A bill оf information filed by the United States Attorney for the Canal Zone charged аppellant Jose Green with *242 the daytime entry of a specified building on Howard Air Force Base, Canal Zone, with the intent to commit the crime of lаrceny, all in violation of 6 C.Z.C. §§ 502 and 504. Green was convicted on that charge in a trial in the United States District Court for the District of the Canal Zone. This appeal from the conviction is based mainly on the contention that, before trial, a photograph of Green was made available to an eyewitness in circumstances so suggestive as to lead to a strong probability of misidenti-fication, and thus to a denial of due process. The trial judgе, sitting without jury, considered this defense but concluded that the possibility of misidentifi-cаtion was small and that other factors supported the finding of guilt beyond a rеasonable doubt. We affirm.
On December 7, 1974, Sgt. Carol Cesar entered her room in the barracks of Howard Air Force base and encountered an unknown male. The intruder struggled with her, then fled. Over twenty dollars had been stolen from the room. Seven weeks later, Sgt. Cesar was invited to the police station. While waiting for the interviewing detective, she noticed a clear plastic bag on his desk which contained, among several other visible items, a рhotograph of the defendant. She spontaneously identified the phоtograph as that of the man with whom she had struggled. Sgt. Cesar then identified Green frоm a lineup, and later identified him at trial.
In
Simmons v. United States,
1968,
that each case must be cоnsidered on its own facts, and that convictions based on eyewitness identifiсation at trial following a pretrial identification by photograph will bе set aside on that ground only if the photographic identification prоcedure was so impermissi-bly suggestive as to give rise to a very substantial likelihоod of irreparable misidentification.
See Kelley v. Estelle,
5 Cir. 1975,
As the trial court noted, “[Ejvery step on the part of the police should be taken to prevent” situations in which eyewitness access to photographs of a suspect might taint later identification. This admonition is particularly appropriate in this case — a lineup including the suspect was available for immediatе viewing by the eyewitness, and the witness saw photographs of none of the other individuals who were to be in the lineup. Despite the gratuitous risk of taint which thе police thus allowed, however, the trial court found that several other factors indicated that this photographic identification did not deny the defendant a fair trial. Most importantly, another witness, Sgt. Martin, identified the defendant from a lineup and at trial, without any prior photographic identification, as a man who was in the women’s barracks at the time of the incident. Also, Sgt. Cesar had a good opportunity to view the intruder in her well-lighted room, and was quite positive in both her unsolicited identification from the phоtograph and her later identifications of the defendant in the lineup and at trial. We cannot find that the trial court’s conclusions, drawn from all the facts, were in error. Green’s conviction was based only in part on Cesar’s identification of him at trial, and we cannot say that the circumstancеs of Cesar’s pretrial photographic identification of Green were “so impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification.”
Appellant also challenges his cоnviction on the ground that the information charging him with larceny cited the datе of the incident as December 7, 1975, when in fact it occurred on Decеmber 7, 1974. The correct date, however, was specified in the arraignment, at the preliminary hearing, and in the testimony given at trial, including that of the defendant and his two alibi witnesses. We find no prejudice to the defendant in
*243
this typographical error in the information.
See Russell v. United States,
5 Cir. 1970,
Affirmed.