Plaintiff appeals an order granting defendant’s motion for a new trial after the jury had returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff. We reverse and remand with instructions to the trial court to reinstate the general judgment.
The material facts are undisputed. Plaintiff’s truck was stopped at a drive-through window when a car'driven by defendant’s mother, decedent,
The case was tried to a jury. Because defendant admitted liability, the jury was asked only to find whether plaintiff was injured and, if so, to determine the amount of damages to which plaintiff was entitled. During voir dire, plaintiffs counsel told the jury panel that the case “involve [d] a personal injury, fortunately not a real serious one, but one that nevertheless involves some out-of-pocket expenses and some — and a permanent injury,” and that “the evidence is-going to be that [plaintiff has] been out of pocket over $5,000 in medical bills and he’s got a permanent injury.” The latter statement prompted one potential juror to ask whether “this person”
“[PLAINTIFF’S COUNSEL]: That’s something— that’s something the Court does not allow us to tell you one way or the other.
“JUROR: But does insurance handle some (inaudible).
“[PLAINTIFF’S COUNSEL]: We can’t tell you that, you’re not allowed to — -you’re allowed — you’re supposed to make a decision without regard to that. I’m actually the one that’s supposed to ask the questions.
“JUROR: (Laughing) (inaudible).”
After the jury was selected, plaintiffs counsel delivered his opening statement, again characterizing the case as “not involving a lot of money but some out-of-pocket — significant out-of-pocket expense.” During his opening statement, plaintiffs counsel told the jury that plaintiff “has spent a little over $5,200 in medical bills from a year after the injury,” and that “the big problem is he’s had a $5,200 out-of-pocket expense.” Plaintiffs counsel concluded his opening statement by describing the case as involving a “very simple injury but it is an out-of-pocket expense and it’s going to continue to be an out-of-pocket expense and that’s why [plaintiff! is here.”
Plaintiff testified at trial that he paid over $5,000 in medical expenses “out of [his] pocket.”
“Q Now, do you remember — do you know how much you paid in medications yourself since a year following the injury to date, do you know the exact figure?
“A I do not know the exact figure, but it’s well over $5,000 out of my pocket.
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“Q And were there any other costs at all [other than prescriptions and medical treatment]?
“A Yes. There’s a cost here [on Exhibit 11] related to obtaining records. I believe that’s for the trial, but I could be mistaken. That’s [$]6.50 to Dr. Takacs. It’s $25 for Dr. Silver’s records, and $175 for his last report for a total of [$]206 and change. That [exhibit] shows this as being out of my pocket $5,206.59.”
Outside the presence of the jury, defendant indicated her intention to cross-examine plaintiff to demonstrate that the amounts that plaintiff claimed were paid “out of [his] pocket” were inaccurate because medical insurance covered a portion of the expenses. Plaintiff objected on the ground that Oregon’s collateral source rule, codified in ORS 31.580, prohibited that line of questioning. The trial court sustained the objection and ruled that defendant was not permitted to cross-examine plaintiff about his insurance coverage or benefits he may have received pursuant to that coverage.
During closing arguments, plaintiffs counsel explained that, if the jury determined that plaintiff was indeed injured in the accident, they must then consider “what the law calls damages or out-of-pocket costs for compensation.” The jury returned a verdict for
Defendant filed a motion for a new trial pursuant to ORCP 64 B(6), which permits the granting of a new trial on the basis of “[e]rror in law occurring at the trial and objected to or excepted to by the party making the application.” Defendant again took the position that it was error not to allow cross-examination of plaintiff regarding insurance payments that he had received for his out-of-pocket expenses and argued that evidence of collateral benefits was relevant to impeach plaintiffs testimony that he paid his medical bills himself. Plaintiff replied that such a line of questioning would have violated ORS 31.580. The trial court granted the motion without explanation, and plaintiff appeals.
At the outset, we note that the parties disagree about the appropriate standard of appellate review of an order granting a new trial based on legal error committed at trial. Plaintiff urges us to review the trial court’s determination for legal error, arguing that the trial court committed an error of law when it held after the trial that defendant should have been able to introduce evidence of collateral benefits during plaintiffs cross-examination. See Bennett v. Farmers Ins. Co.,
Both standards of review play a role in our analysis. We will affirm an order granting a new trial pursuant to ORCP 64 B(6) if any of the grounds argued in support of the motion is well-taken and the error was prejudicial. Williams v. Laurence-David,
If we determine that the trial court committed legal error, we then consider whether that legal error prejudiced the rights of the moving party. Because “ ‘the trial court is usually in a better position to evaluate the circumstances of each case and the prejudicial effect, if any, of any claimed irregularity,’ ” we defer to the trial court’s conclusions regarding prejudice. Schacher,
We begin by evaluating whether the trial court committed legal error by prohibiting defendant from cross-examining plaintiff about his medical insurance coverage after plaintiff testified that he paid medical expenses “out of [his] pocket.”
“(1) In a civil action, when a party is awarded damages for bodily injury or death of a person which are to be paid by another party to the action, and the party awarded damages or person injured or deceased received benefits for the injury or death other than from the party who is to pay the damages, the court may deduct from the amount of damages awarded, before the entry of a judgment, the total amount of those collateral benefits other than:
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“(c) Insurance benefits for which the person injured or deceased or members of that person’s family paid premiums [.]
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“(2) Evidence of the benefit described in subsection (1) of this section and the cost of obtaining it is not admissible at trial, but shall be received by the court by affidavit submitted after the verdict by any party to the action.”
(Emphasis added.) The statute contains no exceptions: Evidence of insurance benefits is not admissible at the trial of a civil action for damages for bodily injury or death.
Despite the plain wording of the statute, defendant contends that she should have been allowed to cross-examine plaintiff using evidence of insurance benefits to impeach his testimony that he paid medical expenses “out of [his] pocket.” In support of her argument, defendant relies on Oregon cases enacted prior to the passage of ORS 31.580 and cases from other jurisdictions that had not codified the collateral source rule at the time of those decisions. Specifically, defendant argues that Oregon law permits a party to inteiject evidence of insurance coverage into a trial to show the bias or interest of a witness, see Rigelman v. Gilligan,
We reject defendant’s reliance on cases decided under the common law of other jurisdictions without codified collateral source rules. Those decisions offer no guidance to us.
Reversed and remanded with instructions to reinstate the general judgment.
Notes
The driver of the car died of causes unrelated to the accident after plaintiff brought this action. Plaintiff amended his complaint to substitute the driver’s daughter and personal representative as defendant.
While defendant contends the juror’s use of “this person” referred to plaintiff, plaintiff contends the term instead referred to decedent because plaintiff was sitting in the courtroom before the jury panel when the question was asked. We cannot tell from the record which interpretation is more plausible, and we need not do so to resolve this appeal.
The trial court issued an opinion letter stating only that it “finds defendant’s arguments persuasive and grants the motion.”
A trial court’s order granting a motion for a new trial based on a ruling that we determine was not erroneous is a per se abuse of its discretion. See State ex rel Juv. Dept. v. D. J.,
Those decisions, which are based upon the common law of other jurisdictions, are inapposite because ORS 31.580 governs our analysis. Even if those cases were somehow relevant, we would conclude that they are factually distinguishable from this case because each relies, in part, on evidence that the plaintiffs had suffered financial hardship or strain as a result of their medical bills. Our review of the record reveals that no such evidence was presented here. See, e.g., Fitzgerald,