MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This mаtter is before the Court, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 158(a), on appeal from a final order of the United States Bankruptcy Court denying appellant Gowan’s application for fees or compensation for services rendered in the consolidated Chapter 11 cases of three Illinois limited partnerships known as Lefkas General Partners Nos. 1017,1018, and 1020 (“Debtors”). A bankruptcy court’s ruling regarding fees will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion.
In re Land,
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The Debtors’ general partners are members of the Demetrios Dellaportas family. The Debtors’ principal asset is their beneficial interests in land trusts, which hold title to the Rivercrest Shopping Center. On October 4, 1991, the Debtors filed Chapter 11 petitions for reorganization. About a month later, Sakura Bank, Ltd. (f/k/a The Mitsui Taiyo Kobe Bank, Ltd.) filed a motion to appoint a trustee to administer the Debtors’ estates. The Sakura Bank is the Debtors’ major creditor (over 90% of the estates’ debt) and holds the first mortgаge on the Rivercrest Shopping Center. According to the Sakura Bank, a trustee was necessary because the Debtors incompetently and fraudulently diverted funds from Rivercrest, preventing them from duly investigating these fraudulent transactions and properly administering the estates.
After the Sakura Bank filed its motion, the Debtors filed an application for authority to employ the Capital Group, Inc. as a financial consultant and to pay the company a $15,000 retainer. Appellant Gowan is the President of the Capital Group. On Januаry 21, 1992, Judge Ginsberg continued this application until resolution of the Sakura Bank’s motion for appointment of a trustee, stating that appointment of new management for the Debtors was premature in light of the Sakura Bank’s pending motion.
Hearings on the motion for appointment of a trustee began on that same day, January 21, 1992, after a preliminary investigation by an examiner verified the Sakura Bank’s allegations of fraud. Twenty-five days of hearings followed. Finally, on April 30, 1992, the Sakura Bank and the Debtors agreed to the appointment of Glenn R. Heymаn, as a special Examiner with Expanded Powers. 1 Since now the special examiner was entitled to select the financial advisors, the bankruptcy court denied as moot the Debtors’ application for employment of the Capital Group without prejudiсing any rights Gowan “may have [] for compensation.”
On July 31, 1992, Gowan filed an application for $111,997.51 in fees. The fee application revealed that Gowan had received $85,000 from the Debtors’ individual partners (the Dellaportas family), of which $50,000 was attributed to services rendеred on the Rivercrest Chapter 11 cases. The *807 balance due was $51,997.51. On August 17, 1992, Judge Ginsberg denied Gowan’s fee application with the parties present in court. Relying on a page of definitions submitted by Gowan to the court, Judge Ginsberg determined that Gowan could not colleсt from the Debtors’ estates because the definitions constituted a judicial admission that Gowan’s clients were members of the Dellaportas family, not the Debtors. Gowan defined his clients as the “Dellapor-tas family partners and guarantors in Lef-kas 1017, 1018, and 1020 [and gjeneral partner originally Demetrios Dellaportas, then Maria Dellaportas.” Gowan’s loyalties while participating in the bankruptcy proceedings were with his clients. These clients were not the Debtors — the Debtors were the limited partnerships of Lefkas General Partners Nos. 1017, 1018, and 1020.
ENTITLEMENT TO COMPENSATION OR FEES
The issue before this Court is whether Judge Ginsberg erred in denying Gowan’s fee application based on the page of definitions submitted to the court for clarification of the parties involved and their status with respect to the bankruptcy proceedings. Gowan essеntially contends that the definitions submitted in response to the judge’s request for clarification are not part of the fee application and cannot constitute judicial admissions. Judicial admissions, however, are not limited to statements made in the particular motion or application pending. Any “deliberate, clear and unequivocal” statement, either written or oral, made in the course of judicial proceedings qualifies as a judicial admission.
Ensign v. Pennsylvania,
Gowan deliberately prepared and submitted his written statement during the pendency of thе bankruptcy proceedings specifically to clarify any confusion as to the parties for whom Gowan performed services. Gowan knew that Judge Ginsberg would consider this statement in determining his right to compensation from the Debtors’ estate. The statement unequivoсally defined his clients as the Della-portas family and partners of the limited partnerships; it did not name the Debtors as individual clients. Under these circumstances, this Court finds that Judge Ginsberg did not err in holding that the written definitions were sufficiently “deliberate, clear and unequivocal” to constitute a judicial admission that the Debtors were not Gowan’s clients.
Even absent the admission, this Court finds that Judge Ginsberg did not abuse his discretion in denying Gowan’s application for compensation and fees under the facts presented in the record. In order to recover fees from a debtor’s estate as an administrative cost, a professional such as Gowan must obtain the bankruptcy court’s approval of his employment. 11 U.S.C. § 327 (1991). Although the Debtors applied for approval for employment of the Capital Group, final approval never manifested and Judge Ginsberg eventually denied the application as moot. Absent court approval, Gowan is not entitled to compensation from the Debtors’ estates.
In re Banhalmi,
*808
Unfortunately for Gowan, Judge Ginsberg did not rule on the application for employment until after Gowan, on behalf of thе Capital Group, had already rendered substantial financial services in the River-crest Chapter 11 cases. Gowan now contends that equity mandates recovery of compensation for those services rendered on behalf of the Debtor with Judge Ginsberg’s knowledgе. Some courts adhere to a liberal interpretation of the requirements in § 327 and will enter retroactive approval of employment and compensation where the professional failed to obtain approval due to inadvertence or neglect.
Id.
at 126, 127. The Seventh Circuit is one of those courts which has held that under proper circumstances, the “equitable aspects of bankruptcy proceedings permit the court to retroactively approve the employment” of professionals who rendered services for a debtor even absent strict compliance with § 327.
Id.; Stolkin v. Nachman,
Even considering the equitable factors pertinent under a liberal reading of § 327, this Court finds that the bankruptcy judge did not abuse his discretion in not excusing prior approval. 2 Gowan does not suggest that he was pressured into giving financial advice without court approval. The Dellaportas family advanced Gowan $85,000 in fees. Knowing that Judge Ginsberg had continued the application for approval, Gowan voluntarily performed the requested tasks — most likely under the expectation that the Dellaportas family would finance any remaining expenses or fees. In fact, in a letter sent to Mr. Norman Newman on July 15, 1992, regarding further payments, Gowan acknowledged the possibility that the bankruptcy court may deny his claim for fees from the Debtors’ estates and that he may have no other recourse than to seek compensation under thе “primary obligation entered into by Mr. Demetrios Dellaportas and members of his family, and by the two entities which issued [him] checks.” Furthermore, retroactive approval would significantly prejudice the Sakura Bank, the Debtors’ primary creditor, by requiring the bank ultimately to bear the expenses for financial advice in securing the appointment of a trustee with expanded powers, an appointment made necessary by the Debtors’ partners’ fraudulent activities. Denial of Gowan’s fee application, therefore, was not an abuse of discretion where it was aimed at protecting creditors consistent with the intended purpose of the rules and procedures governing the employment of professionals under § 327. Id. at 127.
Judge Ginsberg's decision is also justified under the statute’s requirement that the professiоnals employed be disinterested. 11 U.S.C. § 327(a) (1991). The Supreme Court in
Woods v. City Nat’l Bank & Trust Co.,
In short, after reviewing all the evidence, this Court finds that Judge Ginsberg did not abuse his discretion in denying Gow-an’s fee application based not only on his judicial admission, but on the fact that his loyalties were divided between at least two masters with potentially conflicting interests. 3 Equitable considerations also did not warrant retroactive approval of Gow-an’s employment. Gowan may seek compensation for past sеrvices rendered from the Dellaportas family. The bankruptcy court’s decision is affirmed.
MOTIONS TO STRIKE AND FOR SANCTIONS
This Court hereby grants permission for Appellant Gowan to consolidate and include his two motions to strike statements of the issues and designation of the record in his appeal tо this district court. Upon consideration of these motions and the record, this Court denies Gowan’s motions to strike.
Additionally, the Sakura Bank’s motion to strike all allegations of fraud, conspiracy, and falsification of evidence or of the record from Gowan’s motion fоr sanctions is granted. Finally, Gowan’s motion for sanctions is denied.
Notes
. Heyman’s appointment became effective on May 11, 1992.
. Such equitable factors include:
whether the applicant or some other person bore responsibility for applying for approval, whether the applicant was under time pressure to begin service without approval, the amount of delay after the applicant learned that initial approval had not been granted, the extent to which compensation to the applicant will prejudice innocent third parties; and other relevant factors.
In re Arkansas Co., Inc.,
. Gowan assigns a host of other errors to Judge Ginsberg’s handling of his fee petition. None of them have any effect on this Court's outcome.