44 S.E.2d 762 | Ga. | 1947
1. Where a portion of premises sued for is described as being "fifty acres of land in the southeast corner of lot of land No. 30, in the first district of Crawford County, Georgia," the description is sufficient to enable the jury to identify it in the verdict. Such language should be construed as alleging that the lot is in the form of a square and the land sued for located by taking the southeast corner of the lot as a base point and running equidistant along the two lines of the lot which intersect at such corner to the intersection of other lines drawn parallel to the respective lines first mentioned, all lines being of such length as will embrace the exact quantity of 50 acres. As to that portion of the premises sued for which was appropriately described, a verdict should not have been directed for the defendants upon the ground that the jury would be unable to identify it in the verdict.
2. Title to land set apart as a year's support to a widow and minor children upon the death of the widow vests in the children who are then minors, and is not subject to sale by the representative of the widow's estate. Dickerson v. Nash,
By joint answer the defendants admitted that they were in possession of a part of the Rudolphus or Mattie Grace lands, but would not say that they were in possession of the particular part described in the petition. Wallace Rouse purchased from Amelia Grace Rouse, as administratrix of the estate of Mattie Grace, the following lands: "Fifty acres of land in the southeast corner of lot of land No. 30, and fifty acres in lot of land No. 29, in the first district of Crawford County, Georgia, being the Rudolphus Grace home place, less that portion sold to J. T. Mathews by Mattie Grace." Wallace Rouse then conveyed the same land to the other two defendants. These conveyances vested good title in the defendants, Stembridge and Justice. At the conclusion of the evidence offered by both sides, the court directed a verdict for the defendants in the following language: "Take a verdict. I don't believe a jury could ever locate the lands from the pleadings in the case."
The plaintiff's motion for new trial, based on the usual general grounds, and as amended by adding a ground alleging that the court erred in directing a verdict for the defendants, was overruled and the exception here is to that judgment. *722
1. It is well-settled law in this State that where the evidence in a civil case, with all reasonable deductions and inferences which may be drawn therefrom, demands a particular verdict, it is not error for the court to direct the jury to find accordingly. Code, § 110-104; Morgan v. Burks,
2. Upon a careful examination of the record, we do not think that the court was authorized to direct a verdict for the defendants upon the ground that the evidence as to title demanded such a finding. Rudolphus Grace was the plaintiff's and the defendants' common grantor. The plaintiff claimed the land in controversy as sole remaining beneficiary under a year's-support proceeding; it being his contention that the land sued for was set apart from *724
the estate of his father, Rudolphus Grace, to his mother, Mattie Grace, now deceased, and her five minor children, the youngest of whom was the plaintiff, still a minor. The other children now in life, who took under the year's-support proceeding, had all reached their majority. The undisputed evidence showed this contention to be true. The defendants based their claim for the land upon a deed from Amelia Grace Rouse, as administratrix of the estate of Mattie Grace, deceased, to Wallace Rouse, and from Wallace Rouse to the other two named defendants. The record shows that Mattie Grace, at the time of her death, had no interest in the lands involved, except such as passed to her and her minor children under the year's-support proceeding. This being true, and the evidence shows that it is, she left no interest in the lands to be administered by her representative. Dickerson v.Nash,
From what we have held in the two divisions of this opinion, it follows that the court erred in overruling the amended motion for new trial.
Judgment reversed. All the Justices concur, except Wyatt, J.,who took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.