GRAHAM v. LAWRENCE COUNTYGRAHAM v. LAWRENCE COUNTY
On March 2, 2026, Plaintiff, Kenneth Michael Graham, filed a Complaint, alleging constitutional violations under
I. Statement of Facts
Mr. Graham has three children. (ECF No. 1, at ¶ 14). Mr. Graham alleges that in July 2021, Lawrence County Children and Youth Services (“LCCYS“) removed his children from his care, “without a judge‘s signed order and without the existence of any exigent circumstances.” (Id. ¶ 16). The subsequent dependency proceedings regarding Mr. Graham‘s children continued for over four years. Mr. Graham alleges that LCCYS failed to provide him with a shelter care hearing within 72 hours of his children‘s removal, as required by
II. Relevant Legal Standard
When reviewing a motion to dismiss pursuant to
Nonetheless, a court need not credit bald assertions, unwarranted inferences, or legal conclusions cast in the form of factual averments. Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 n.8 (3d Cir. 1997). The primary question in deciding a motion to dismiss is not whether the plaintiff will ultimately prevail; but rather, whether he or she is entitled to offer evidence to establish the facts alleged in the complaint. Maio v. Aetna, 221 F.3d 472, 482 (3d Cir. 2000). The purpose of a motion to dismiss is to “streamline[] litigation by dispensing with needless discovery and factfinding.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 326-27 (1989).
Furthermore, “in evaluating a motion to dismiss, courts are not limited to the complaint, but may also consider evidence integral to or explicitly relied upon therein.” Tanksley v. Daniels, 902 F.3d 165, 172 (3d Cir. 2018) (internal quotations omitted). “In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6)
III. Discussion
A. LCCYS as Improper Party
Defendants argue that LCCYS should be dismissed as a Defendant, because they are a subunit of Lawrence County and are not a proper party in this action. (ECF No. 9, at 5). Mr. Graham does not respond to this argument.
Offices or departments of a county are not properly “persons” capable of being sued under
B. Statute of Limitations for § 1983 Claims
Mr. Graham brings constitutional claims under
Constitutional claims brought under
Mr. Graham contends that the continuing violations doctrine applies in this case to toll the statute of limitations period related to his constitutional claims. The continuing violation doctrine provides an exception to the “strict application of a statute of limitations where the conduct complained of consists of a pattern that has only become cognizable as illegal over time.” Foster v. Morris, 208 F. App‘x 174, 177– 78 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing Cowell v. Palmer Twp., 263 F.3d 286, 292 (3d Cir. 2001)). The doctrine only applies when the alleged wrong “‘is more than the occurrence of isolated or sporadic acts.‘” Id. (quoting Cowell, 263 F.3d at 292). The following factors are to be considered in making this determination:
(1) subject matter ‒ whether the violations constitute the same type of discrimination, tending to connect them in a continuing violation; (2) frequency ‒ whether the acts are recurring or more in the nature of isolated incidents; and (3) degree of permanence ‒ whether the act had a degree of permanence which should trigger the plaintiff‘s awareness of and duty to assert his/her rights and whether the consequences of the act would continue even in the absence of a continuing intent to discriminate.
Cowell, 263 F.3d at 292 (citations omitted). “The consideration of ‘degree of permanence’ is the most important of the factors.” Id. If an act has a degree of permanence, then continuing violations doctrine is not a substitute for a plaintiff‘s “awareness of and duty to assert his/her rights” in a timely fashion. Id. at 295.
It is well-settled that the continuing violations doctrine “will not stop the ticking of the limitations clock [once] plaintiff obtained requisite information [to state a claim]. On discovering an injury and its cause, a claimant must choose to sue or forego that remedy.” Barnes v. American Tobacco Co., 161 F.3d 127, 154 (3d Cir. 1998) (quoting Kichline v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 800 F.2d 356, 360 (3d Cir. 1986)). The Third Circuit has considered the continuing violations doctrine in the context of constitutional claims related to the removal of children, and has held that the removal of the child triggers plaintiff‘s awareness of their ability to bring suit. See Bennett v. Susquehanna Cty. Children & Youth Servs., 592 F. App‘x 81, 83 (3d Cir. 2014) (“Bennett‘s cause of action for all claims accrued at the time of the alleged unlawful seizure and withholding of her two minor children on November 18, 2009.“); Moore v. Morrison, 2022 WL 824102, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 18, 2022) (dismissing
The July 22, 2021, removal of Mr. Graham‘s children from his physical custody was an act that had an immediate degree of permanence. Any allegations that Mr. Graham makes against Defendants, related to the dependency hearings, investigations, or interactions which relate to his children‘s removal started accruing from the July 21, 2021 date of removal. Mr. Graham does not plead any facts to show that the continuing violations doctrine applies to any such claim, because his children were only removed once. Any constitutional claims against Defendants, unrelated to Mr. Graham‘s children‘s removal, are their own contained claims which are also subject to the two-year statute of limitations.
Mr. Graham filed his Complaint on March 2, 2026. Thus, the two-year statute of limitations period will preclude any claims for conduct before March 2, 2024. Accordingly, all of Mr. Graham‘s pre-March 2, 2024 claims within his Complaint are time barred by the statute of limitations. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss will be granted. All of Mr. Graham‘s pre-March 2, 2024 claims will be dismissed.
C. Insufficient Pleadings
Defendants argue that Mr. Graham fails to allege facts to establish any of his constitutional claims. Mr. Graham argues that he pleads sufficient facts to establish his constitutional claims against all Defendants.
All of Mr. Graham‘s post-March 2, 2024 pleadings are broad and unspecific. Of the general allegations pled by Mr. Graham, those that could be considered to have occurred after March 2,
i. Procedural Due Process Claim
Mr. Graham brings a Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process claim against Defendants at Count I of his amended complaint. “The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (internal quotation marks omitted). See Dennis v. Dejong, 557 F. App‘x 112, 116-17 (3d Cir. 2014).
Mr. Graham does not allege any facts to establish that he did not receive the opportunity to be heard at any point during the dependency process regarding his children. Instead, the record supports that Mr. Graham received notice of the dependency hearings and he was present at each proceeding with counsel. See generally (ECF No. 7-1). To support his procedural due process claim, Mr. Graham alleges that he was never provided a shelter care hearing within 72 hours of his children‘s removal, in accordance with
As such, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Mr. Graham‘s Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process claims against them, at Count I, will be granted. Said claim will be dismissed. As amendment would be futile, Mr. Graham will not be granted leave to amend this claim.
Mr. Graham brings a Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process claim against Defendants at Count II of his amended complaint. To establish a claim for a substantive due process violation, a plaintiff must show that governmental action was “so ill-conceived or malicious that it shocks the conscience.” Mulholland v. Government County of Berks, Pa., 706 F.3d 227, 241 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting Miller v. City of Philadelphia, 174 F.3d 368, 375 (3d Cir. 1999)). In the child welfare context, a plaintiff must prove that the government officials’ actions “exceed both negligence and deliberate indifference and reach a level of gross negligence or arbitrariness that indeed ‘shocks the conscience.‘” Id. (quoting Miller, 174 F.3d at 375-76). Such a claim “requires decision-making by a social worker that is so clearly arbitrary…[that it] can properly be said to ‘shock the conscience.‘” B.S. v. Somerset County Children and Youth Services, 704 F.3d 250, 268 (3d Cir. 2013). The inquiry is whether there was an objectively reasonable suspicion of abuse justifying the degree of interference with the parents’ rights as the child‘s parents. Croft v. Westmoreland County Children & Youth Serv., 103 F.3d 1123, 1125 (3d Cir. 1997).
Mr. Graham‘s timely allegations to support his substantive due process claims against Defendants are general and conclusory. Defendants’ unspecific allegations that Defendants delayed reunification efforts and withheld medical assessments do not rise to the level that would “shock the conscience.” Further, Mr. Graham‘s allegations also do not allege when or how each Defendant was individually involved in the substantive due process claims he brings. As such, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Mr. Graham‘s Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process claims will be granted. Said claims will be dismissed. As the Court cannot say that amendment would be futile, Mr. Graham will be granted leave to amend this claim.
Mr. Graham contends that Lawrence County is liable for all of his alleged constitutional claims pursuant to Monell v. Dept. of Soc. Servs. of City of New York 436 U.S. 658 (1978). (ECF No. 9 at 12). Defendants argue that Mr. Graham fails to allege sufficient facts to establish that the constitutional violations occurred because of a county policy or custom. (ECF No. 7, at 7).
Under Monell v. Dept. of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978), a local government is subject to liability “when execution of a government‘s policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury” complained of by the plaintiff. Id. If there is no underlying constitutional violation, Monell liability cannot exist. Bridges v. Scranton Sch. Dist., 644 F. App‘x 72, 178 (3d Cir. 2016). Policy can be adopted when a decisionmaker possessing final authority to establish municipal policy with respect to the action issues an official proclamation, policy, or edict. Mulholland v. Gov‘t Cnty. of Berks, 706 F.3d 227, 237 (3d Cir. 2013). A course of conduct is considered a custom when, though not authorized by law, such practices of state officials are so permanent and well-settled as to virtually constitute law. Id.
Mr. Graham alleges that Lawrence County had a policy of adoption instead of reunification when it came to child dependency proceedings. Mr. Graham broadly alleges that this policy is what caused Defendants to violate his constitutional rights. As discussed above, Mr. Graham‘s allegations are broad and conclusory and insufficient to establish any underlying constitutional violations to support Monell liability claims against Lawrence County.
As such, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss as to Monell liability for Lawrence County, will be granted. For these reasons, and those stated above, Mr. Graham‘s claims against Lawrence
D. Supervisor Liability for Defendant Bout
Defendants argue that Mr. Graham‘s constitutional violations against Defendant John Bout, Director of LCCYS, must be dismissed because he fails to allege sufficient facts to show that Defendant Bout was individually involved in any of the alleged claims. (ECF No. 7, at 5-6). Mr. Graham argues that he has established that Defendant Bout was individually involved in his constitutional violations by virtue of his position within LCCYS. (ECF No. 9, at 12-14).
To bring a
Mr. Graham‘s pleadings against Defendant Bout broadly allege that Defendant Bout was responsible for “establishing, approving, and enforcing agency policies, practices, and customs,” and that he failed to train, supervise, or discipline LCCYS employees. (ECF No. 1, at ¶¶ 6, 55). Such bare and conclusory allegations are not sufficient to establish that Mr. Bout established or approved of any policy or custom that violated his constitutional rights, nor are they sufficient to show that he was individually involved in the underlying constitutional violations.
IV. Conclusion
For the reasons above, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss will be granted. A separate order to follow.
DATED: September 1, 2026
BY THE COURT:
Marilyn J. Horan
United States District Judge