Gradwell v. StrausserGradwell v. Strausser
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- McEwen
Lead Opinion
This is an appeal from an order of the Court of Common Pleas of Schuylkill County dismissing Appellants’ complaint for custody. We affirm.
Appellants, Thomas Gradwell and his wife, Emma Grad-well, the maternal grandparents (“grandparents”) of Lynn Anne Strausser, sought legal custody of Lynn Anne, presently age 15. The grandparents instituted this action against Luther D. Strausser and Emma A. Strausser, Lynn Anne’s natural parents. The parents filed an answer with new matter, requesting legal and physical custody of Lynn Anne.
At the time this action was commenced, physical custody of the Lynn Anne was with the paternal grandfather, Luther T. Strausser (“Luke”). Legal custody was with the parents. The parents also had the right to partial custody
On August 29, 1990, following a hearing, the court entered a second temporary order vacating the prior order and transferring legal and physical custody of Lynn Anne to her parents pending further court action. On February 19, 1991, the grandparents and Luke filed a motion requesting that testimony be taken and that the agency rendering family counseling to the parties report on the parents’ status. See
1. Do maternal and paternal grandparents have standing to institute a civil action seeking custody, partial custody, or visitation with a minor child?
2. Did the trial court err in denying paternal grandfather partial custody or visitation with the minor child where the grandfather and stood in loco parentis to the minor and they had lived together for over a twelve month period?
3. Assuming but not conceding the trial court’s ruling on standing is correct, did the trial court err in not transferring this matter to the juvenile section of the court?
Persons other than natural parents are “third parties” for purposes of custody disputes. In re Custody of Hernandez, 249 Pa.Super. 274, 376 A.2d 648 (1977). See also Commonwealth ex rel. Witherspoon v. Witherspoon,
Absent a prima facie right to custody, a third party lacks standing to seek custody as against the natural parents. Helsel v. Blair County Children and Youth Services, 359 Pa.Super. 487, 519 A.2d 456 (1986). If we were to grant standing to third parties under these circumstances,
a parent’s prima facie right to custody could thus be challenged without a clear and convincing showing that the child is not receiving proper parental care. This is not appropriate when the party seeking custody lacks a legal basis to claim custody equal with that of a parent. It is an unacceptable means of circumventing the procedures established to determine the necessity of forfeiting parental rights.
Id., 249 Pa.Superior Ct. at 496, 519 A.2d at 460. See also Weber v. Weber, 362 Pa.Super. 262, 524 A.2d 498 (1987); Herron v. Seizak, 321 Pa.Super. 466, 468 A.2d 803 (1983).
The appropriate manner for a third party to challenge child custody is through dependency proceedings, set forth in the Judicial Code. See
In Palmer v. Tokarek, 279 Pa.Super. 458, 421 A.2d 289 (1980), this court affirmed an award of custody to a father in a contest with the maternal grandparents. The child’s parents were divorced. The father was awarded custody despite the fact that his seven-year old son had lived almost his entire life with the maternal grandparents, had been well cared for by them and wished to remain with them. The trial court had stated in its opinion that “if the parties stood in equal position” it would have awarded custody to grandparents. Id., 279 Pa.Superior Ct. at 465, 421 A.2d at 293.
Palmer graphically illustrates the rationale supporting the exacting standard of proof. The courts, in order to promote and protect the policy of protecting the parent/child relationship, will hesitate to interfere absent clear evidence that the child’s welfare so demands. Only then may the courts intrude upon the parents’ natural and primary right to rear and care for their child. Cf Snarski v. Krincek, 372 Pa.Super. 58, 538 A.2d 1348 (1988) (parents divorced; child lived with maternal grandparents and mother for six and one-half of his eight years; after mother died, father sought custody; the court awarded custody to the maternal grandparents, subject to father’s right to partial custody).
A third party has been permitted to maintain an action where that party stands in loco parentis, that is,
Luke argues that he should be permitted to maintain this action because he stands in loco parentis with respect to Lynn Anne. Specifically, Luke contends that he has resided with Lynn Anne for a length of time and, therefore, he has overcome the natural parents’ prima facie right to custody. We disagree.
The phrase “in loco parentis” refers to a person who puts himself in the situation of assuming the obligations incident to the parental relationship without going through the formality of a legal adoption. The status of “in loco parentis” embodies two ideas: first, the assumption of a parental status, and second, the discharge of parental duties.
Commonwealth ex rel. Morgan v. Smith, 429 Pa. 561, 565, 241 A.2d 531, 533 (1968). The trial court found that Luke had resided with Lynn Anne and her parents for almost two years. Thereafter, Lynn Anne resided with Luke, without her parents, for a period of three months. Lynn Anne and Luke evidently had a very warm and caring relationship. Lynn Anne stated that she preferred Luke’s supervision over that of her parents, and stated that she would rather live with her grandparents than with her parents. Lynn Anne characterized her parents as more rigid in their discipline than Luke or her maternal grandparents.
The level of discipline is doubtless a strong consideration to a child in determining a preference. This is especially true during adolescent years when the child ex
Sections 5311, 5312 and 5313 of the Domestic Relations Code3 provide grandparents or great-grandparents with a right of action for partial custody or visitation under certain circumstances — when a parent is deceased,
Luke maintains that he has acquired in loco parentis status and has overcome the parents’ prima facie right to custody because he has met the statutory period of residing with his granddaughter.
Section 5313 provides:
If an unmarried child has resided with his grandparents or great-grandparents for a period of 12 months or more and is subsequently removed from the home by his parents, the grandparents or great-grandparents may petition the court for an order granting them reasonable partial custody or visitation rights, or both, to the child. The court shall grant the petition if it finds that visitation rights would be in the best interest of the child and would not interfere with the parent-child relationship.
Luke misapprehends both the purpose and application of the statute.
The statutory rights created under section 5311-5313 provide a means for grandparents or great-grandparents on the non-custodial side to guard against potential estrangement. The statute, however, speaks to partial custody or visitation; it does not provide a right of action for custody. We find, therefore, that
In Herron, supra, the court interpreted the predecessor act to
The “Custody and Grandparents Visitation Act” provides visitation rights to grandparents upon a finding by the court that visitation would be in the best interests of the child. The Act provides this right only in three circumstances: (1) when a parent is deceased; (2) when parents’ marriage is dissolved; and (3) when the child has resided with grandparents for a period of twelve months or more.
Herron, 321 Pa.Super. at 469, 468 A.2d at 805. The court held that grandparents do not have standing to seek partial custody or visitation, over the parents’ objection, unless they come within the purview of the Grandparents Visitation Act. Further, a court has no power to order grandparent visitation where both parents are alive, reside together with the child, and object to visitation. Id., 321 Pa.Superior Ct. at 468, 468 A.2d at 804; see also Weber v. Weber, 362 Pa.Super. 262, 524 A.2d 498 (1987) (absent statutory authority, an adult sister does not have standing to bring an action for partial custody of a minor child over the objections of the minor child’s parents).
Order dismissing complaint affirmed.
McEWEN, J., files a dissenting statement.Notes
. The court ordered the plaintiffs to join Luther as a party to the action. See Pa.RX.P. 1915.6. Rule 1915.6 incorporates the provision of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act,
.
. The prior law, The Custody and Grandparents Visitation Act, Act of November 5, 1981, P.L. 322, No. 115 § 2;
. The terms “partial custody” and “visitation” are often used interchangeably. Each term, however, has a distinct legal meaning. See
. Although not stated in the declared purpose of this chapter of the Domestic Relation Code, we do not construe this statement to preclude a grandparent or great-grandparent from seeking relief under
. We note that our research has revealed no cases in which
. The trial court found that Luke had not met the statutory time period under
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting:
While the author of the majority Opinion has provided a persuasive expression of view, I am compelled to a differing, conclusion. Since Lynn Anne was not in the physical custody of her parents, but in the physical custody of her paternal grandfather, appellant Luther T. Strausser, on July 23, 1990, the date when her maternal grandparents, appellants Thomas and Emma Gradwell, instituted this action, and since appellant Luther T. Strausser retained physical custody of Lynn Anne pursuant to court orders of July 23, 1990, and August 2, 1990, I am not persuaded that appellants lacked standing. See: Snarski v. Krincek, 372 Pa.Super. 58, 538 A.2d 1348 (1988). Thus, I would remand the case to the trial court for the conduct of such proceedings as will enable the trial court to determine what custody arrangement will now serve the best interest of Lynn Anne.