25 How. Pr. 483 | NY | 1863
A natural or moral obligation is one which cannot be enforced by action, but which is binding on the party who incurs it, in conscience and according-to natural justice, (2 Bouv., 200;) and the instance of such an obligation is given as when the action upon the contract is barred by the statute of limitations,, a natural or moral obligation still subsists, although the civil obligation is extinguished. A natural obligation is a sufficient consideration for a new promise. (5 Binn., 33 ; 2 Binn., 591; Yelv., 41, a. n. 1; Cow., 289 ; 2 Bl. Com., 445 ; 3 B. & P., 249, n. ; 2 East., 506; 3 Taun., 311; 5 Taun., 36; Yelv., 41-6, n.3 Pick., 207, and other cases hereinafter referred to.)
The very able note to Wennall agt. Adney, (3 Bos. & P., 249,) contains a review of all the cases, and a criticism upon the decisions of Lord Mansfield; and the writer says that the instances adduced - by him as illustrative of the rule of law do not carry that rule beyond what the older authorities seem to recognize as its proper limits ; for in each instance the party bound by the promise had received a benefit previous to the promise. Indeed, it is said, it seems that in such instances alone will an express promise have any operation, and there it only becomes necessary, because, though the consideration wrere originally beneficial to the party promising, yet inasmuch as he were not of a capacity to bind himself when he received the benefit, or is protected from liability by some statute provision, or some stubborn rule of law, the law will not, as in ordinary cases, imply an assumpsit against him. Again : it is remarkable that Lord Mansfield appears to have used the term “ moral obligation,” not as expressive of any vague and undefined claim arising from nearness of relationship, but of those imperative duties which would be enforceable by law, were it not for some posi
Butler, J., in Hawkes agt. Saunders, (Cowp., 289,) says : The point in justice, equity and good conscience to pay a sum of money, be or be not a sufficient consideration in point of law to support a promise to pay that sum ? If such a question, he says, were stripped of all authorities, it would be resolved by inquiring whether law were a rule of justice, or whether it were something that acts in direct contradiction to justice, conscience and equity. He says the matter has been repeatedly decided, and refers to numerous authorities.
In Barnes agt. Hedley, (2 Taunt., 184,) a promise to pay a void and usurious debt was held binding on the party making it; and although the promissor was not and never had been under any legal obligation to pay the debt, yet it was held that in conscience and equity he was bound to pay the money actually borrowed, and that such moral
Lee agt. Muggeridge (5 Term, 10) is a case often referred to, and was regarded as a controlling authority until a late period, when its soundness has been in some degree questioned. There a feme covert, having a separate estate, gave a bond for the repayment, by her executors, of a certain sum of money advanced at her request, on the security of that bond, to her son-in-law. After her husband’s decease she wrote, promising that her executors should settle the bond. It was held that assumpsit would lie against the executors upon the promise of their testatrix. Mansfield, 0. J., said that it had long been established, that where a person is bound morally and conscientiously to pay a debt, though not legally bound, a subsequent promise to pay will give a right of action; and the judges say that the case is not distinguishable from Barnes agt. Hedley, (supra;) that in that case, certainly, Hedley was never for a moment legally bound to pay a farthing of that money for which he was sued.
Bentley agt. Morse (14 Johns., 468) is a case similar in principle to Hedley and Barnes. In that case a debt had been paid, and a receipt taken therefor as evidence of the payment. A suit was brought to recover the same debt, and the receipt not being produced a recovery was had, and the amount paid the second time. There was, therefore, no legal liability on the part of the creditor to refund the money, but a moral and conscientious obligation to do so, as he had no claim morally to the money paid the second time. It was held that a promise to repay, on production of the receipt, was founded on a good consideration. The court say : “ The debt having been paid, the recovery in the former action was clearly unjust, and though, in consequence of his neglect, the defendant in error lost all. legal remedy to recover back his money, yet there was such a moral obligation on the part of the plain
Littlefield agt. Shee (2 Barn. & Ald., 811) was decided in 1831, and on the ground that in that case the debt which the wife promised to pay, after she became discovert, was the debt of her husband, and she was under no obligation to pay the same. Butcher’s meat had been furnished to the wife for the space of about six months, while her husband was absent in Europe, and after his death she promised to pay it. Lord Tentebjdox held that the plaintiff had failed to show that he had supplied the defendant with the meat, but that it appeared it was furnished to her while her husband was living, so that the price constituted a debt due from him. They were therefore of the opinion that the declaration was not supported by the proof, and the nonsuit was right. Lee and Muggeridge is referred to, and it is remarked that all the circumstances in that case showed that the money was in conscience due from the defendant.
In Eastwood agt. Kenyon (11 Adol. & Ellis, 438) the broad doctrine laid down in Lee agt. Muggeridge is criticised by Lord Denmore, and it is said that that doctrine would annihilate the necessity for any consideration at all, inasmuch as the mere fact of giving a promise creates a moral obligation to perform it: and he quotes with approbation the note to Wennall agt. Adney, (supra,) “ that an express promise can only revive a precedent good consideration which might have been enforced at law through the medium of an implied promise, had it not been suspended
Watkins agt. Halstead (2 Sand. S. C. R., 311) was a case of goods sold under such circumstances, that the husband was clearly liable for them, and that no moral obligation rested upon the wife to pay for them. Her promise, after she was divorced from her husband, to pay for them, was but a promise to pay the debt of another person, and the court held, following Littlefield agt. Shee, that there was no good consideration to support the promise. I should judge, from the statement of the case, that the goods were originally charged to the husband and sold on his credit, with the understanding that if he did not pay for them, the wife would.
Geer and wife agt. Archer (2 Barb. S. C., 420) was a case where it was held that a mere moral or conscientious obligation, unconnected with "a prior legal or equitable claim, is not sufficient to support an express promise, and the rule as laid down in the note in Bosan. and Puller {supra) is cited as containing the true text.
In the present case, can there be any doubt but that the defendant, if she had been a single woman, would have been under a legal and equitable obligation to pay for these goods ? The law would have raised, in that event, an implied promise to pay for them. An express promise, therefore, revived a precedent good consideration which might have been enforced at law, through the medium of an implied promise. The inability of the wife to contract is precisely the same as that of an infant, and cannot be distinguished. If a sale and delivery of goods to an infant imposed a moral obligation upon him to pay
It follows, from these views, that the debt referred to in the complaint, under the circumstances therein detailed, was not the debt of the defendant’s husband, but that morally and equitably she ought to pay the same. That but for the rule of law prohibiting a feme covert from entering into or making a legal contract, the law would have implied a promise on her part to pay for the same, and that, after such disability ceased, she having made an express promise to pay the price of such goods,, the moral obligation or duty resting on her to make su.ch payment formed a good consideration for such promise, and she is consequently liable to pay for the same.
The judgment of the supreme court should therefore
Judges Balcom, (read an opinion to the same purport,) Wright, Denio, Rosekrans, Marvin and Selden concurred. Emott, J., was absent.
