OPINION
delivered the unanimous opinion of the Court.
Aрpellant was charged as a party with the felony offense of capital murder. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. §§ 7.01, 19.03 (Vernon 1994). The indictment arose out of appellant’s alleged participation in a drug-related robbery during which three individuals were killed. Specifically, the State sought to present the jury with a single, thrеe-paragraph indictment alleging that appellant committed capital murder by (1) causing the death of Heimar Prado Hurta-do (“Hurtado”) and the death of Danny Giraldo (“Giraldo”) during the same criminal transaction; (2) causing the death of Hurtado while in the course of robbing him; and (3) causing the death of Jesus Garcia-Castro (“Garcia-Castro”) while in the course of robbing him. 1
Before trial began, appellant sought a severance pursuant to Texas Penal Code § 3.04(a), alleging that the indictment charged at least two distinct capital murder offenses.
2
The State maintained that the indictment did not consolidate оr join two or more offenses within the meaning of § 3.04(a), but rather alleged different theories for committing
one
capital murder. Thus, according to the State, only оne offense was charged and a severance was not required. The trial court agreed with the State’s argument, overruled appellant’s motiоn to sever, and allowed the State to proceed to trial under each of the three alternative paragraphs. The jury ultimately returned а general
In the Court of Appeals, appellant argued,
inter alia,
that the trial court erred in refusing to grant a severance. The appellate court affirmed appellant’s conviction in an unpublished opinion.
See Graham v. State,
No. 14-98-00097-CR, slip op.,
An indictment may contain as many separate paragraphs charging the same offense as is necessary to meet the contingencies of the evidence.
See Hathorn,
The facts presented in the instant case, however, differ from those in Hat-hom in one key respect — two of the three paragraphs allege different murders as the basis for the capital charge. As a prediсate to charging capital murder, the Penal Code requires that a defendant commit murder as defined under § 19.02(b)(1). See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 19.03(a) (Vernon 1994). That prediсate murder is aggravated to capital murder where any one of eight additional circumstances are present. See id. at § 19.03(a)(1)-(8). For example, a capital murder charge is warranted where the defendant commits the murder in the course of committing robbery, see id. at § 19.03(a)(2), or where the defendant murders more than onе person during the same criminal transaction. See id. at § 19.03(a)(7)(A).
In
Hathorn,
the murder of the appellant’s father served as the predicate to the capital murder chаrge.
See Hathorn,
The Court of Appeals erred in concluding that the indictment alleged only one offense and that § 3.04(a) did not apply for that reason. The appellate court’s decision is therefore vacated and the cause remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Notes
. The original indictment included thirteen sepаrate paragraphs. At a pre-trial hearing, the State abandoned all but the three paragraphs described above.
. When two separаte offenses arise out of the same criminal episode, the State may join the offenses and try them in a single trial.
See
Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 3.02 (Vernon 1994). However, where the State properly joins two offenses for trial pursuant to § 3.02, the defendant, upon timely motion, has an absolute right to a severance оf the offenses.
See id.
§ 3.04(a);
Coleman v. State,
. This would be a different case, of course, if the murder of Garcia-Castro was being used as an aggravating circumstance to enhance Hurtado’s murder into capital murder.
See, e.g., Shavers v. State,
