*1 rightful mаde in the exercise its consistently the distinction it had statutorily granted powers. issue, not to this we need ad- disposition respect
In view our other for review. presented dress the issues Reversed. KASSERMAN, JJ., concur.
HARRISON and GRADY, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. BI-STATE DEVELOPMENT SHIRLEY
AGENCY, Defendant-Appellant. No.
Fifth District 5 - 86-0189 17, 1986. Opinion filed December WELCH, J., dissenting. Brown, Rouse, & Bab- James P. both and Steven L. McMullin
John Missouri, P.C., appellant. for bitt, of St. appellee. filed for
No brief the opinion delivered EARNS PRESIDING JUSTICE court: *2 pursuant Agency, appeals,
Defendant, Development Bi-State of the from a 308), judgment Ill. 2d R. (87 Court Rule 308 Supreme motion to dis denying County circuit court of St. Clair sustained she allegedly personal injuries action for miss plaintiff’s defendant. We operated by a owned and on bus passenger while a file an brief. appellee’s failed to Shirley Grady, plaintiff, note that merits of this deciding from us However, prevent this does not Talandis Construction v. Mortgage Corp. Capitol First appeal. 493, 495. 128, 133, Ill. 2d 345 N.E.2d Corp. (1976),63 Gov is the Local uрon Defendant’s motion to dismiss based (Tort Tort Act Employees Immunity ernmental and Governmental 1981, 85, seq.). (Ill. par. Rev. Stat. ch. 1—101 et We Immunity Act) entity” is a “local public are asked to decide whether defendant re of the Tоrt Act for purview Immunity purposes within the of her claim defendant with notice quirement plaintiff provide or the injury one from the date that was received year within If 1981, 85, 102.) ch. (Ill. par. cause of action accrued. Rev. Stat. 8— entitled to no entity” we conclude that defendant is a “local public tice, defendant sufficient no plaintiff gave we must decide whether 85, 1981, Ill. Stat. ch. 8—102. par. tice of her claim. Rev. “ 1—206 of the Tort Act that a ‘lоcal Immunity provides Section a township, municipality, municipal includes public entity’ county, district, board, district, school school forest corporation, preserve district, district, district, fire and all other park рrotection sanitary 1981, 85, 206.) ch. government (Ill. par. local bodies.” Rev. Stat. 1— a mass transit dis hospital This court has held that district and v. public trict are “local entities.” See LaSanche North Suburban 394, (1985), Mass Transit District Ill.
1170; Sparta Municipal Hospital District Sappington 255, 245 N.E.2d 262. for section 1 of “An Act by providing
Defendant was created Mis Illinois to enter into a with the State of compact the State of District Development for the of a Bi-Statе and souri establishment ***” (Act) (Ill. Rev. Development Agency the creation of a Bi-State en- 1981, 127, 1). ch. The district created the Act par. Stat. 63r— St. Louis the counties St. compasses city St. and Madison, Charles, St. in Missouri and countiеs and Jefferson Clair, 127, Stat. ch. 63r— (Ill. par. and Monroe Illinois. Rev. and “shall be a 1.) body corporate The Act that defendant provides (Ill. par. 1.) ch. Defendant’s Stat. politic.” 63r— bridges, (1) planning, constructing, maintaining include: and рowers facilities; for coordina making terminal airports, plans and is collecting fees; (4) (3) charging tion of streets and highways; local, State, from and Fed suing bonds; (5) receiving contributions shall governments; (6) exercising powers eral additional (Ill. it by legislature. conferred on either State Rev. Stat. ch. par. 1.) reports Defendant is to make annual required 63r— of each and to make governor State recommendations Ill. Rev. lеgislatures improvement States’ for the district. ch. 63r—1. par. of the statute which defines defendant’s reading powers Our gov leads that defendant is “local responsibilities us conclude and, public- entity” a “local under body” consequently, ernment This (Ill. Tort Act. Rev. Stat. ch. an “in further definition of supported following conclusion is forth in the Local Mass authority,” terstate as set transportation lll2/s, Rev. Stat. par. 352(h)): Transit District *3 “ mean transportation authority’ any politi- ‘Interstate shall and an- by compact cal created between State subdivision state, politi- body corporate politic other which is and and ***.” contracting (Emphasis cal of bоth states subdivision added.) of plain defendant is entitled to notice entity,”
As a “local public Tort Im it section 8—102 of the required by tiff’s claim as against 1981, 85, 102). Act (Ill. par. Rev. Stat. ch. munity 8— conclusion, decide the we must reached above Having require in with the plaintiff gave notice accordance proper whether 1981, 85, Sec 102.) Rev. ch. (Ill. par. ments of the statute. Stat. 8— 1981, 85, Stat. ch. Immunity 8—102 the Tort Act Rev. tion of or serve, personally either that must 102) provides par. 8— mail, the or secretary notice on registered or certified written by in the following public entity,” giving clerk of the “local substance information: has ac- the of action
“the name of the to whоm cause person the the date injured, name residence of crued, person accident, the or location place the hour of the and about the acci- occurred, general nature of the accident where
751 if any, dent, attending physician, the name and address of the or treating hospital hospi- the name and address of the tals, if any.” 1982, letter sent to defendant attorney’s
Plaintiff’s of January mail, information: by only following pertinent certified contains Shirley “Please that I retained Miss be advised have been she injuries in a claim for which Grady represent personal 1981, at sustained in accident on the 25th day Seрtember, Road, Gardens, Johnson and East St. Piper Golden Clair, I in- County of St. State of Illinois. believe bus volved this accident was numbered 7003.” The letter does not defendant with address or with supply plaintiff’s accident, information time of the pertaining approximate general accident, nature of the the name at- any or and address tending or physician treating hospital. compliance (Lando
Substantial statute is required. City Chicаgo (1984), 3d N.E.2d 1174.) compliance Substantial necessitates that each element of in formation the Tort in the required by Immunity Act be included written notice that each element be set forth with reasonably sufficient so as not to clarity public entity.” (128 mislead “local 597, 600, Ill. App. 1174; v. City Smith Chi cago (1980), 247, 250, N.E.2d We note that this cause does not present situation where a complaint filed period within notice can deemed to substantially comply with sеction 8—102 because of the of information under availability (Rio v. discovery procedures. Hospital Edward 104 Ill. 2d 354, 366-67, 425-26.) Where, here, several ele ments have been omitted from the formal notice completеly required section 8—102 of the Tort Immunity (Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 85, par. 102), we cannot conclude that plaintiff substantially has complied with the Tort Act. Failure to com substantially ply with the notice requirement action requires plaintiff’s аgainst defendant be prejudice. dismissed with 8—103.
For the given, reasons of the circuit court of St. judgment Clair County denying defendant’s motion to dismiss is reversed and *4 plaintiff’s action is hereby dismissed with prejudice.
Reversed.
JONES, J., concurs. WELCH, dissenting:
JUSTICE
I
I
the
order de-
respectfully dissent. would affirm
trial court’s
to
complaint.
dеfendant’s motion
dismiss
nying
plaintiff’s
that
recognizes
The
the
substantial
rather
majority
principle
than
of the Tort
compliance
literal
section 8—102
The
is sufficient.
102)
pur
governmental
the
is
the
requirement
entity
of
notice
to allow
pose
at
to
the
of the occurrence
an
the
examine
location
opportunity
does not
early
change
date so that conditions do not
evidence
stale,
liabilities,
of
to
plan
budget
light
become
to
its
in
prospective
and to correct the al
litigation,
settle claims and avoid
civil
costly
leged
may
defective condition so
future
liabilities
injuries
v.
3d
(Rio
Hospital (1983),
be avoided.
Edwаrd
458 N.E.2d
aff’d
421.) The
is
liberally
respect
statute
to be
construed with
suf
forth in
written notice. Where
of the elements
set
the
ficiency
reasonably
the
element as set forth is
sufficient
fulfill
particular
public
of
where the
has not been
the statute and
requirements
(Lando
is
the notice itself
sufficient.
or prejudiced thereby,
misled
City Chicago (1984),
of
of
the requirements
trial
concluded
apparently
Here the
court
misled or
met
was not
publiс
the statute were
sufficiently
in
notice.
shortcomings
prejudiced
in
or misled
omissions
prejudiced
How was defendant
The
of defendant’s brief devoted
portion
instant
notice?
timely
[statute], a lo-
provisions
in
of
entirety: “By
states
its
point
Agency,
Bi-State Development
cal mass transit district such as the
in
rely
must
on tax
corporation,
money
as an
municipal
uninsured
potential
certainty
order to
its
tort liabilities. Without
meet
Agency will
Dеvelopment
defendant Bi-State
provisions,
the notice
What is
tort
potential
liability.”
forecast its
effectively
be unable
information from
enough
gather
defendant could not
implied is that
case. Let
in this
liability
its
perceive
possible
the instant notice to
by the
instant notice as noted
shortcomings
us examine the
in mind:
allegations
prejudice
with defendant’s
majority,
time
acci-
approximate
not state the
The nоtice does
at which
the street intersection
states the date and
dent: The notice
of the bus involved.
occurred, as
as the number
the accident
well
Any
its
on schedules.
Defendant,
busses
company, opеrates
a bus
the accident hap-
when
cared
ascertain
officials who
letter of
attorney’s
in her
stated
exactly
more
than
pened
it.
determine
schedules to
could
to records and
notice
resort
*5
accident:
nature
the general
The notice does not state
(2)
in a
resulting
per
notice, it was a bus accident
According
liberally
is to be
sufficient if the statute
sonal
this was
injury. Surely
Chicago (1984),
Lando v. City
cоnstrued.
has to with defendant’s asserted nothing do rectifi- event, readily this omission was liability. any tort In potential identified adequately who plaintiff’s аttorney, contact with able himself in his letter. attending physi- any not the address (4) The notice does state these items need to the statute treating hospital: According
cian or Further, has if the so treated. suppliеd only plaintiff be was omis- based on allegation prejudice to do with defendant’s nothing readily these facts ascertainable Finally, sions in the notice. were plaintiff’s attorney. direct inquiry mo of defects in the nоtice arose on defendant’s
Since issue the alle dismiss, tion to the trial court and this court must assume v. Fed (Martin are true gations well-pleaded plaintiff’s complaint 596, 601, 440 eral Insurance Co. Life i.e., accident wаs involved in the 1003), actions or omissions were injured was and that defendant’s By reversing cause of her decision proximate injuries. valid case, consigns trial court in this this court a presumptively nothing reasons which have to do with claim oblivion for technical or the Section 8—102 has protecting rights public. not purpose, and should to effect that purpose implemented valid trap unwary injured parties. In should not be opinion why plaintiff there is no reason my just of the trial court was her The decision permitted prosecute claim. affirm correct, and should we it.