Gowdy v. Mitchell (In Re Ocean Warrior, Inc.)Gowdy v. Mitchell (In Re Ocean Warrior, Inc.)
Before MARCUS, DUBINA and MELLOY,* Circuit Judges.
MELLOY, Circuit Judge:
This appeal arises from an order by the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida, dated March 31, 2015. In that order, the district court affirmed eight rulings of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Florida. The bankruptcy court found, in part, that Appellant James Gowdy was liable for civil contempt. The bankruptcy court also imposed compensatory sanctions against Gowdy. Gowdy raises five issues on appeal. We affirm in most respects but reverse and remand for redetermination of the amount of the Trustee fee award.
I.
In June 1989, Appellee Mitchell, a commercial fisherman, sued two Florida corporations, Ocean Warrior, Inc. (“Ocean Warrior“), and Warrior Fleet, Inc., in the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington. He alleged the corporations failed to provide “basic maritime remedies of maintenance, cure and unearned wages” after he was injured while working aboard the corporations’ commercial shrimping vessel, the F/V Janice. Mitchell also filed an in rem maritime claim against the F/V Janice, naming as its owner Ocean
Warrior. The United States District Court for the Western District of Washington had the F/V Janice arrested in admiralty. On August 28, 1990, the district court in Washington ordered the in rem sale of the F/V Janice and the sale took place on the same day.
On the same day as the sale, Ocean Warrior filed a Chapter 11 Petition in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Florida. The sale of the F/V Janice was voided. The bankruptcy court determined there was substantial equity in the boat, over and above the amount claimed in Mitchell‘s lawsuit. As a result, on May 9, 1991, the bankruptcy court ordered that Gowdy, the president of Ocean Warrior, be allowed to continue to operate the F/V Janice. The bankruptcy court ordered that Gowdy maintain insurance on the boat. The bankruptcy court also ordered the boat to remain in U.S. waters off the state of Washington pending
Based on the Washington district court‘s judgment, the bankruptcy court in Florida ordered Ocean Warrior to deposit $38,000.00 into the court‘s registry as security for Mitchell.1 No money was deposited, insurance was not maintained on the F/V Janice, and the F/V Janice disappeared in August 1992. When the boat
disappeared, Gowdy also disappeared. The bankruptcy court in Florida and the district court in Washington each issued warrants for Gowdy‘s arrest. The Washington warrant was for criminal contempt in connection with the suspected theft of the F/V Janice.
On February 10, 1993, with Ocean Warrior‘s only valuable asset missing and a bankruptcy reorganization no longer possible, the bankruptcy court converted Ocean Warrior‘s Chapter 11 case to a Chapter 7 case and appointed a Trustee. The case was closed and reopened several times over the years. Then, on December 2, 1999, the bankruptcy court closed the case with the condition that “[t]he court shall retain jurisdiction to reopen this case in the event the Vessel F/V Janice and/or Mr. James Gowdy are located. All existing Orders shall remain in full force and effect.”
In June 2011, nearly twenty years after the F/V Janice and Gowdy disappeared, United States Marshals arrested Gowdy in Texas. At that time, he alleged that the F/V Janice had been stolen by a group of Colombians and that he had nothing to do with the theft. He also alleged that he came back into possession of the boat but subsequently lost it to creditors for liens. Gowdy was brought before the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington on the arrest warrant issued by that court. In September 2011, the Washington district
court released Gowdy on his own recognizance and deferred to the civil contempt proceedings in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Florida. On October 17, 2011, the bankruptcy court reopened the bankruptcy proceedings and entered an Order to Show Cause as to why Gowdy should not be held in civil contempt.
The bankruptcy court held a hearing on December 8, 2011, regarding its show cause order. Gowdy appeared pro se at the hearing. Gowdy initially indicated he thought he was being brought before the court on criminal contempt. However, the bankruptcy judge made it clear to Gowdy that the December 2011 hearing was for civil contempt only. According to the bankruptcy judge, Gowdy was not in danger of being incarcerated as a result of the hearing and the only issue was the location of the boat and damages owed to Mitchell if it could not be located. Gowdy refused to disclose the location of the F/V Janice or answer any questions about what had happened to the boat.
The court found Gowdy in civil contempt and ordered him to produce the F/V Janice or pay the amount due on Mitchell‘s judgment. On May 4, 2012, the bankruptcy court entered a written order finding Gowdy in civil contempt for violating “numerous” prior orders of the court, including provisions in orders dated February 9, 1991, and August 7, 1992. The May 4, 2012 order allowed Gowdy to
purge the civil contempt by either returning the F/V Janice or depositing funds into the court‘s
On June 19, 2012, Gowdy filed an affidavit alleging he had no assets, seeking to avoid paying filing fees to appeal the bankruptcy court‘s civil contempt order. However, Gowdy‘s representations about his finances excluded reference to his interest in a pending maritime personal injury lawsuit in Texas. Gowdy‘s Texas lawsuit later settled for $449,637.22. Gowdy also excluded reference to his interest in a Texas home. Gowdy opined that the home was valued at $75,000.00 whereas Mitchell asserts on appeal that the home‘s publicly assessed value is approximately $120,000.00. On September 7, 2012, the Trustee commenced an adversary proceeding against Gowdy, seeking recovery for the conversion of the F/V Janice, turnover of the F/V Janice, and injunctive relief relating to the settlement funds due to Gowdy. Following interpleader proceedings, on May 29, 2013, the Trustee received $224,818.63 from the Texas court registry.
On July 17, 2013, the bankruptcy court entered an order awarding interim attorneys’ fees and costs to the Trustee. On December 11, 2013, the bankruptcy
court entered an order temporarily staying the disbursement of funds to Mitchell pending the adversary proceeding‘s conclusion or final conclusion of any appeal of the July 17, 2013 order. On March 7, 2014, the bankruptcy court ordered sanctions against Gowdy for failing to purge his civil contempt. In that order, the bankruptcy court also approved the disbursement of funds to Mitchell and authorized the entry of a final judgment against Gowdy and in favor of the Trustee. On April 8, 2014, the bankruptcy court entered an amended final judgment in favor of the Trustee in the amount of $239,143.14. Gowdy filed his notice of appeal on April 16, 2014 and appealed the bankruptcy court‘s judgment. The district court affirmed the bankruptcy court‘s judgment. This appeal followed.
II.
In a bankruptcy case, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals “sits as a second court of review and thus examines independently the factual and legal determinations of the bankruptcy court and employs the same standards of review as the district court.” In re Fisher Island Invs., Inc., 778 F.3d 1172, 1189 (11th Cir. 2015) (quoting In re Brown, 742 F.3d 1309, 1315 (11th Cir. 2014)). “Where the district court [sitting as an appellate court] affirms the bankruptcy court‘s order,” the Eleventh Circuit “review[s] the bankruptcy court‘s decision.” Id. In doing so, the court “review[s] the bankruptcy court‘s factual findings for clear error and its
legal conclusions de novo,” id., and its imposition of sanctions for an abuse of discretion, In re Walker, 532 F.3d 1304, 1308 (11th Cir. 2008). A lower court‘s decision to impose sanctions will be affirmed unless the court “made a clear error of judgment, or has applied the wrong legal standard.” In re Walker, 532 F.3d at 1308 (quoting Amlong & Amlong, P.A. v. Denny‘s Inc., 500 F.3d 1230, 1238 (11th Cir. 2007)).
A.
Gowdy initially contends that the bankruptcy court abused its discretion by failing to conduct an evidentiary hearing on disputed issues of fact regarding his civil contempt. Appellees counter that the bankruptcy court conducted an evidentiary show-cause hearing on December 8, 2011. Having reviewed the record, it is clear that Gowdy received notice of the civil contempt
law that due process is satisfied when a civil contempt defendant receives notice and an opportunity to be heard . . . .“).
B.
Gowdy next argues that his due process rights were violated when the bankruptcy court threatened incarceration for contempt and he lacked counsel at the show-cause hearing. Appellees reply that the show-cause hearing met the due process requirements and that Gowdy was not entitled to counsel at his civil contempt hearing. The United States Supreme Court has made clear Gowdy was not entitled to counsel at his civil contempt hearing because he faced no jeopardy of incarceration. See Turner v. Rogers, 564 U.S. 431, 443 (2011) (interpreting prior Supreme Court cases as “pointing out that the Court previously had found a right to counsel ‘only’ in cases involving incarceration, not that a right to counsel exists in all such cases . . . .“). As the district court noted in its May 31, 2015 order, at Gowdy‘s show-cause hearing the bankruptcy court stated: “[W]e‘re not going to incarcerate you . . . . This is a civil contempt motion here notwithstanding that you were arrested on the criminal contempt motion . . . .” Thus, the
bankruptcy court did not violate Gowdy‘s due process rights by conducting a show-cause hearing on his civil contempt without appointing Gowdy an attorney.2
C.
Gowdy contends that the bankruptcy court had no authority to punish him for contempt and that the bankruptcy court‘s sanction amounted to a criminal sanction. Appellees reply that the bankruptcy court had authority to impose civil contempt sanctions.
“Civil contempt power is inherent in bankruptcy courts since all courts have authority to enforce compliance with their lawful orders.” Alderwoods Grp., Inc. v. Garcia, 682 F.3d 958, 967 n.18 (11th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted). Distinct from the bankruptcy courts’ inherent contempt powers,
court may issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title.“). “Civil penalties must either be compensatory or designed to coerce compliance.” In re Evergreen Sec., Ltd., 570 F.3d 1257, 1280 (11th Cir. 2009) (quoting In re Dyer, 322 F.3d 1178, 1192 (9th Cir. 2003)).
In this case, the bankruptcy court had subject matter jurisdiction to hold Gowdy, the president and agent of Ocean Warrior, liable for civil contempt. Gowdy did not comply with the bankruptcy court‘s orders in 1991 and 1992 because he failed to keep the F/V Janice in U.S. waters, failed to maintain insurance on it, and failed to deposit money into the registry of the court. At the show-cause hearing on December 8, 2011, the bankruptcy court determined Gowdy was in civil contempt and sought to coerce Gowdy to return the F/V Janice: “So the Court, based on what you have to say here, determines you are in civil contempt and directs that you have, let‘s say, 14 days to either deliver the boat or the amount due [Mitchell‘s] judgment.” After Gowdy failed to purge his civil contempt, on March 7, 2014, the bankruptcy court imposed sanctions to compensate the aggrieved parties—Mitchell and others—for the costs incurred because of Gowdy‘s contempt.
Further, the sanctions were not punitive. See In re McLean, 794 F.3d 1313, 1323 (11th Cir. 2015) (“Punitive sanctions . . . take the form of a fixed fine and have no practical purpose other than punishment; it is immaterial to a court imposing such sanctions that a contemnor might be fully in compliance with the order in question at the time the sanctions are imposed.“). Moreover, as the district court noted in affirming the bankruptcy court‘s orders, “The bankruptcy court never contemplated incarceration or punitive sanctions and it acted within its jurisdiction to find Gowdy in civil contempt.” Thus, the bankruptcy court did not err by imposing coercive and compensatory civil contempt sanctions. See In re Evergreen Sec., Ltd., 570 F.3d at 1280; see also Leshin, 719 F.3d at 1234 (discussing the distinctions between coercive civil contempt sanctions and compensatory civil contempt sanctions).
D.
Gowdy claims that the bankruptcy court lacked jurisdiction because the civil contempt proceeding was not a “core proceeding.” Relying on Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462 (2011), Gowdy argues that the bankruptcy court should have proposed a judgment instead of entering a final order. Appellees disagree, arguing that the civil contempt proceedings relating to the F/V Janice and Gowdy‘s
violation of the bankruptcy court‘s orders are “core proceedings” over which the bankruptcy court has jurisdiction to enter a final order.
Bankruptcy courts may “enter final judgments in ‘all core proceedings arising under title 11, or arising in a case under title 11.‘” Stern, 564 U.S. at 474 (quoting
Here, Gowdy violated the bankruptcy court‘s 1991 and 1992 orders involving the F/V Janice. As a result, following Gowdy‘s show-cause hearing, the bankruptcy court
In addition, “[c]ivil contempt proceedings arising out of core matters are themselves core matters.” In re Skinner, 917 F.2d 444, 448 (10th Cir. 1990); see In re White–Robinson, 777 F.3d 792, 795–96 (5th Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (noting post-Stern that a contempt order was a “core proceeding” because it was a “matter[] concerning the administration of the estate” pursuant to
E.
i.
Lastly, Gowdy argues that the bankruptcy court erred in disbursing his money to pay the Trustee fees pursuant to the July 17, 2013 order. On appeal, Gowdy raises the same argument that he raised at the district court: he contends that, if sanctions were appropriate, fees should have been “paid out of the judgment, not fees awarded from [his] property first, and then a judgment entered on top of the fees.” As the district court correctly noted, Gowdy fails to cite case law or statutes to support his argument. In making his argument, Gowdy also fails to fully explain the details of his critique of the bankruptcy court‘s sanction and fee
orders. Appellees counter that Gowdy‘s appeal of the fee orders was untimely and that the bankruptcy court has wide discretion in fashioning an equitable remedy.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, we are compelled to reverse as to the quantity of the fee award. First, we conclude Gowdy‘s appeal is not untimely. And second, we conclude the fee award cannot include fees beyond those reasonably related to litigation and asset recovery efforts surrounding the contempt litigation. See Abbott Labs. v. Unlimited Beverages, Inc., 218 F.3d 1238, 1242 (11th Cir. 2000) (“[A]ttorneys’ fees in a civil contempt proceeding are limited to those reasonably and necessarily incurred in the attempt to enforce compliance.“); see also Jove Eng‘g, Inc. v. I.R.S., 92 F.3d 1539, 1557 (11th Cir. 1996) (noting that one purpose of civil contempt sanctions is to “compensate the complainant for . . . expenses it incurred because of the contemptuous act.“). Further, on remand, the district court must decide whether to permit the Trustee to pursue its adversary proceeding against Gowdy—a proceeding that never actually took place in light of the transfer of the substantial sums from Texas.
ii.
Under
iii.
Regarding the actual sanction award and the absence of any resolution of the conversion claim, we believe it is necessary to recount in additional detail what occurred after the Trustee received $224,818.63 from the Texas court registry on May 29, 2013. Instead of continuing to pursue the adversary proceeding, the Trustee filed a motion to summarily disburse Gowdy‘s settlement funds in the following manner: $135,167.95 to Mitchell; $80,465.78 to Trustee‘s Counsel; and $9,184.90 to Trustee‘s Local Counsel in Texas. On July 17, 2013—even though the bankruptcy court had not entered a sanctions award against Gowdy and the adversary proceeding had not been resolved—the court ordered allocation of the Trustee‘s and attorneys’ fees and scheduled a hearing to consider disbursement to Mitchell. The bankruptcy court did not identify the fees as “reasonable and necessarily incurred in the attempt to enforce compliance.” Abbott Labs., 218 F.3d at 1242. Instead, the court explained the fees were reasonable in light of the work performed during the entire 20-year bankruptcy proceeding.
Finally, on March 7, 2014, the bankruptcy court imposed the sanction award in favor of Mitchell, which was a judgment “in favor of Mitchell in the amount of $372, 209.02.” The court ordered the Trustee to transfer to Mitchell the
$133,433.75 remaining from Gowdy‘s settlement, and then entered a final judgment against Gowdy for the rest of the sanction award, $238,775.27.
Bankruptcy courts have broad discretion in awarding professional fees in bankruptcy proceedings. Howard Johnson Co. v. Khimani, 892 F.2d 1512, 1519 (11th Cir. 1990) (“District courts have broad discretion in fashioning civil contempt sanctions.“). And, in awarding sanctions for civil contempt, a court “ha[s] numerous options, among them: a coercive daily fine, a compensatory fine, attorneys’ fees and expenses.” Citronelle-Mobile Gathering, Inc. v. Watkins, 943 F.2d 1297, 1304 (11th Cir. 1991). A fee award in relation to a civil contempt sanction, however, is not without limit, and we conclude the bankruptcy court abused its broad discretion because it possessed no legal basis to require Gowdy to pay the full Trustee‘s fee. In re Red Carpet Corp. of Panama City Beach, 902 F.2d 883, 890 (11th Cir. 1990) (“An abuse of discretion occurs if the judge fails to apply the proper legal standard or to follow proper procedures in making the determination, or bases an award upon findings of fact that are clearly erroneous.“).
We reach this conclusion because Gowdy was never adjudged liable to the bankruptcy estate for converting the JANICE.
been limited to an amount necessary to “compensate the complainant“—Mitchell—“for losses and expenses . . . incurred because of the contemptuous act [or to] coerce the contemnor into complying with the court order.” Jove Eng‘g, 92 F.3d at 1557. The bankruptcy court could have required Gowdy to compensate the Trustee for the efforts in obtaining the personal injury settlement funds from Texas, which were costs reasonably incurred in enforcement of the court‘s sanction order. But before being required to bear the full Trustee‘s fees, Gowdy was entitled to a jury trial in an Article III tribunal on the Trustee‘s conversion claim. See Stern, 564 U.S. at 503.
III.
For the reasons above, we affirm the judgment of the district court in all respects other than the amount of the fee award. We remand for the bankruptcy court to award a fee based on the work the Trustee performed pursuant to Mitchell‘s motion for contempt. The lower court also shall determine whether the Trustee may pursue its adversary claim at this late date.
AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED and REMANDED in part.