10 Md. 544 | Md. | 1857
delivered the opinion of this court.
This record presents two propositions for our consideration: the right of the appellant to the money claimed, and the propriety of the remedy employed.
Upon the first we agree with the appellee’s counsel, that the case of the Balto. & Susq. Rail Road Company vs. Nesbit, 10 Howard, 395, is decisive of the present appeal, if we are
' Now, if the title does not vest in the city until payment or tender, and the owner could compel payment by legal process, there would be no mutuality. The city might be required to’ pay for land that it may never use or need for the purposes of the act. This certainly would be a hardship on the citizens of Baltimore, from which, we think,-they should be relieved by adopting the interpretation of-the Supreme Court in the case cited.
This may be a severe system of legislation, as was said, because it places the property owner at the discretion, not to say caprice, of the other party, by allowing it to 'condemn and ■afterwards abandon the property. But this construction is not likely to work so much injustice as that contended for by the appellant, because, by the latter, the city is deprived of all choice of another location, after a condemnation is once made
The inquisition allows the owner such adamages as he will sustain by the taking, use and occupation” of the premises, and this is in pursuance of the oath which the law requires to be administered to the jury. The clause, authorizing the condemnation, implies, that the city should have an election to take or reject the property, after the condemnation, in requiring the jury to ascertain and assess the sum or sums of money to be paid by the Mayor and City Council, &c., “for the land, spring, brook, or water-right, or other property which they may deem necessary to purchase and hold, or use for the purpose.”
This means, necessarily, a purchase after the inquisition, by payment or tender of the valuation of the jury, because a previous agreement with the owner, would render the functions of a jury altogether unnecessary, and involves the power to reject the location altogether. The entry for purposes of condemnation is not a taking, use and occupation, within the meaning of the act, and, as we have seen, does not devest the owner’s title, or confer it on the city. The act of Assembly has not made the inquisition and confirmation obligatory on
Our conclusions are: 1st, that the judgment of confirmation decides the value of the land, from which there is no appeal directly to this court; and, consequently, its propriety cannot be inquired into in this collateral way. 2nd, that the city is not bound by the mere inquisition and judgment thereon, and could rightfully abandon the location in question; and 3rd, that the city may be made liable, in another form of proceeding, to the appellant for any loss or damage, he may have sustained by reason of the conduct of its authorities in the premises.
For as much as the appellant has no right to the amount in dispute, on the basis of the inquisition, we need not consider the questions propounded as to the remedy.
Order affirmed.