Graf v. FriedlanderGraf v. Friedlander
Lead Opinion
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
On thе 7th of March, 1871, plaintiff leased from the defendant certain vacant lots in New Orleans for the period of four years, ■at the rate of $1000 per annum, payable monthly. It was also stipulated in the samе contract that the plaintiff should erect a house upon the premises, and upon the exрiration of the lease the plaintiff could elect whether he would buy the lots from the defendant, or whether the defendant should take the building erected thereon; and the price to be paid by thе one or the other, as the case might be, should be determined by “ two disinterested persons ” (quoting the language of the contract), one to be chosen by each of the parties; and in case of disagreement, they to choose an umpire whose decision would be final. The term of the lease was extended by consent for another year. Upon the expiration of this extension the plaintiff elected that .the defendant should take the building erected by the plaintiff upon the property under the provisions of the contract.
Each party selected, what is termed in the proceedings, an expert to.
The defendant answered, admitting substantially the facts аs stated above, but claimed that he was entitled to certain credits which the experts failed to consider, and that the experts had appraised the building too high, and such appraisement wаs made in the interest of the plaintiff, and to his, defendant’s, prejudice.
The case was tried before a jury who rendered a verdict in favor of the plaintiff for $1463 50, and from the judgment on this verdict, the defendant appealed. From the nature of the suit this Court is greatly restricted in its review of the ‘pleadings, and 'evidеnce to be found in the record.
The suit is not based on an award of arbitrators or amicable сompounders appointed and qualified as prescribed by the articles of the Code upоn the subject, nor was the award, as it is termed, and the proceedings relating thereto, in strict accord with the provisions of law.
The contract of these parties, however, was a law unto themsеlves. In that contract it was expressly stipulated that the amount to be paid by the defendant, in the еvent he took the house constructed on the leased premises, was to be determined in a certain way pointed out by the contract, namely, by the judgments and decision of the persons selеcted under the provisions of the instrument. By the terms of the instrument, the persons to be thus chosen for this purpose were clothed with full authority to fix and determine the matter to be submitted to them; and the contrаcting parties bound themselves expressly to abide by their decision. The persons, whether we call them arbitrators, amicable compounders, experts, or by whatever name selected аs provided by the agreement, did make a valuation of the property, and did report the amount of that valuation. In the absence of charges of fraud in making their award, the plaintiff and defendаnt, parties to the contract, are bound by it, as they declared they would be. It may not have been the best mode of settling the matter in dispute contemplated by the parties, but it was the one chоsen by them, and they must abide by the result. The jury by their verdict corrected an error committed by these exрerts in making their estimate, an error of calculation, and which is mentioned in the answer of the defеndant; and this correction is conceded by the plaintiff’s counsel to be a proper one.
Under this view of the contract and the law governing it, we could not go into an examination of the voluminous evidence in the record,
We cannot allow the additional intеrest claimed by the plaintiff; 'the experts did not allow it, and we cannot.
The judgment of the lower cоurt is, therefore, affirmed with costs.
Rehearing
On Application foe Eeheaeing.
In our former decree no interest was allowed on the amount found to be due the plaintiff by the defendant. Further examination has satisfied us that legal interest should be allowed from the 6th June, 1876; the date of the award of the experts, which fixed the amount of the defendant’s liаbility, at which time the debt became ■ due. It is not necessary that the rehearing should be granted.
It is, therefore, ordered that our former decree rendered herein be amended by allowing five per cent interest per annum on the amount thereof, from the 6th of June, 1876, until paid.