Graham v. StateGraham v. State
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Meyers
OPINION
MEYERS, J.,delivered the unanimous opinion of the Court.
Aрpellant was charged as a party with the felony offense of capital murder.
See
Before trial began, appellant sought a severance pursuant to Texas Penal Code § 3.04(a), alleging that the indictment charged at least two distinct capital murder offenses.
2
The State maintained that the indictment did not consolidatе or join two or more offenses within the meaning of § 3.04(a), but rather alleged different theories for committing
one
capital murder. Thus, according to the Statе, only one offense was charged and a severance was not required. The trial court agreed with the State’s argument, overruled appеllant’s motion to sever, and allowed the State to proceed to trial under each of the three alternative paragraphs. The jury ultimаtely returned a general
In the Court of Appeals, appellant argued,
inter alia,
that the trial court erred in refusing to grant a severance. The appellate court affirmed appellant’s conviction in an unpublished opinion.
See Graham v. State,
No. 14-98-00097-CR, slip op., 1999 WL 605519 (Tex.App.—Houston [14 th Dist.] Aug. 12, 1999) (not designated for publication). Relying on
Hathorn v. State,
848 S.W.2d 101, 113 (Tex.Crim.App. 1992), the Court of Appeals agreed with the State that the three-paragraph indictment presented alternative theories for one offense.
See Graham,
slip op. at 3. The court noted that the different subsections of § 19.03 allowеd a conviction for capital murder where a person either (1) intentionally commits the murder in the course of committing or attempting to commit robbery; or (2) intentionally commits the murder and murders more than one person during the same criminal transaction.
See id.
(citing
An indictment may contain as many separate paragraphs charging the same offense as is necessary to meet the contingencies of the evidence. See Hathorn, 848 S.W.2d at 113 (citations omitted). Where an indictment charges different theories under which a defendant may have committed a single capital murder, the provisions of § 3.04(a) will not apply. Id. In Hathom, the appellant was charged in a single, three-paragraph indictment with the capital murder of his father. Id. The three paragraphs alleged that appellant committed (1) murder in the course of robbеry and burglary; (2) murder for remuneration or the promise of remuneration; and (3) murder for hire. Id. In that case, this Court concluded that the appellant’s argument that the indictment charged more than one offense misconstrued the language of § 3.04(a). We determined that the challenged indictment charged thе appellant “with committing only one offense, capital murder of [his father].” Id. Thus, the alternative paragraphs simply alleged different theories for the commission of that one capital murder. Id.
The facts presented in the instant case, however, differ from those in
Hat-hom
in one key respect — two of the three paragraphs allege
different murders
as the basis for the cаpital charge. As a predicate to charging capital murder, the Penal Code requires that a defendant commit murder as defined under § 19.02(b)(1).
See
In
Hathorn,
the murder of the appellant’s father served as the predicate to the capital murder charge.
See Hathorn,
848 S.W.2d at 113. That murder was aggravated through the indiсtment’s alternative theories that it was (1) committed in the course of robbery and burglary; (2) committed for remuneration or the promise of
The Court of Appeals erred in concluding that the indictment alleged only one offense and that § 3.04(a) did not apply for that reason. The appellate court’s decision is therefore vacated and the cause remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Notes
. The original indictment included thirteen sepаrate paragraphs. At a pre-trial hearing, the State abandoned all but the three paragraphs described above.
. When two sepаrate offenses arise out of the same criminal episode, the State may join the offenses and try them in a single trial.
See
. This would be a different case, of course, if the murder of Garcia-Castro was being used as an aggravating circumstance to enhance Hurtado’s murder into capital murder. See, e.g., Shavers v. State, 881 S.W.2d 67, 74 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1994, no pet.) (noting that although indictment contained two distinct murders, one of the murders was used as aggravating circumstance to charge a single capital murder). As it stands in the current indictment, however, the murder of Garcia-Castro is not alleged to bear any relation to the murder of Hurtado.