41 Del. Ch. 355 | New York Court of Chancery | 1963
This is an action to compel defendant to issue and deliver to plaintiff certificates for 11,600 shares of defendant’s common stock to which plaintiff became entitled by reason of a stock split. The case is before the court on cross motions of the parties for summary judgment based upon the pleadings and an agreed statement of facts. It appears that on May 1, 1961 defendant’s transfer agent mailed to the plaintiff certificates for 11,600 shares of defendant’s common stock representing the split shares to which plaintiff was entitled. The envelope containing these certificates was addressed to the plaintiff at his residence in Baltimore, Maryland as the same appeared on the stock records of the corporation. It was sent by regis
Plaintiff contends that under the circumstances recited the certificates were never issued to him and that the by-law requirement may not, therefore, be invoked by the defendant. Plaintiff relies principally upon the decision of this court in Smith v. Universal Service Motors Co., 17 Del.Ch. 58, 147 A. 247. In the cited case the stockholder-plaintiff was entitled to receive additional shares of the defendant company as a stock dividend. A certificate for these shares was filled in and executed in the company office but thereafter disappeared. There was no showing of a delivery of the shares to the stockholder or to any one else on his behalf. In these circumstances it was held that the certificates had not been issued and that the stockholder was not required to comply with a by-law relating to lost-certificates. The Chancellor said: “Delivery, either actual or constructive, is essential before a certificate can be said to have been issued * * *. [U]ntil the certificate, made up in due form, not only passes from the custody and control of the defendant but also is delivered
The parties do not agree as to the primary issue which is here presented for the court’s determination. Defendant contends that the sole issue is whether or not plaintiff obtained possession of the certificates. It urges that under the decisional law plaintiff came into possession at least when the envelope containing the certificates was "placed in the basket with the rest of the plaintiff’s mail in plaintiff’s bedroom.” Defendant cites the following cases, Regina v. Hayward, 1 C. & K. 518, 174 Eng.Rep. 919; Regina v. Reed, Dears, C.C. 257, 169 Eng.Rep. 717; Commonwealth v. Ryan, 155 Mass. 523, 30 N.E. 364, 15 L.R.A. 317; Warmoth v. Commonwealth, 81, Ky. 133; Washington v. State, 106 Ala. 58, 17 So. 546. To these it would seem appropriate to add Nolan v. State, 213 Md. 298, 131 A.2d 851, where the Maryland court said: “Goods which have reached their destination are constructively in the owner’s possession although he may not yet have touched them.” It is to be observed that all of the cases so cited deal with the question of possession in criminal cases where the issue has been whether the crime charged constituted larceny or embezzleement. None of them deal primarily with the question of agency which plaintiff contends is the real issue to be here determined. I shall proceed to consider the issue which plaintiff claims is raised.
Plaintiff argues that the maid who accepted and receipted for delivery of the registered mail containing the stock certificates was without authority, either express or implied, to do so. It is difficult to follow plaintiff’s reasoning under this argument. True, neither of the maids in his household had express authority to accept and receipt for registered mail. But housemaids are domestic servants whose duties are to serve the needs of the master’s household. Jack v. Belin's Estate, 149 Pa.Super. 531, 27 A.2d 455. They work within the master’s house for the upkeep thereof and for the care, comfort and convenience of its occupants. Wiseman v. Phipps, 176 Misc. 964, 28 N.Y.S. 2d 971. If servants of this kind do not have the authority, as a necessary incident of their employment, to accept and receipt for delivery of parcels and mail, either ordinary or registered, it is difficult to see what needs of the household they serve. Certainly the
Though the courts in this state have never specifically ruled or commented on the point, it would seem to be a rule of universal application that mail which is properly addressed and posted with postage prepaid is presumed to be duly received by the addressee. 31 C.J.S. Evidence § 136, p. 777. It has been held that where a registered letter is properly mailed and transmitted to the address of the person to whom the letter is addressed, and is there delivered by the postal authority to a person who signs the return receipt as agent of the addressee, the presumption arises that the person so receiving and signing for the registered mail is in fact the agent of the addressee. Miller v. Penwell, 112 Okl. 163, 239 P. 651; Farmers’ Mut. Ins. Ass’n. v. Tankersley, 13 Ala.App. 524, 69 So. 410. This presumption may be strengthened, weakened or overcome by proof of attendant pertinent circumstances. E. Clemens Horst Co. v. Grand Rapids Brewing Co., 280 Mich. 49, 273 N.W. 388.
In Nemo v. Local Joint Executive Board, 227 Minn. 263, 35 N.W.2d 337, notice of a hearing addressed to the relator-union was sent by registered mail. The return receipt was signed for the union by a purported agent. In answer to the contention that no proper notice had been served the Supreme Court of Minnesota said: “In the absence of proof to the contrary, it is presumed that mail properly addressed and posted, with postage prepaid, is duly received by "the.
In the present case there is a presumption from the fact of due mailing that the registered parcel was received by plaintiff. Whether or not this is overcome by the statement' that plaintiff has never personally received or seen the same it is not necessary to decide for the parcel was received and signed for on plaintiff’s behalf by his maid.
Plaintiff complains that defendant has not treated its stockholders equally in replacing certificates which were not received. It appears that certificates of a value of less than $100,000 were sent by regular mail and replaced without bond when they were not received. As defendant observes, where the certificates were sent by regular mail there ordinarily would be no proof that they were received at the stockholder’s address. Here the registered parcel admittedly was received at plaintiff’s address.
Plaintiff claims also that there is no substantial risk of loss to the defendant and that the expense incident to the furnishing of a lost instrument bond is so great as to outweigh the possible risk. The short answer to this is that whether or not a lost instrument bond may be required is within the discretion of management of the defendant corporation. With this discretion the court can not interfere. Mastellone v. Argo Oil Corp., 7 Terry 102, 82 A.2d 379.
Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is denied. Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is granted.
Order on notice.
I attribute no significance to the fact that the receipt was signed by the maid “in her own name and not in the name of plaintiff.” It is clear that the maid intended to sign on plaintiff’s behalf as the parcel was placed in the basket in plaintiff’s bedroom with his other mail.