in the lumber industry.”
No case is cited and our research discloses none holding an ensilage cutte'r to be'within the definition of'a “mill,” under similar statutes enumerating extfahazardous occupations. On the other-hand, certain farm machineries have been held, not to be within the statutory definition of “milling.” In Vincent v. Taylor Bros.,
In Barney v. Anderson,
The Wyoming court also had occasion to discuss the meaning of “factory,” “workshop,” and “mill” under a statute similar to our own. In In re Roby,
We note, however, that in Raney v. State Industrial Acc. Commission,
■We -also notice that under so-called Factory Acts, requiring certain safety equipment in “all manufacturing, mechanical and other establishments” or in “plants,” it has been held that ensilage cutters were not within the purview of the acts. Johnson v. Bear,
While this court recognizes that the purpose of our workmen’s compensation legislation is to provide a humanitarian and economical system of compensation for injured workmen, and that such legislation should be given a liberal construction in favor of a claimant, still we have said that-the provisions of the act may not be disregarded in the name of liberal construction. Kosmicki v. Aspen Drilling Company,
Plaving concluded that the finding of the trial court that at the time of the injury appellant was not engaged in any extra-hazardous business or occupation is supported by substantial evidence, it was not error to deny appellant’s requested findings and conclusions to the contrary, The conclusion. reached eliminates a discussion of appellee’s cross-appeal.
The judgment should be affirmed. It is so ordered.