*1 1025 Burke, witness omitted Burke. just as it deems enter such other order produced until statement was under the circumstances. after Moreover, testified. witness had another 573(E). However, “this Pa.R.Crim.P. case, Burke, the statement unlike this charges has held that dismissal exculpatory evidence. provided prosecutor’s a penalty far too drastic for discovery violation of rules.” Common- ¶ ques Finally, 13 note “[w]e (Pa.Su- 948, 952, King, wealth v. discovery in criminal cases involving (citations per.2007) the trial court discretion of lie within the ¶ language 10 Both sides refer re will not be court’s and that decision 402, Burke, Pa. 781 v. 566 Commonwealth abused.” such discretion was unless versed 1136, (2001), quoting 1144 from Com- A.2d 261, Rucci, 670 v. 543 Pa. Commonwealth 622, 712 Shaffer, monwealth v. (1996). 1129, if we were Even A.2d (1998): 749, A.2d car preclusion order that the determine charges punishes criminal Dismissal of we hold that ried over the rearrest only ... but also the prosecutor an abuse of discretion initial order was law, public has ex public large, since because of the violation expectation reasonable those who time the Commonwealth tremely truncated charged have with crimes will be complete discovery, been and thus would had to fairly prosecuted to the full extent of the ruled subsequent judge who reverse Thus, preclusion law. the sanction of dismissal of initial bound she was charges only utilized criminal should be order.2 the most blatant cases. Given precluding evidence Order public goal protecting pub- adjudica- for an Matter remanded versed. conduct, a lic from criminal trial court tory relinquished. hearing. Jurisdiction charges should consider dismissal of
where the actions of the Commonwealth egregious
are and where demonstrable
prejudice will be suffered the defen- charges
dant if are not dismissed. case, 11 In this there no show ing egregious actions Com EMPLOYEES GOVERNMENT any prejudice monwealth defense. COMPANY, INSURANCE extremely short time Considering the Appellant discovery, frame for the it is understanda comply ble that there could be difficulties AYERS, Appellee. Jesse Likewise, discovery order. ing with that the agree we with the Commonwealth Pennsylvania. Superior Court “possi vague made defense claims Argued Feb. 2008. any par prejudice specifying without ble” ticular facts. Aug. Filed anything, If “violations” significant than instant case less grounds dis- formally have been no there would missal, judge did not
2. While the initial order, grant preclusion the dismissal grant order or she did case shows that *2 Hudock, Jr., Joseph Pittsburgh, A. appellant. Pittsburgh, Crosby, appel-
Judd F. lee. Goodrich, Pittsburgh,
William F. for Pa. Justice, Association for Amicus Curiae. MUSMANNO, BEFORE: ORIE *, MELVIN and COLVILLE JJ. COLVILLE, BY OPINION J.: Employees 1 Appellant Government (“GEICO”) Company appeals from an its order which denied motion for Appellee Ayers’ (“Ayers”) Jesse motion for sum- mary judgment. reverse and remand We with instructions.
¶ 2 The trial court summarized back- ground underlying this matter in fol- lowing manner: 29, 2004, July On was involved in two accidents motor vehicle City Pittsburgh. He first sustained injures operat- personal serious while he motorcycle ed as a result of pick-up op- struck truck Chevrolet * Judge assigned Superior Retired Senior Court. leased a vehicle owned or struck [“Pirotta”]. Pirotta
erated
David
is not
you or a relative
when []
accident occurred
second
Coverage
Motorist
for Underinsured
vehicle rolled backwards over
Pirotta’s
*3
policy.
under this
[lying] in the
[Ayers’] body, while he was
Both
following the first accident.
street
ac-
declaratory judgment
GEICO filed
bodily inju-
in serious
accidents resulted
no
had
seeking
tion
a declaration
ries.
any
claims with
duty
arbitrate
[Ayers]
pay
underinsured bene-
accidents,
Ayers
[]
At the time
of the first acci-
arising
fits
him
out
separate
the named insured on two
was
for
a Motion
parties filed
dent. Both
by
policies
motor vehicle
issued GEICO.
Judgment. The
Summary
[trial c]ourt
motorcycles
policy insured two
One
Summary
for
denied GEICO’s Motion
policy
by [Ayers]. The second
owned
for
and
Motion
Judgment
by
pick-up
two
trucks owned
insured
Ay-
Judgment
[of
Summary
]
in favor
[Ayers].
provided for
policies
Both
ers.
coverage.
underwrit-
policies required
mo-
ing
]
(cita-
[
8/24/07,
1-3
Opinion,
at
Trial Court
torcycles
pick-up
and
trucks be
omitted).
tions
The
separate policies.
under two
exis-
ap-
timely
a notice of
filed
GEICO
motorcycles
pick-up
tence of the
GEI-
The trial court then directed
peal.
were dis-
[
trucks
]
Pennsylvania Rule of
comply
CO to
closed to GEICO.
1925(b). GEICO
Appellate Procedure
Ayers
liability limits for
collected the
complied
court’s directive.
[Pirotta’s]
both accidents
Thereafter,
opinion.
its
the court issued
made
claim for
policy.
]When
[
rationale for
The trial court’s
[(“UIM”)]
underinsured motorist
cover-
Ayers can
in favor of
polices
age under
the two
issued
as follows:
summarized
GEICO,
acknowledged
right
his
GEICO
Here,
stipulated
have
separate
coverages
to stack the
on two
stacking of
[Ayers]
not waive the
did
polices
for the second accident
addi-
[Ayers]
pay
chose to
[Ayers]
“occupying”
purchase
premiums
tional
motorcycle at
the second
the time of
deny [Ayers]
coverage. To
Ayers the
[]
accident. GEICO denied
cer-
pay
coverage for which he chose
coverages from the
to stack the
legislative
tainly
promote
does
first accident because
polices
two
for the
[Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle
goals of the
motorcycle
“occupying”
he was
when
Law
Responsibility
Financial
Pirotta’s truck struck him.
[]
(“MVFRL”),
§ 1701 et
75 Pa.C.S.A.
coverages
had
never waived
Craley
[Supreme]
[v.
The
seq.].
polices
the two
issued
for either of
Co.,
Causualty
Farm
State
Fire
GEICO.
(2006),]
as-
A.2d
relied on the household
GEICO
all insureds
know-
right of
serted the
pol-
in the insurance
exclusion contained
stacking.
waive
voluntarily
ingly
it de-
trucks when
icy covering the two
Here,
declaration]
seeks [a
GEICO
accident.
coverage for the first
nied
deny stacked
unilaterally
GEICO can
states:
relevant
coverage paid
else-
exclusionary language
inserting
bodily
does not
The insured would
where
or from
injury
occupying
have
expect
no reason to
or anticipate
granted [Ayers’] Motion for Summary
exclusionary
regarding
clause
a cov-
Judgment.
erage
consciously
for which he or she
(cita-
Opinion,
Trial Court
at 5-6
pay.
chose to
There is
ambiguity
contradiction or
¶ 4
appeal,
On
presents
GEICO
one
this
as applied under the
facts
consideration,
question
namely:
Ambiguities
case.
in a policy must
“Whether
household exclusion con-
be construed against the insurer. Simi-
[Ayers’]
tained
is violative of the
larly, exceptions to coverage
gener-
[MVFRL]?”1 GEICO’s Brief at 4. The
*4
ally
against
construed
the insurer. Fur-
argument
thrust of
on appeal
GEICO’s
is
ther, the insured has a right to expect
that the household vehicle exclusion found
that
or
he
she will
something
receive
of
in
trucks’
policy preclud-
in
comparable value
return
the pre-
ed
coverage
regard Ayers’
to
mium paid
policy
providing
and
clauses
first
the exclusion is valid
coverage
interpreted
are
in a manner
and,
enforceable,
and
specifically,
more
affording
greatest protection
the
the exclusion does not violate the
insured.
MVFRL.
With
principles
by
these
articulated
the
Pennsylvania Superior
in
Court mind as
primarily presents
5 This matter
well
as the
of the principles
the
requires
an issue which
set
Craley,
forth in
the [trial c]ourt
interpret
that we
an
contract.
[found]
is entitled to the
As
the manner
which we
are
sought
[UIM] benefits
herein under the
accomplish
charge,
such
Supreme
a
our
facts and
of
circumstances
this case.
Court has stated:
The contradiction within the insurance
The task of interpreting [an insurance]
policy at
issue creates an ambiguity
generally performed by
contract
is
a
which must
[Ay-
be resolved in favor of
by
court rather
a
The
jury.
pur-
than
ers]. To
allow
on the policy
pose of that
is to
the
task
ascertain
covering the trucks meets the reason-
by
intent
the parties
of
as manifested
expectations
able
of [Ayers] who volun-
tarily
terms used in
written insurance
chose
and the
policy.
attendant
premium.
language
increased
When the
Accord-
ingly,
trial
is
unambiguous,
th[e
denied
clear and
a
is
c]ourt
GEICO’s
court
Summary Judgment
Motion for
required
give
language.
effect to that
appeals
1. Because GEICO
from an
de-
summary judgment,
tion for
a court views
nying
granting summary judgment,
light
record
most favorable to the
following general principles apply to
nonmoving party, and all doubts as to the
view:
genuine
of a
existence
issue of material fact
moving
against
party.
must be
resolved
govern
summary judg-
standards which
may grant
Finally,
summaty judg-
the court
party
ment
well
a
settled. When
seeks
judg-
ment
when the
to such a
summary judgment, a court shall enter
ment is clear and free
An
from doubt.
judgment
genuine
whenever there is no
is-
appellate
may
court
reverse the
of
sue
necessary
material fact
a
as to
a motion for
if there
element
cause of action or defense
has
an
of law
an
been
error
or
abuse
that could be established
additional dis-
covery.
summary
A
discretion....
judgment
motion for
is
Harleysville
Companies,
evidentiary
based
Swords v.
record that entitles
moving
(2005)
party
judgment
ato
as a
matter
566-67
(citations omitted).
considering
of law.
the merits of a mo-
Coverage
Apply
Does Not
ambigu-
This
in a
is
When
provision
When a
ous, however,
con-
coverage
...
does not
bodily
of the insured
further
or from
injury
occupying
strued
favor
while
of indemni-
prime purpose
the contract’s
or
owned
being
struck
insurer,
against
fication and
as the
you
that is
relative
leased
policy,
insurer drafts
controls
Coverage under
am-
language is
Contractual
reasonably
biguous
susceptible
if
A,
Complaint,
Exhibit
capable
constructions and
different
Amendment,
Policy
Automobile
than one
understood
more
original).
(emphasis in
Finally,
determining
sense.
what
[i]n
¶7
two
As to the first
contract,
intended
their
accidents,
injured
he
undisputed
it is
was
they clearly
must look to what
law
he
a vehicle
owned
occupying
expressed.
interpreting
Courts
for UIM
contract, do not assume that
its lan-
*5
Thus, pursuant
the
trucks’
to
Thus,
guage
carelessly.
was chosen
we
unambiguous
policy’s
language,
clear and
merely
will not consider
individual terms
to
Ayers’
did not
contract,
coverage
stacked
utilized in the insurance
but
Consequently,
is
first accident.
provision
entire
ascer-
for that
coverage
parties.
tain the intent of the
not entitled
stacked
con
unless the above exclusion is
St., Inc. v.
Fourth
Investors Insurance
401
public policy.
trary
166,
445,
Group, 583 Pa.
879 A.2d
(2005) (citations and
marks omit
quotation
¶8
at
Ayers argues
exclusion
ted).
words, “[generally,
In other
courts
contrary
is
to public
issue
this case
give plain meaning
must
clear and
policy contained in the MVFRL. More
unambiguous
provision
contract
unless to
Ayers maintains
specifically,
contrary
clearly
do so
to a
ex
would
companies to
requires insurance
MVFRL
pressed public policy.”
Prop
Prudential
stacking of
provide inter-policy
offer and
erty
Casualty
Company
know
coverage,
UIM
unless the insured
Colbert,
572 Pa.
813 A.2d
coverage.
In
such stacked
ingly waives
(“Prudential”).
(2002)
view,
policy’s
Ayers’
his
GEICO utilized
trucks, Ayers pur-
toAs
his two
strip
exclusion to
him
household vehicle
chased from GEICO
paid
for
stacking
which he
inter-policy
allowed for the
of UIM
which
knowingly
other
waived.
and never
cover-
coverage. Not unlike most forms of
words, Ayers believes that the household
coverage
subject
stacked
age,
facto,
a de
operated
vehicle exclusion
exceptions.
In the amendment to
stacking.
inter-policy
unknowing waiver
entitled,
clearly
“Underin-
policy, which
Craley,
Court
supra,
Supreme
9 In
Coverage Pennsylvania
Motorist
sured
intra-
(Stacked
insured can waive both
held that an
Coverage),”
a heading
there is
Here, Ayers
inter-policy stacking.2
states,
noticeably
which
“EXCLUSIONS.”
inter-policy
intra-or
stack-
heading,
did
waive
provides:
this
Under
coverage. Craley,
How-
531-32.
Supreme
allowance of
2. The
address,
ever,
that Cra-
the court determined
appeal
Craley in
inter
order to
alia,
stacking,
inter-policy
waive
Craley’s
ley could and did
interplay between
interplay.
address
provisions of
the court declined
vehicle
and the
exclusion
at 532.
allow for the waiver of stacked
Id.
MVFRL which
rather,
ing;
purchased
he
both
erage
forms of
contained
his trucks’
top
stacked
coverage
is sub-
coverage
UIM
contained in his mo-
ject to
The household
exclusions.
torcycles’ policy. The exclusion is not con-
prohibits
exclusion
trary
to the MVFRL or
other discern-
narrow circum-
able public policy. Consequently, the trial
stances, which
triggered
were
the first
contrary.
court
ruling
erred
Thus,
accident.
the exclusion does not
reasons,
11 For these
we reverse the
operate as a de
inter-policy
waiver of
facto
order
the trial
court and remand this
instead,
stacking;3
merely
excludes
directing
matter with instructions
from coverage accidents which occur under
court to enter an
limited circumstances.
As
United
summary judgment.
motion for
Stated District Court for the Middle Dis-
¶ 12 Order reversed. Case remanded
Pennsylvania
trict of
has explained:
with instructions.
Jurisdiction
relin-
[Tjhere
important
is an
distinction be-
quished.
paying
tween
something you
cannot
(e.g., paying
receive
in a
¶ MUSMANNO, J.,
files a Dissenting
policy which contains an exclusion of all
Statement.
stacking)
paying
for something that
all
know is limited
the terms
BY
DISSENTING STATEMENT
policy (e.g.,
the situation here MUSMANNO, J.:
.
where the household exclusion clause
*6
¶ 1 Although
majority
forth
sets
only
limits
stacking
certain situations
analysis,
reasoned
I
compelled
am
and does not otherwise affect
in-
spectfully
my
dissent
judg-
stack).
right
sured’s
The latter is
application
ment that the
of the household
contractually valid and not inconsistent
exclusion where an
had
not waived
public policy.
with
an
received
attendant
reduction in
Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company
premiums
unknowing
acts as an
of
waiver
Roth,
(M.D.Pa.
v.
2006 WL
*6
deprives
an insured
2006) (emphasis
original);
see also Cra-
of
paid.
the benefits for which he or she
ley,
(Eakin, J.,
stacking coverage,4 application HUDSON, Appellant. Nicholas effectively stripped exclusion Pennsylvania. Superior Court of stacking to which he MVFRL as pursuant entitled 25, 2008. Argued March coverage or re- he had not waived this Aug. Filed The ma- premiums. a reduction ceived attempts this fact jority side-step
claiming stripped would be stacking upon the inter-policy benefits un- of the household exclusion circumstances,” only and con-
der “narrow therefore, is, acceptable.
cludes that it
¶4 However, agree I cannot stripping inter-policy
effective circum- occur “narrow
benefits will companies
stances.” Because to in-
routinely require motorcycle owners motorcycles separate
sure under a their policy from the owners’ other
vehicles, motorcycle owners who those paid for inter-policy
elected and *7 stripped of
will be these benefits when
they injured riding their motor- as a
cycles. I do not characterize this the in- permit
“narrow circumstance” and windfall, companies to receive a
surance
they permitted would be to withhold bene- paid.
fits for which the insured has I Or- Accordingly, would affirm the trial
der of the court. 2; 10/27/06, Reply Motion Defendant’s opt stipulated Ayers did not Summary Judgment, reduc- at 3. or receive out Facts, Stipulation premiums. tion in See