138 Iowa 456 | Iowa | 1908
After Dillon v. Lee, 110 Iowa, 156, had been determined in this court, the defendants Timothy Dillon and The Telegraph by its manager P. J. Quigly engaged the services of plaintiff to prosecute another suit against Lee for the benefit of the Dubuque Specialty Machine Works.
The plaintiff contends that in executing these memoranda the original arrangement in parol was merely reduced to writing, while the defendants deny this, and say that their design was to enable their attorney by procuring excessive fees in these cases to recoup for them the costs and expenses incurred by Dillon and The Telegraph in the first suit brought against Lee. It will be enough to say, without reviewing the evidence, that we are not inclined to join defendants in attributing to the parties to these agreements motives in making them alike dishonorable, and, if entertained, equally reprehensible to clients and attorney; The writings are strong corroboration of plaintiff’s testimony that they embodied the conditions as agreed upon orally at the time of his engagement to prosecute the actions and in view of the circumstances disclosed, as well as the finding of the trial court, we reach the conclusion that such was the arrangement made between them.
No relief against Dillon or The Telegraph is claimed in the petition. Payment for the services of attorney from the amounts recovered in behalf of the corporation was contemplated in the employment, and the sole remaining inquiry concerns the amount of compensation which should be allowed. It will be found from an examination of the decisions mentioned that in each the action was based on a breach of trust, i. e., the officers of the Dubuque Specialty Machine Works, in disregard of their relation and obligation to it, had appropriated to their own use money belonging to that corporation, and the sum of $3,016.65 was recovered from Lee and $6,031 from Loetscher. If these contracts
Wherever a cause of action exists primarily in behalf of the corporation against directors, officers, and others for wrongful dealing with corporate property, or wrongful exercise of corporate franchises, so that the remedy should regularly be obtained through a suit by and in the name of the corporation, and the corporation, either actually or virtually refuses to institute or prosecute such a suit, then, in order to prevent a failure of justice, an action may be brought and maintained by a stockholder or stockholders, either individually or suing on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, against the wrongdoing directors, officers, and other persons; but it is absolutely indispensable that the corporation itself should be joined as a party — usually as a codefendant. The rationale of this rule should not be misapprehended. The stockholder does not bring such a suit because his rights have been directly violated, or because the cause of action is his, or because he is entitled to the relief sought; he is permitted to sue in this manner simply in order to set in motion the judicial machinery of the court. The stockholder, either individually or as the representative of the class, may commence the suit, and may prosecute it to judgment; but in every other respect the action is the ordinary one brought by the corporation, is maintained directly for the benefit of the corporation, and the final relief, when obtained, belongs to the corporation, and not to the stockholder — plaintiff. The corporation is, therefore, an indispensably necessary party, not simply on the general principles of equity pleading in order that it may be bound by the decree, but in order that the relief, when granted, may be awarded to it, as a party to the record, by the decree. This view completely answers the objections which are sometimes raised in suits of this class, that the plaintiff has no interest in the subject-matter of the controversy nor in the relief. In fact, the plaintiff has no direct interest; the defendant corporation alone has any direct interest; the plaintiff is permitted, not*462 withstanding his want of interest, to maintain the action solely to prevent an otherwise complete failure of justice.
As sustaining the text, see Slattery v. Ry., 91 Mo. 217 (4 S. W. 79, 60 Am. Rep. 245) ; Harding v. American Glucose Co., 182 Ill. 551 (55 N. E. 577, 74 Am. St. Rep. 189, 223, 64 L. R. A. 738) ; Grant v. Lookout Mountain Co., 93 Tenn. 700 (28 S. W. 90, 27 L. R. A. 100). Nor aré the expenses of litigation allowed the shareholder on the theory that he has acted as the agent of the corporation in what he has done. The action is, to all intents and purposes, the suit of the corporation, and is for the benefit of all parties interested to protect a trust fund, and on this ground the stockholder is reimbursed from such fund for all proper expenditures made or liabilities incurred. Grant v. Lookout Mountain Co., supra; Forrester v. Boston, etc., Min. Co., 29 Mont. 397 (74 Pac. 1088, 76 Pac. 211); Meeher v. Iron Co. (C. C.) 17 Eed. 48 et seq. In 2 Spelling on Private Corporations, section 643, the author lays down the rule that “ the owner of stock in a corporation who sues for himself and all other shareholders successfully, for a wrong done to the corporation, is entitled to be reimbursed his actual and necessary expenses and expenditures, including attorney’s fees out of the corporate fund.” In Cook on Stock & Stockholders, section 748, it is said that, in case the suit is successful, the complaining stockholder is entitled to have his costs paid by the corporation. In Trustees v. Greenough, 105 U. S. 527 (26 L. Ed. 1157), the court says: “ It is a general principle that a trust estate must bear the expenses of its administration. It is also established by sufficient authority that where one of many parties having a common interest in a trust fund, at his own expense, takes proper proceeding to save it from destruction or restore it to the purposes of the trust, he is entitled to reimbursement, either out of the fund itself, or by proportional' contribution from those who accept the