7 Minn. 203 | Minn. | 1862
By the. Court,
The first objection raised by the..demurrer is,.that .the complaint-does.,not show the owner?
It is also claimed that the action should have been against School District No. 3, as the trespass was committed by that School District. By section five of an act approved March 7, 1861, (8ess. Laws 1861,^?. 56), it is provided that “the several school districts heretofore organized in any county of this State, shall be the sub-districts of the several towns in which they are situated.” By section four of the same act, it is provided that the several districts, (each consisting of a township), shall be subdivided by the trustees into sub-districts, which shall be numbered in a regular series, from number one upwards, and their description and boundaries clearly given and well defined. It is alleged in the complaint, that at the time of the injury complained of, the Defendants were known, designated, acting- and doing business under the name and style of School District Number Three, in Eagle Creek Township, describing the limits of the same, and then alleges that by virtue of the act above named, “the Defendant is now
It is further claimed that the act of 1861 does not save a cause of action against the old school district for a trespass. As to how far this may be called, or may in fact be an action of trespass, will be considered hereafter. The causes of action saved by section sixty of the act of 1861, are such as exist in favor of a party who holds a contract, obligation, or right, or lien. "What was here intended by the use of the word “right”? The word is of broad signification, and has a wide scope of meaning in its various legal applications. It must here embrace some other right than those arising under a contract, obligation or lien. I see no reason why it should not include the right to indemnity or damages, for injuries of
'Itig further ux*ged by Respondent in-support of the-demur-rér;'tha't' the ■ complaint ought to ■ -have shown the-means’ or agency by 'which'the"Defendaht committed' the -alleged' trespass.” Tt is said that a school, district-is a corporation-of the most-limited powers,'and can act-only by duly authorized agents'. ..But it is not - because of its limited -powers ‘that -it must act by and through agents, but because it is an impersonal and intangible being, and from its very nature incapa-r ble of doing personal acts. Every corporation (we can call to mind no exception) must act- through -its agents, whether- in the performance of lawful or unlawful acts, and-whether.-it possess limited or the most enlarged "powers.- -And as the corporation-must necessarily act by and through- its agents, and cannot act otherwise, we see- no necessity of stating that- the act complained'of," was done-by the corporation through its agents, unless it be necessary to go further, and. state-who those1 agents were. But this, it is believed,- has -never- been held'necessary. A railroad corporation is authorized to construct a railroad, ánd run cars thereon. -In an action-against such company for damages to -thé person-, the allegation1 usually iá' in 'general terms, that said company did. so -negligently, carelessly, 'and Unskillfully "construct- - a bridge,- or run and manage their cars, &c.; (aB the case may be)j-'that the Plaintiff waé inj ured,- &c. It is never necessary to state -who' the
The main argument of the Eespondent in support of the demurrer, is based upon the proposition, that the trespass 'complained of is an act which a school district is incapable of doing in its organized and official capacity. That the liability of a limited public corporation, such as a school district, for the torts of its agents and officers, extends only to consequential injuries, arising from the wrongful performance of a lawful act.
In the view which we take of the complaint, it will not be necessary to decide upon the correctness of this position, since we think that the complaint fails to show that the entry, use, and occupation of the house of Plaintiff, was a trespass, though the pleader, perhaps, may have intended to make an allegation to that effect. In the first place the complaint alleges that the Plaintiff was seized and possessed of the title in fee simple to certain real estate, describing it. The complaint then goes on to state “that on said premises and forming a part thereof, was on the day last aforesaid, standing and being a good, substantial, and permanent dwelling house, of the value of four hundred dollars, of a portion of which the Plaintiff had the exclusive possession.” The first clause of the complaint alleges a general possession of the real estate. The subsequent allegation haying particular reference to the dwelling house, modifies this, and only claims possession of a part of the same, thus expressly negativing the idea that the Plaintiff was entitled to possession of the whole. It is not stated who was entitled to the possession of the other part,— for aught that appears to the contrary, it may have been the Defendant in this action.
The next statement in the pleading with reference to this
Now, if any trespass is here charged, it is a trespass in breaking the close of the Plaintiff, that is, in entering upon his real estate, separate and apart from his house, since it is of that only that he claims the exclusive right of possession. Prom the construction and connection of the sentences, it may be a matter of doubt, whether the pleader intended to charge that anything more than breaking and entering upon his close, was “ without the consent and against the will of. the Plaintiff,” but whether this be so or not, is immaterial, inasmuch as it could be no trespass upon the Plaintiff to enter that part of the dwelling house of which he had not the right of possession, and occupy the same, whether with or without his consent. Possession, either actual or constructive, is essential in order to maintain the action of trespass. And laying out of view the corporate character of the Defendant, I do not think the action of trespass could be maintained against a natural person, under these allegations, so far as the taking possession, use, and occupation of the dwelling house are concerned. And if the averments do not directly negative the idea of a trespass, (as regards the house), they are too indefinite and uncertain to render a party liable for a tort.
If the Defendant had the right to take possession of, and occupy the house, or a part of the same, a trespass previously committed, or upon other property, could not render such occupation and possession tortious. Nor could the purpose for which the Defendant used the building, since the trustees would have the undoubted right to employ a part of a dwelling house as a school house, if in their judgment the same was necessary or proper. There is nothing in the statute ren-
But even admitting that the pleading shows that the Defendant was committing a trespass, in the occupation of this house for the purpose named, I can by no means assent to the doctrine which the Respondent here contends must follow from the admission of this fact. It may indeed be admitted, that the proposition that the liability of a limited public corporation, extends only to consequential injuries arising from the wrongful performance of a lawful act, has received the sanction of judicial authority to a certain extent. But we do not think these decisions have been^of such uniformity and weight, as to have established this as a fundamental principle of the law, — and much less that it is now considered as well settled by Courts of the'highest authority. In a recent case, Bissell vs. The Michigan Southern and Northern Indiana Railroad Companies, the principle has been examined at great length by the Court of Appeals of New York, and -the question ably and exhaustively discussed by Justices Com-stock and Selden. Those judges differed as to the powers of the corporations, and as to the grounds of the liability of the corporations, in that case, but the opinions of both, I think, clearly expose the fallacy of much of the reasoning of the counsel for the Respondent in this case. In that case the Plaintiff sued for injuries received by the carelessness and negligence of the companies in running their cars from Chicago to Toledo, bringing his action upon a contract betwéen himself and the companies, safely to convey him from one city to the other, for a consideration paid. Judge Selden held, that the companies had no right to transport passengers between those points by their charters, and that the contract was illegal and void. But, he remarks, “ it does not follow,
“It is said that if the contract was ultra vires, and the corporation is protected from all responsibility for its violation on that ground, it must be equally free from responsibility for an injury inflicted while attempting to perform it. But this I apprehend by no means follows, though it is probably true so far as the duty to observe due care grew out of the contract. The Plaintiff’s claim, however, rests not upon his contract, but upon the right which every man has to be protected from injury through the carelessness of others. It has the same legal foundation as that of one who has been injured by the negligent driving ot some person upon the public highway, or who has been run over by a train of cars when crossing the railroad track. The duty to observe care in these cases arises, not upon any contract, but from the obligation which rests upon all persons, whether natural or artificial, so to conduct as not through their negligence to inflict inj ury upon others. It will scarcely be doubted that if the Defendants’ cars, through the carelessness of their employees, had run over the Plaintiff, while passing upon a highway across the track of any portion of the road used by them, the corporation would have been liable. They could not set up, that having no power to run their cars beyond the limits prescribed by their respective charters, all acts outside ot those limits must be regarded as the acts of the individuals performing them, and not of the corporation.”
This is precisely the claim made in the case at bar, that because the corporation was acting beyond the limits to which the statute has confined it, the acts complained of must be regarded as those of the individuals performing them, and
The order sustaining the demurrer is reversed, and the case remanded, with leav.e to Defendants to answer, within twenty days after service of a copy of the order to be entered hereon.