53 S.C. 132 | S.C. | 1898
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
In order to understand clearly the questions at issue, it has been deemed advisable to set out the complaint and answer.
The complaint alleges: “1. That heretofore, to wit: on the 10th November, A. D. 1893, the plaintiff, Benjamin Graham, entered into a contract in writing with one W. M. Arant, whereby it was agreed that the plaintiff lease certain lands in Orangeburg County, in Amelia Township, known as the Arant part of Belleville plantation, to said W. M. Arant, for the period or term of one year from the 1st day of January, 1894, to the 31st day of December, 1894, for the yearly rental of $340, to be paid on or before 15th October, 1894; no part of which said sum has been paid, except the sum of $151.40, which sum'was the proceeds of all the crops raised by the said Arant on said lands during said year, except the fourteen bales of cotton converted by the defendant, as hereinafter alleged. 2. That to secure the payment of the said sum of money, the said W. M. Arant executed and delivered in writing under seal a lien on the crop or crops which might be made on said lands. 3. That the said W.
The answer alleges: “1. Defendant denies that he at any time, or in any way, converted fourteen bales of cotton, or the proceeds thereof, as alleged in the first paragraph of the amended complaint. As to the remaining allegations of said first paragraph, defendant denies any knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief. 2. Defendant denies any knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the allegation of the second paragraph of the amended complaint. 3. Defendant denies the allegations of the third and fourth paragraphs of the amended complaint. 4. Further answering, defendant alleges that W. M. Arant shipped to this defendant in the year 1894, fourteen bales of cotton, but this defendant has no knowledge or information, sufficient to form a belief, as to whether said cotton was grown on lands under lease from plaintiff, or that plaintiff had or has any lien or claim upon said cotton. Defendant alleges that on 19th January, 1894, he entered into an. agreement in writing with the said W. M. Arant and M. A. Arant to make advances in money or supplies to an amount not exceeding $900 during the said year, to be used by said W. M. Arant and M. A. Arant in the cultivation of plantations known as ‘Belleville’ tract, containing 412 acres, near
At the close of the plaintiff’s testimony, the defendant made a motion for a nonsuit on the following grounds: “1. There is no evidence as to the material allegations of the complaint. 2. Because knowledge is the most material allegation in this action, and there is total absence of testimony tending to show the fact of knowledge on the part of defendant, to wit: that he received and took and sold and disposed of fourteen bales of cotton under lien to plaintiff, ‘being well aware of the lien of plaintiff thereon,’ as alleged. 3. There is no testimony tending to show that James M. Seignious, of Charleston, ever knew or heard of Benjamin Graham, of New York, or ever knew or heard that said Benjamin Graham owmed and rented out land in Orange-
After argument, the motion was granted in the following order: “A motion for nonsuit having been made upon the grounds set out in the notice therefor, after hearing argument thereon, it is ordered, that the nonsuit be and the same is hereby granted, and that judgment thereon be entered with costs. (Signed) I. D. Witherspoon, presiding Judge. March 18th, 1897.”
The questions properly raised by the exceptions are, whether there was error in excluding the introduction of certain testimony mentioned in the first exception, and in granting the order of nonsuit, on the grounds upon which the motion was made.
As the presiding Judge committed error in granting the order of nonsuit for the reason just stated, which will necessitate a new trial, it becomes unnecessary to consider whether there was any other testimony tending to establish the fact of noticfe. Indeed, it is deemed advisable, for the reason just stated, that the Court should not express an opinion as to the other .testimony, as it might prejudice one or the other parties to the action upon the second trial thereof. The exceptions raising this question are sustained.
It is the judgment of this Court, that the judgment of the Circuit Court be reversed, and the case remanded for a new trial.