57 N.Y.S. 363 | N.Y. App. Div. | 1899
The defendants, residing in the town of Pendleton, in the county of Niagara, were sued, at the instance of the plaintiff, a resident of the city of Lockport, in that county, before a justice of the peace of
The original charter of the city of Lockport was chapter 365 of the Laws of 1865. The office of justice of the peace of the city was recognized by that act, and with the probable design of making the jurisdiction of that official co-extensive with that of any of the justices of the peace within the limits of the county. (§ 12, tit. 2.)
It is not contended by the respondent’s counsel that the powers sought to be vested in these officials were authorized by the Constitution of 1846. Section 17 of article 6 of that Constitution provided for the election of justices of the peace of the various towns, but no provision was made for those officials in the cities. It is settled by authority that this omission- to create these officials prohibited their election in the cities. (People ex rel. Sinkler v. Terry, 108 N. Y. 1; Geraty v. Reid, 78 id. 64, 66.)
Section 18 of article 6 of the Constitution of 1869 supplied this omission. It provided : “Justices of the peace and District Court judges shall be elected in the different cities in this State in such manner and with súch powers and for such terms respectively as shall be prescribed by law.” The succeeding sections provided for local courts of inferior grade, also to be established by the Legislature. A radical departure was made by this Constitution from the preceding one. Two courts were authorized, of different jurisdictions ; one, that of justice of the peace, whose judge was of ancient existence and possessed powers of a general character, and, within its sphere, of extensive authority ; the other was purely and strictly local in its operations, and for the benefit of the people of the city in which the official resided. The failure to recognize the difference in the scope of these two courts has given rise to much litigation over their relative powers.
Words similar to those engrafted in the original charter have been held to be merely descriptive of the character of the office and not to refer to its territorial jurisdiction. (Curtin v. Barton, 139 N. Y. 505, 513 ; Brandon v. Avery, 22 id. 469.)
The language of the revised charter, however, is unmistakable in its import, as the adjective “ territorial ” has been inserted, indicating the reference therein is to the extent of the jurisdiction. That addition marks the distinction between the original charter and the revised one, showing that, in the latter, the intent of the Legislature was- to make it certain that the jurisdiction of the official was to embrace the entire county.
The Constitution, therefore, required the election of justices of the peace in towns, prescribing the length of the term. In cities, the creation of that court, the prescription of its powers and the length of the term, were all committed to the Legislature. It was . obviously in attempted consummation of this authority that the Legislature provided the courts of justices of the peace with jurisdiction coterminous with the county boundaries. This provision in the act of 1886 was futile unless it was designed to provide for a judicial officer of like powers with that of every other justice of the peace within the county. The power to provide inferior courts for the exclusive use of the city was already ample. Inasmuch as there is no restriction in the Constitution upon the authority of the Legisture in its grant of power to the justices of the peace in cities, that body would be enabled to prescribe the same powers which are accorded to officials in towns.
It is a principle of construction that courts will adopt that which gives force and validity to a statute or section rather than the one which avoids it. (The People ex rel. Sinkler v. Terry, 108 N. Y. 1.) That the Legislature intended to give this effect to this section I am now seeking to uphold is obvious, for in prescribing the mode of procedure for courts of justices of the peace those in cities and towns are treated alike. (Code Civ. Proc. §§ 2868, 2869.)
Even if the power to elect justices of the peace in the city of Lockport with jurisdiction embracing the entire county exists, it is urged that this was not accomplished by the act of 1886 ; that the office theretofore existing was not abrogated, but was simply enlarged, and hence is within the condemnation of Ziegler v. Corwin (12 App. Div. 60) and kindred authorities. The intent of the Legislature is plain; it was to create the office of justice of the peace in the city of Lockport, not as a local officer, but with civil powers identical with the constitutional magistrate of that title. To make that intent
We accordingly have constitutional warrant for the creation of tliis office by the Legislature, and the execution of the authority intrusted to it by the law-making body.
In Baird v. Helfer (12 App. Div. 23) and Ziegler v. Corwin (Id. 60), recent decisions of this department, the' question involved was as to the power to endow the Municipal Court of Rochester with jurisdiction over the entire county of Monroe. The act giving life to the court limited its jurisdiction in plain terms to the city of Rochester. There was no endeavor to abolish that court and create the court of justice of the peace in its stead ; but there was a palpable attempt to enlarge the authority of this Municipal Court to embrace the county. There was no power in the Legislature to make that extension. To carry that purpose into effect involved the commingling of a purely local court with one of general juris.diction, and the Constitution made these separate and distinct.
There are two well-known canons of construction where the constitutionality of legislative enactments is involved: First, the act. will not be held in contravention of the Constitution unless the violation is palpable. (People v. Budd, 117 N. Y. 13; Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 625.) Second, that interpretation will he given which coincides with justice and the public demands, unless it runs counter to the fundamental law. Ho extraneous aid is necessary to spell out of the Constitution a purpose to make the duties devolving upon justices of the peace in cities commensurate with those of the towns. Ho restriction is embodied in th.e language vesting the - law-making power with authority to establish these courts. In the creation of this court in question there was no enlargement of its powers beyond what is usual in the administration of that office. Unless this interpretation is followed, an invidious discrimination is upheld against the people of the city of Lock-port. To enforce their small claims against residents of their county they would be forced to go outside their city, while they can be made to go to the remotest town in the county at the behest of a'suitor residing in such town. A reasonable construction of the Constitution and of the act in pursuance of it prevents this, injustice.
The judgment is affirmed, with costs.
All concurred.
Judgment affirmed, with costs.
See People v. Bork (96 N. Y. 198).