225 S.W. 751 | Tex. Crim. App. | 1920
Lead Opinion
The death penalty was inflicted upon appellant by the jury under a charge of rape.
Mrs. Howard, the assaulted female, testified upon the trial that she recognized appellant as the assaulting party at her house; that the room was dark when he entered, that he woke her by placing his hand on her, that she turned on the light and that he instantly broke it, showing that the recognition was by the momentary flash of the light. It is also claimed that she got a view of him as he went out of the door. There is evidence of parties who talked with prosecutrix the morning after the rape occurred at night showing that she stated she did not know whether her assailant was a white man or a negro There is evidence not controverted that her hand was cut by a knife. She says this knife was in the hands of her assailant who threatened to kill her if she did not submit to his desires, and in the scuffle her hand was cut. It bled profusely on the bed clothes and on her night gown. Appellant offered evidence to establish an alibi which, if believed by the jury, should have entitled him to an acquittal. There is also a confession introduced having been made to the officers on the day subsequent to the alleged rape. This confession does not come in the best shape, but it is not the purpose here to discuss it. It is fully questionable, if not more than questionable, that this confession was admissible as presented by the bill of exceptions.
There is a bill of exceptions which shows that the bloody clothing were introduced in evidence, the pillow case, sheet, night gown and bed clothes. These clothing were quite bloody. The bill of exceptions is full and sets out all the circumstances, and questions and answers of witnesses and objection of appellant. We are of opinion this testimony was not admissible. It could serve to illustrate no fact connected with the transaction. There is no issue as to the fact that Mrs. Howard had her hand cut and that it bled profusely on the clothing that were admitted in evidence. Appellant did not question that fact but denied his presence. She testified fully and clearly as to the wound and what produced the shedding of blood. Other witnesses testified to the fact that her hand was cut and there was blood on her gown as well as on the bed clothing. The introduction of this evidence could not solve any question before the jury. Its effect was to inflame their minds, and was necessarily prejudicial. It has been held where bloody *303
clothing illustrate some question in the case or tend to solve it, such evidence is introducible, but where it does not tend to solve any issue in the case it would not be admissible. These lines of distinction are well marked and well known. In support of the proposition that the clothing were not admissible see Cole v. State, 45 Tex.Crim. Rep.; Christian v. State,
For the reasons indicated the judgment will be reversed and the cause remanded.
Reversed and remanded.
Addendum
There is but one question that is thought necessary to be noticed in the State's motion for rehearing filed by the prosecution in the trial court. This refers to what the motion says in an incorrect statement of a fact not found in the record. The language of the motion is as follows: "We have diligently searched the record to find such testimony and we cannot find it," etc. The matter referred to in the motion is thus stated, substantially, that the court was in error in stating "There is evidence of parties who talked with prosecutrix the morning after the rape occurred at night showing that she stated she did not know whether her assailant was a white man or a negro." That statement from the opinion is substantially correct. The opinion is attacked, on that statement. The court correctly stated the matter in the opinion. On page 37 of the record, in the testimony of the witness Carver, set out in bills of exception Nos. 1 and 5 which were approved by the court, this language is found: *304
"I seen two niggers talking there to her, and after I had got out there I learned there had been a prowler, or some one in the yard, but I didn't know it at the time. Then I stopped and talked to her, but she did not tell me that the man she saw was a white man, she said she didn't know, that it was dark and she didn't know him; that he was a tall fellow, rather stoop shouldered. I did not tell her, `we think it is this same man here, and you must not say he was a white man, I have almost gotten a confession out of that nigger.' I told her, `You must be positive.'"
On page 65, in another bill of exceptions approved by the court, practically the same language is found as that quoted above. The witness further says: "I told her she must be positive whether he was or was not the nigger. The fact she was talking to two niggers, that is the reason why I stopped, I thought I would stop and ask her and see if she had any information about who those two niggers were." It is unnecessary to discuss this matter with the record in this shape. The language in the opinion did not quote exactly that of the witnesses, but it is substantially correct. She stated she did not know who it was that assaulted her, whether it was a white man or not. She was being queried about it in the presence of these two negroes for the reason stated by the witness. We are of opinion that the criticism is without merit. The statement in the opinion is in accord with transcript as approved by the trial judge. The other matters we deem unnecessary to discuss.
The motion for rehearing is overruled.
Overruled.
