Case Information
*1 ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS DIVISION IV
No. CR-13-994 JAMES ANTHONY GOULD Opinion Delivered October 8, 2014 APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM THE POPE COUNTY V. CIRCUIT COURT
[NO. CR-2012-368] STATE OF ARKANSAS HONORABLE BILL PEARSON,
APPELLEE JUDGE
AFFIRMED DAVID M. GLOVER, Judge
James Anthony Gould was charged by criminal information in the Pope County Circuit Court with first-degree murder and aggravated robbery. A jury acquitted Gould of the murder charge but convicted him of aggravated robbery. He was sentenced to forty years in prison, with an additional fifteen-year sentence for use of a firearm during the commission of the aggravated robbery. The sentences were ordered to be served consecutively. Gould appeals, arguing (1) that there was insufficient evidence to convict him of aggravated robbery; (2) that the trial court erred in excluding Gould’s expert witness; (3) that the trial court erred in refusing the proffered jury instruction regarding the crime of possession of a controlled substance; and (4) that the trial court erred in refusing the proffered jury instruction regarding self-defense. We affirm. On August 26, 2012, Gould and his nephew, Leondre Gould, went to drug dealer Randall Boykin’s house to steal his marijuana. Gould sent his girlfriend, Ashley Ojeda, who *2 had a baby with Boykin, to see if she could get some marijuana from Boykin; Gould thought that, with Ashley being there, Boykin would leave the door unlocked, would be unprotected, and that he and Leondre could just walk into the house and take the marijuana. Leondre had previously robbed Boykin twice and told Gould that it would be “easy” and that Boykin would not fight them.
Gould and Leondre drove to Boykin’s house and placed red bandanas over their faces. Gould wore a fur-lined hat. As they walked up to Boykin’s door and knocked, Gould was holding a .40-caliber pistol in his hand. Boykin looked out of the peephole, saw the two masked men, and warned them to get away from the door because he was “coming out shootin’.” Leondre ran away; Gould and Boykin exchanged gun fire. Gould shot Boykin in the driveway of Boykin’s home; when Gould went to see if Boykin was alive and take his gun, Gould’s gun went off again. Boykin died from his injuries. Gould then went into Boykin’s house and took 6.25 pounds of marijuana that testimony at trial established had a value of approximately $4,800.
I. Sufficiency of the Evidence Gould first argues that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his aggravated-robbery conviction. A person commits aggravated robbery if he commits robbery as defined in § 5-12-102 and inflicts death upon another person. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-12- 103(a)(3) (Repl. 2013). A person commits robbery if, with the purpose of committing a felony or misdemeanor theft, the person employs or threatens to immediately employ physical force upon another person. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-12-102(a) (Repl. 2013).
In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, the appellate court
determines whether the verdict is supported by substantial evidence; that is, whether the
evidence is forceful enough to compel a conclusion one way or the other beyond suspicion
or conjecture.
Sweet v. State
,
At the close of the State’s case, Gould moved for a directed verdict as to aggravated robbery on the basis that Boykin had no possessory interest in the property alleged to have been taken from him—the over six pounds of marijuana—because it was illegal for Boykin to possess the marijuana. Gould contended at trial, and now on appeal, that there cannot be a theft of property that would satisfy the robbery portion of the aggravated-robbery statute if the property in question is marijuana because it is illegal for an ordinary citizen to possess marijuana in Arkansas. We disagree.
In support of his argument, Gould cites
Daniels v. State
,
contraband owned by a defendant.” Ark. Code Ann. § 5-5-101(a) (Repl. 2013). We note that the statute discusses disposition of seized contraband in the context of ownership, providing that contraband owned by a defendant will not be returned, thus recognizing the aspect of ownership, even if the property is contraband. We also note that our theft statutes define “property,” in pertinent part, as tangible personal property that represents or embodies anything of value. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-36-101(7) (Repl. 2013). “Property of another person” is defined as any property in which any person other than the actor has a possesory or proprietary interest. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-36-101(8)(A). Clearly, marijuana has value—in this case, there was testimony that the marijuana was worth approximately $4,800—and is subject to possession. Marijuana, therefore, falls within the definitions of “property” and “property of another person” as set forth in the theft statutes. Here, there is sufficient evidence that Gould committed aggravated robbery, and his argument fails.
II.
Exclusion of Expert-Witness Testimony
Gould next argues that the trial court erred in excluding the expert testimony of
attorney John Irwin. The decision of a circuit court to admit or exclude expert testimony is
reviewed on an abuse-of-discretion standard.
Gordon v. State
,
III. & IV.
Jury Instructions
Gould’s last two points of appeal concern the trial court’s refusal to give two jury
instructions. A party is entitled to a jury instruction when it is a correct statement of the law
and when there is some basis in the evidence to support giving the instruction.
Jones v. State
,
The first jury instruction at issue is a non-AMCI jury instruction that stated that it is
unlawful for a person to possess a controlled substance. A non-AMCI instruction can only be
given when the trial court determines that AMCI does not contain an instruction on a subject
upon which the jury should be instructed or when an AMCI instruction cannot be modified
to submit the issue.
Re: Arkansas Model Crim. Instructions
,
The second jury instruction concerns AMI Crim. 2d 705, which involves the justification of the use of deadly physical force in defense of a person. This jury instruction comports with Arkansas Code Annotated section 5-2-607 (Repl. 2013), which provides, in pertinent part:
Use of deadly physical force in defense of a person.
(a) A person is justified in using deadly physical force upon another person if the person reasonably believes that the other person is: (1) Committing or about to commit a felony involving force or violence; (2) Using or about to use unlawful deadly physical force; or
(3) Imminently endangering the person’s life or imminently about to victimize the person as described in § 9-15-103 from the continuation of a pattern of domestic abuse.
(b) A person may not use deadly physical force in self-defense if the person knows that he or she can avoid the necessity of using deadly physical force with complete safety:
(1)(A) By retreating.
(B) However, a person is not required to retreat if the person is: (i) In the person’s dwelling or on the curtilage surrounding the person’s dwelling and was not the original aggressor; or (ii) A law enforcement officer or a person assisting at the direction of a law enforcement officer; or (2) By surrendering possession of property to a person claiming a lawful right to possession of the property.
However, Gould’s proffered instruction was an incorrect version of AMI Crim. 2d 705; it did not properly state the law, as it provided, in pertinent part:
A person is not justified in using deadly physical force if he knows that the use of deadly physical force can be avoided with complete safety, (a) by retreating and was not the original aggressor.
It is an appellant’s duty to submit a wholly correct instruction.
Ghoston v. State
, 84 Ark. App.
387,
Affirmed.
H ARRISON and W YNNE , JJ., agree.
James Dunham , for appellant. Dustin McDaniel , Att’y Gen., by: Karen Virginia Wallace , Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellee.