Graham v. NorrisGraham v. Norris
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Lead Opinion
This appeal represents the last in a trilogy of cases in which inmates contend they were unlawfully denied meritorious good time when the General Assembly enacted what Teddy Graham contends to be ex post facto legislation. Duncan v. State, 337 Ark. 306, 987 S.W.2d 721 (1999); Ellis v. Norris, 333 Ark. 200, 968 S.W.2d 609 (1998). Our court took jurisdiction of this case to interpret certain Arkansas acts and statutes that deal with prisoners’ meritorious good time and to determine if those laws, or the State’s application of them, have violated Arkansas’s or the United States’ Ex Post Facto Clauses. Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 1 — 2(b).
In June of 1986, appellant Teddy Graham was convicted of aggravated robbery and of being a felon in possession of a firearm and given a forty-year sentence. While serving his sentence, Graham was transferred pursuant to the Interstate Corrections Compact (
SECTION 1. Arkansas code 12-30-408 is hereby repealed.
SECTION 4. Emergency. It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that Arkansas Code 12-30-408 establishes good time credit for contractual and volunteer work by inmates at a higher rate than is provided for job assignments within the Department of Correction; that this law creates inequities that are detrimental to the overall operations of the Department of Correction; that Arkansas Code 12-29-202 makes adequate provision for good time awards; and that this Act should be given immediate effect in order to clarify the law as soon as possible.
On January 9, 1998, Graham filed a petition for declaratory judgment and writ of mandamus in the Jefferson County Circuit Court’ where he claimed the 544 days in good-time credit, and contended that Act 503, which repealed
In this appeal, Graham continues his argument that Act 503 violated the Ex Post Facto Clauses because its retroactive application worked to his disadvantage by extending his period of confinement before he is eligible for release or parole and by increasing his punishment. He also cites
Graham’s arguments are almost identical to the ones we dealt with in our recent Ellis and Duncandecisions. In Ellis, the prisoner challenged as ex post facto Acts 536 and 558 of 1993, which repealed “good-time allowances” provided in Act 273 of 1987. Act 273 permitted prisoners extra good time when they completed rehabilitative programs or performed special jobs. Prisoner Ellis premised his constitutional argument on the case of Weaver v.
Our opinions in Lindsey, Weaver and Miller suggested that enhancements to the measure of criminal punishment fall within the ex post facto prohibition because they operate to the “disadvantage” of the accused offenders, [citations omitted] But that language was unnecessary to the results of those cases and is inconsistent with the framework developed in Collins v. Youngblood, [citation omitted] [emphasis added]. After Collins the focus of the ex post facto inquiry is not on whether a legislative change produces some ambiguous sort of “disadvantage,” nor, as the dissent seems to suggest, on whether an amendment affects a prisoner’s “opportunity to take advantage of early release,” [citation omitted], but on whether any such change alters the definition of criminal conduct or increases the penalty by which a crime is punishable.
We considered the foregoing language in our Ellis case and interpreted it as follows:
We think a fair interpretation of this footnote is that it was not a disadvantage in the form of the lost opportunity to reduce the prison sentence that was dispositive in Weaver. Rather, it was the fact that a reduction in the amount of good time that was automatically awarded operated to increase the length ;of time Weaver would be in prison. In other words, the disadvantage suffered by Weaver, in the form of an increase in the punishment for his crime, is within the scope of the Ex Post Facto Clause. Consequendy, Weaver is not helpful to Ellis unless the repeal of “extra good time” actually operates to increase his sentence, rather than merely remove his opportunity to reduce his time in prison. We hold that it does not.
In’ conclusion, the Ellis court stated that Act 273 of 1987 provided that “the director may recommend ... good time awards” for completing rehabilitation programs and special jobs, and by performing such acts, a prisoner had the opportunity to add to the meritorious good time he has earned automatically. We further held in Ellis that when Act 273 was repealed in 1993, all that was lost was the opportunity to earn discretionary good time which was not violative of the Ex Post Facto Clauses. In Duncan, 337 Ark. 306, 987 S.W.2d 721 (1999), we reached the same decision on almost identical facts.
- Graham argues that, while the good-time credits provided in the Ellis and Duncan cases may be discretionary under Act 273, the extra good time earned here under
Inmates who engage in volunteer work by contractual agreement with state departments, agencies, counties, school districts, civic organizations, and other non-profit organizations, shall earn an additional day of meritorious good time for every day engaged in volunteer work. (Emphasis added.)
Relying on the above provision, Graham urges that an inmate’s good time earned under
As we pointed out in Ellis, an inmate, whether under Arkansas’s prior special programs provided in Act 273 or
In the present case, when Arkansas’s volunteer work program was authorized under
Meritorious Good Time is not something to which an inmate is entitled as a matter of right, but is awarded in proportion to his good discipline, good behavior, work practices, and job responsibilities. (Emphasis added.) Department of Correction Regulation 826.
The foregoing regulation was promulgated pursuant to Act 50 of 1968, as amended, which encompassed the laws that established the volunteer work and meritorious good time provided under
In sum, Graham’s situation, while involving a different statute,
Notes
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Now recodified with other provisions at
Concurrence Opinion
concurring. I do not disagree with the majority’s analysis. However, there is one other factor in this case that distinguishes it from Duncan v. State, 337 Ark. 306, 987 S.W.2d 721 (1999) (per curiam), and Ellis v. Norris, 333 Ark. 200, 968 S.W.2d 609 (1998) (per curiam). Graham was serving time in the Bilis County Jail in Oklahoma under the Interstate Compact. Six years after the Arkansas statute authorizing meritorious good time for volunteer work was repealed, Graham began doing volunteer work in Oklahoma for the city, county, and school district. See
The Arkansas Department of Correction should not be held responsible for volunteer work done in Oklahoma, which was not done under its auspices or rules or with its blessing. It is quite a stretch in my judgment for Graham to argue that Arkansas enhanced his punishment by denying this good time, when Graham was performing the volunteer services unbeknownst to the Department.
I concur for the reasons stated by the majority but also for this additional reason.
Concurrence Opinion
concurring. I agree with the majority’s holding, but write only to point out a difference between the present case and the cases of Ellis and Duncan. The statute at issue in Ellis and Duncan, Act 273 of 1987, provided that meritorious good time could be awarded at the discretion of the Director if a prisoner, among other things, completed rehabilitative programs or performed other special jobs. The statute at issue here provides that inmates who are engaged in volunteer work “shall earn an additional day of meritorious good time for every day engaged in volunteer work.” Although the language of