Gould v. Davis

WILLIAMS, Before ERVIN and Circuit GOODWIN, Judges, and United States Judge for District the Southern District of Virginia, sitting designation. West by published opinion, Affirmed Judge majority wrote the opinion, ERVIN in which joined. Judge Judge GOODWIN wrote a dissenting opinion. WILLIAMS

OPINION

ERVIN, Judge: Circuit Davis, Russo, Andrew Lee Philip and (“the officers”) Crumbacher police are offi- in County, Maryland cers Baltimore ap- who peal the district court’s denial of their motion summary judgment for based on immunity. action, § In this the officers violating accused of Clarence Gould’s right Fourth Amendment to be free from unreasonable searches sought when and executed “no-knock” search warrant. We agree with the district court that the officers are not entitled to immunity be- right cause the constitutional at issue was clearly established at the time of the events and was a of which a rea- sonable officer would For have known. below, reasons we affirm the district court’s summary judgment. denial of

I. (“Gould” Gould, “Gould,

Clarence Sr.”), wife, Lena, granddaugh- his and their ter, Brittany, County reside in Baltimore at Mill 3806 Milford Road. On October Gould, (“Gould, Jr.”), the Clarence Jr. son, Goulds’ was arrested and detained as a suspect in a series of robberies that had Liberty occurred in the area of Road Gould, County. appre- Baltimore Jr. was ARGUED: John Beverungen, robbing gunpoint Edward As- after the Pizza hended County Towson, sistant Attorney, Maryland, Liberty following day, Hut Road. The on Appellants. for Calia, custody police brought McCoy Lauren Ruth Israel- into Daniel son, Salsbury, Bekman, L.L.C., Clements & him in and interviewed connection with Baltimore, Maryland, McCoy Appellees. robbery for the Pizza Hut. informed ON BRIEF: Virginia Barnhart, Gould, County W. police At- that he was the driver of Jr.’s torney, Jeffrey Cook, robbery Grant County getaway Assistant ear in the Pizza Hut as well Attorney, Towson, Maryland, Appellants. Liberty in the for as in several other robberies Bekman, Paul D. Israelson, Salsbury, McCoy that after Clem- Road area. also stated Bekman, L.L.C., Baltimore, Gould, ents & Mary- the robberies he drove Jr. to some of land, Road, Appellees. for Mill his father’s house on Milford hospitalized chest, and Gould was Gould, stayed abdomen. frequently par- Jr. for his wounds. police were and treated home. At the time that ents’ interviewing McCoy, Jr. was also an federal district filed action Gould already ob- police custody, police had against the officers and Balti- court a search a warrant and conducted tained County alleging that the defendants more ' home. Jr.’s federal state laws violated various information, ap- Based on this request for execution of search their to search plied for search warrant joined Gould her husband’s warrant. Lena for a application In their war- Sr.’s home. seeking damages loss consor- action they had rant, prob- the officers averred pro- bifurcated the tium. district court of the that evidence able cause to believe against ceedings that the claim Baltimore so at could found Liberty Road robberies be County longer part of this action and is no Gould, caps, several home: baseball Sr.’s not before us. The district court therefore shirts, sunglasses, handguns, a jacket, two for granted the officers’ motion sum- also currency. pair jeans, States of and United counts, judgment on law mary several federal action, law ap- as on the state causes importantly purposes of this as well for Most not The also before us. requested the warrant and that decision peal, the officers that court, however, denied the officers’ This district a “no-knock” warrant. issued as judgment summary based on forcibly motion for enter the would allow the officers immunity qualified on one claim—Gould’s announcing presence and their home without § that his 1983 claim the officers violated waiting a time for the Goulds to reasonable right to free from unreason- constitutional The officers believed answer door. for exe- application searches of which able seriousness of the crime accused, appeal, warrant. On cution of the no-knock and the fact that the officers Jr. was handguns, justified argue that the district court the officers sought to recover two denying qualified claim im- erred in their the “knock and announce” departure from liability. munity at from executing a warrant requirement in Sr.’s home. judge County

A Baltimore Circuit Court II. warrant for issued search Sr.’s of a claim The district denial court’s very early morning on October home it turns immunity, to the extent 18, morning, 5:00 1992. Later between law, “final appealable is an on an issue of a.m., 6:00 the officers smashed front meaning of 28 U.S.C. within the decision” battering home means of a door Gould’s § the collateral order doctrine. 1291 under forcibly weapons ram and entered with their 511, 530, Forsyth, 472 v. U.S. Mitchell knocking without first or otherwise drawn (1985); see L.Ed.2d Cohen announcing presence. their Gould was Corp., Loan 337 U.S. v. Indus. Beneficial asleep at the time and did hear (1949). 93 L.Ed. 1528 69 S.Ct. home, they nor did he hear entered However, jurisdiction lack to review “Police, yelling, everybody get the officers that order order “insofar as court’s district down,” they upstairs toward his while ran pretrial rec or not the whether determines bedroom. Gould’s first recollections were ‘genuine’ for issue fact sets forth ord footsteps running up the sound stairs Jones, 304, 320, 515 U.S. trial.” Johnson gave way. a loud noise when the banister (1995). 2151, 132L.Ed.2d 238 115 S.Ct. Gould feared that intruders had broken into disputed ques- are argues there way his he his to the Gould home and made bed- this court deprive fact that of material kept handgun. closet he tions room where Offi- interlocutory ap- to hear this jurisdiction cer in the Davis was first arrive bed- Indeed, court’s order de- peal. the district weapon in room. he saw with a When Gould judgment, part, because hand, summary missing nied weapon, he fired his Gould questions of “disputed there hitting Fragments believed but him. wall beside arm, officers would as to fact” whether from the bullet in the struck Gould reason, jurisdiction securing law. For this we have lawfully acted have believed J.A, executing court’s order. the no-knock warrant. review the district the offi- district court noted that 303. The “reasonably believed cers claimed III. appli- contained in their

that the averments immunity Qualified protects gov consti- warrant] affidavit [for cation and damages from suits for probable cause.” J.A. at 303. ernment officials civil tuted pointed “countervailing arising then the exercise of district court out of their discretion support plaintiffs’ con- would ary Fitzgerald, evidence which Harlow functions. [the it was not reasonable tention that L.Ed.2d 396 U.S. probable exist- (1982). to believe that cause officers] This is available when warrant.” ed for of this ‘no knock’ issuance government employee conduct of a “does J.A. statutory violate consti rights of which a tutional the district court is correct While known.” would have Id. We have divided used to facts evidence could be different into a three-part analysis. this standard whether support conclusions as to different First, .identify right allegedly we must immunity, deserve violated; second, we whether must-decide dispute, a but rath does not indicate factual clearly right the was established at the time er, of law. court’s question The district violation; third, of alleged the must point disputed questions of order does determine whether a rather, fact, disputed legal inferences but position the officer’s have known would an be drawn from what is undis that could right. his or her actions violated Smith puted example, record. For the con factual (4th Cir.1996). 351, Reddy, v. 101 F.3d 355 they flict the officers’ between assertion in their their were reasonable belief that assertion actions were lawful and Gould’s A. belief is not a

that such a was unreasonable prong, first alleges Under the Gould actual, subjective The be factual conflict. the violated his Fourth officers Amendment resolving liefs of the officers are irrelevant in right to free from unreasonable searches immunity question. v. the See Anderson police. specifically, the More Gould 635, 641, 3034, Creighton, 483 U.S. 107 S.Ct. officers’ (1987) (“The claims that the decision to seek ques 97 523 L.Ed.2d relevant of his (albeit execute a no-knock search warrant objective fact-specific) the tion ... is rights. his Fourth Amendment home violated question a reasonable officer could whether true, claim, if concede that The officers this search lawful in [the] have believed to be right. alleges a of a constitutional clearly violation light of established the infor law and searching possessed. mation the officers subjective [The beliefs about the officer’s B. irrelevant.”). reason, search are For the of prong The second of “reasonableness” the officers’ decision right analysis inquires whether the applying executing is a for warrant clearly time established at the at issue was

legal question that must be determined from our place. violation took alleged Under perspective what right defined precedent, the must be court’s would have known about established determining specificity: “In some law, with given the facts available to the officers specific right allegedly violated whether the Here, at the time acted. there is no established,’ focus is proper ‘clearly was dispute what about information the officers general most upon its them applied had before when for and level, applica but at the level of its warrant; abstract only the no-knock executed chal specific being conduct tion to the question hypothetical whether “reason 307, Alford, F.2d v. 973 known, lenged.” Pritchett given able officer” would those have Cir.1992). (4th facts, prong The second undisputed 312 his conduct was immunity analysis must take into violation of established constitutional 270 Jackson, 585 F.2d at destroy evidence.” specific and context of account facts States, 662; 391 see also Sabbath United alleged Maciariello v. Sum- violation. See Cir.1992) (4th (“[TJhe ner, 585, 591, 20 88 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 828 F.2d 298 973 U.S. (1968) right applies danger to the (exigent in which this circumstances include

manner States, officers); appar- of the official must also Katz v. United 389 actions ent.”). short, for not liable n. “[officials In L.Ed.2d U.S. areas; they (1967) (“[Officers for gray are liable guesses in need not bad announce (citations transgressing bright lines.” Id. conducting purpose before an other- their omitted). appropriate at its level Defined if such an announce- wise authorized search then, claim is that specificity, Gould’s provoke escape of the sus- ment would in- officers, their given the circumstances of evidence.”); pect destruction of critical or the Gould, Jr., con- exceeded their vestigation (“[The] Simons, n. 2 F.2d at 32 likeli- executing seeking authority stitutional of destruction evidence will consti- hood Sr.’s a no-knock search warrant circumstances....”); exigent United tute (4th home. Couser, F.2d States Cir.1984) pos- (exigent circumstances include survey analysis begin must our with We evidence). sible destruction the law in the Fourth Circuit of the state of regard to the “knock in October 1992 with then, parties agree, following The requirement and announce” under law in October 1992: was Fourth Amendment. first required by Fourth the officers were established law whether Amendment to knock and announce their required 1992 that the Fourth Amendment presence, and wait a reasonable time pres- to knock and announce their officers home; entering prior response, Gould’s ence, time, period a and wait and, only requirement this could be excused brief, entering dwelling. prior to In their justified exigent if immediate circumstances an- the officers concede that the knock and mind, in entry. background this With requirement clearly nounce has been estab- argument in turn now to the officers’ basic in the lished law Fourth Circuit since at least exigent court —that circumstances this 14; Appellants’ 1985. Br. at v. See Mensh sufficiently in doctrine defined 1992 was 36, (4th Cir.1991); Dyer, 956 F.2d 40 Simons know he so that reasonable officer would Montgomery County Officers, 762 Police violating clearly in seek- was established law (4th Cir.1985). 30, F.2d 32 n. 1 ing executing and a no-knock warrant under The officers also that it concede was case. the circumstances of this clearly established law in October 1992 that First, argue they comply need not with the knock and immunity because are entitled requirement announce under certain “exi exigent circumstances was not the doctrine gent Appellants’ Br. circumstances.” See at and, indeed, in re 14; Simons, 1992 2; F.2d at n. 762 32-33 & Unit Br. (4th day. at Jackson, Appellants’ unclear to this 653, mains ed F.2d States 585 662 above, Cir.1978).1 disagree. As we discussed Exigent justi We circumstances can and Fourth Circuit Supreme countless Court fy entry any an an without knock and prior to 1992 held doctrine nouncement “if there is a likelihood that eases basically encompasses attempt circumstances occupants escape, exigent will or resist merely expressive precedent, § of the common 1. Under con 3109 is this circuit's the exact in equally applicable an in tours the Fourth Amendment knock and is rule and thus law requirement, exception context.”); nounce and the to this States v. Kenne also United state see circumstances, requirement exigent Cir.1994) ("Because under 876, (4th dy, 882 32 F.3d by informed reference the federal knock and encompasses the constitutional re statute (1994) § announce statute. See 18 U.S.C. 3109 ("The amendment, only it not quirements of the fourth may any open officer break outer or inner by agents, governs federal but federal searches door window of house ... to execute a analyz provides proper framework for also warrant, after, if, authority search notice of (quo warrants.” ing of state search the execution admittance...."); purpose, he is refused Si omitted)). tation mons, ("[T]he incorporated 762 F.2d at 33 rule

271 easily- provide why The officers two safety they and the destruction reasons Sabbath, See, peril in e.g., believed would be a search of disposed 391 evidence. 1) 1755; Katz, 591, Gould’s home: the crime which 389 U.S. at U.S. 88 S.Ct. being Simons, investigated Jr. was was 507; armed rob 762 F.2d at 355 n. 88 S.Ct. bery and the search warrant listed Jackson, at 662; two hand 2;n. F.2d 585 see also seized, 2) guns among the to be (4th items Anderson, F.3d Bonner v. history the criminal of Gould’s children war Cir.1996) C.J., (Wilkinson, dissenting) (quot ranted an inference that might Sr. Jackson, ing finding exigent if1 shoot officers knocked and an “plainly indicat- circumstances doctrine was presence nounced entering. their before by September Fourth ed” Circuit caselaw justifications put first of these forward 1992). In order the law in a to find the officers’ affidavit used to secure the war established, given area is “there need rant, see J.A. at and the second was prior directly on not be a case all fours.” propounded the officers’ brief appeal, on (4th Johnson, Pinder v. 54 F.3d Appellants’ see Br. at 37 n. 9. We cannot Cir.1995) (en banc); Haines, DiMeglio v. see accept argument, the officers’ and hold that Cir.1995) (“This (4th is 45 F.3d no reasonable officer in 1992 could have be protected say by that an is official action lieved that the to seek decision and execute a very action in unless no-knock warrant under these circumstances previously been held question has unlaw- was consistent with established law. ”). Instead, contours of the ful.... “[t]he justifications Both of the articulated sufficiently must clear that a reason- rely assumption officers on an that we cannot officialwould that what he able understand accept, any and that reasonable officer would doing right.” violates that Anderson v. rejected have as inconsistent with 635, 640, Creighton, 483 U.S. established law 1992—a belief that (1987); DiMeglio, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 see 45 F.3d might weapon use a because of the crimi- (“[I]n light pre-existing law the propensities nal If anything of his children. apparent.”). unlawfulness must be We be- laws, principle bedrock our is that “sufficiently lieve it would have been clear” law an treats each of us as individual. “apparent” to a reasonable officer in The law cannot notion that a abide the child’s 1992 that failure to knock and an- October sufficient, itself, can be to behavior de- prior entering nounce to Gould’s home could rights. his father of In prive constitutional only justified by safety be a for officer fear case, they knew at the time this the officers sought a fear that or the evidence in the warrant, applied for the and when later destroyed. easily warrant could be battering with a down Gould’s door broke ram, history that had no criminal Second, alternative, in the and the the armed and was not involved in robberies argue exigent that if definition of officers the Gould, Jr., any way. They knew that in also clearly circumstances was established in alleged perpetrator of the crimes under the 1992, then a officer would have investigation, custody. police was in Given believed that the circumstances of this case circumstances, essentially the officers these justified dispensing with knock and an officer, in us to hold that a reasonable ask requirement nounce in the search of Gould’s parent that a would have believed loses point, rely On this home. on the basic, protections in his Fourth Amendment safety” of component exigent “officer cir children have been home when his own cumstances doctrine. officers’ brief think it that charged in a crime. obvious We presents way: In the issue October this argument be correct. officers’ cannot clearly provided established law that “the justified component Defendants’ if actions were the exi of the offi Another gencies practicalities a warrant argument the situation ... that no-knoek cers’ is justified sought peril arresting served to of the officers to increase the because the was handguns Gould’s home. The Appellants’ (quotation officer.” Br. at 31 from recover omitted). recognize Sr. had never that officers case, just his not a reason- arrested, a action is no to such

been had reason mistake, unacceptable but an error against able believe he would use violence Nonetheless, suggest police. indicating incompetence neglect or gross officers would have believed that a reasonable officer then cannot excuse duty. The officer his handguns at Gould’s presence by pointing greater own default home, itself, justified departure a in and of magistrate. incompetence of the requirement. announce from the knock and case, In Id. 346 n. correct, knock If then the the officers are although judge state court ne- would never requirement and announcement glected sanctioning his a no-knoek duties anyone’s home who apply in the search facts, incompetence warrant under these This was legally a firearm. owned bring- default in not excuse the officers’ does law, no not and not the judge ing request no-knock to the in the it to be We believed so. officer could have place, first as well as their execution of the known officer would have think a reasonable morning. warrant later themselves, that a fire guns do not sum, reject In officers’ claim that safety must justifiable for an officer’s fear exigent circumstances doctrine was so belief, gun may simply that a a not include that it poorly defined could not have home, but someone a located within been considered established law. We might willing use it.2 the home inside reject argument also the officers’ alternative argue Finally, the officers exigent the doctrine of circumstances grant the no- judge’s state court decision well-defined, was and that the circumstances deciding jury prohibits warrant from knock led in this case would have a reasonable have be a reasonable officer would whether safety executing officer to for his fear justified that a no-knoek warrant was lieved In search warrant Gould’s home. October Contrary to the these circumstances. under established that the law however, obtaining a argument, war officers’ justify circumstances this case did objective per rant is evidence of rea se seeking executing a no-knock warrant. Malley Briggs, sonableness. 475 U.S. (1986). 345, 106 In 89 L.Ed.2d 271 C. rejected Supreme Malley, the Court prong contention, In the final of the quali officer’s on the analysis, we must determine immunity, rely “that fied entitled he[was] judicial in ... a reasonable officers’ judgment on the of a whether his actions issuing position Id. would have known that the warrant.” alleged by plaintiff. violated the magistrate mistakenly acts [W]here of some confusion prong This source issuing range a warrant but within the in their parties, argue who briefs for the competence magistrate, a professional of question is a “reasonableness” about whether [police] requested the the war- who court, law, by or a to of be decided rant cannot held liable. But is differ- be it by a question of fact that must decided competence if of ent no officer reasonable (“The i.e., Br. at 38 district warrant, jury. Appellants’ See requested would have refusing decide whether the profes- court erred in to request range is outside the of the reasonably.”); Appellee’s competence Defendants acted expected sional of an officer. (“[W]hether officers’ actions magistrate 22 If the in Br. at issues warrant the officers in this suggests 2. and whether The officers’ brief also that home it), shooting jurisdic- were involved in a incident with one of are without case were we aware Jones, brothers at home in Jr.'s Sr.’s 515 U.S. it. tion to review Johnson 311, support (1995) 1991. The evidence in the record this 132 L.Ed.2d 238 Furthermore, points is scant. assertion Gould may pursue (holding not interloc- defendant support evidence in the record to his contention qualified immunity utory appeal denial of of the knowledge this that the officers had no inci- or whether not as that order determines "insofar dent, place. if indeed it took Inasmuch as ‘genuine’ a issue of pre-trial record sets forth qualified immunity question on turns this issue trial”). fact for (whether place fact an incident took at Gould’s may “extraordinary still able to show objectively cannot be deter- were reasonable “prove that he by summary judgment.”)- The circumstances” and neither way mined known parties part analysis, knew nor should have of the misconstrue this rele however, legal vant Id. at by arguing over whether the offi- standard.” S.Ct. cers’ behavior in this ease was “reasonable.” question not qualified The is (citations n. 1 DiMeglio, 45 F.3d omit- “reasonably” in

whether the officers acted ted). argument The offered no officers have term is in tort the sense in which that used why, if their actions were violation of whether a law. The is reasonable law, clearly a person established person controlling known about would have would not have of that been aware law. Ac- law, to have been once that law is deemed cordingly, protected by officers are prong. established second under qualified immunity. reasonableness, objective concept The as immunity, qualified used in is not free- IV. standing evaluation of the “reasonableness” reasons, For these affirm we the order of Objective of an officer’s actions. reasonable- denying the district court the officers’ motion provides qualified immunity ness summary judgment qualified based on analysis objective inquiry; signals is an .immunity. Because the officers’ decision to Supreme repudiation subjective of a Court’s seek and execute no-knock warrant was in standard, qualified immunity “good faith” violation of established constitutional Fitzgerald, immunity, in Harlow v. 457 U.S. person law of which a reasonable would have 800, 815-19, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 known, proceed Gould is entitled (1982). action. parties’ on confusion this matter AFFIRMED. understandable, given that some courts by § right alleged plaintiff define the WILLIAMS, Judge, dissenting: Circuit very general at a level under the second prong specific and consider the factual cir Today majority holds officers exe- prong. cumstances In under the third such cuting (pursuant a no-knock search to a war- cases, prong second im rant issued a neutral detached state munity analysis proa becomes recita forma specifically circuit judge court autho- general right, tion of a constitutional and the search) rized a no-knoek at a home where a (that is, real “work” the consideration of the previ- within resident had shot at officers case) specific facts of the done under the year ous immuni- are not entitled See, prong. e.g., Reddy, third Smith v. 101 ty. Because I am convinced the officers’ (4th Cir.1996) F.3d (holding conduct Sr.’s did violate “right only probable to be arrested on cause” rights, respectful- I established constitutional and considering, un ly dissent. der the prong, third “whether position in [the officer’s] would have I. thought right”). her actions violated that where, here, But have defined the notes, correctly police offi- majority As the right in prong well-defined, the in second if, immunity in cers entitled to fact-specific manner, prong the third will be duties, performance “their con- of their quite easy resolve, to absent extraordinary ... duct does not violate established circumstances: which a rights constitutional Harlow v. Fitz- inquiry proceeds

When the to would have known.” [the third 2727, 800, 818, prong], 102 457 S.Ct. 73 ordinarily gerald, “the defense U.S. (1982). fail, should For reasons that reasonably competent since a L.Ed.2d 396 follow, however, majori- public with the disagree I govern official should know the law 818-19, ing conduct,” Harlow, officers’ ty’s his conclusion that the decision to 457 U.S. at 2727; however, and execute a no-knoek warrant of S.Ct. the defendant seek 102 274 — denied, (4th Cir.1996), cert. U.S. Gould, his estab- 642 home violated Sr.’s -, 2512, 1015 117 S.Ct. 138 L.Ed.2d rights. Amendment lished Fourth (1997), judged must not be their actions plainly indicat As Fourth Circuit case law hindsight,” vision of Graham v. “with 2%o actions, exigent officers’ ed at the time of the Connor, 386, 396-97, 1865, 109 S.Ct. U.S. to the failure could excuse circumstances (1989). I Accordingly, be 104 L.Ed.2d 443 See, e.g., v. Simons “knock and announce.” to the officers’ decision seek and lieve that County Officers, 762 Montgomery Police objectively a no-knock warrant was execute (4th Cir.1985) (noting 30, F.2d 32-33 justified and reasonable. justify the failure exigent circumstances assuming, majority argues, Even announce”); Arkan Wilson v. “knock and cf. in at time of the search the officers 1918, 1914, sas, 927, 514 U.S. 115 S.Ct. prior knowledge had no of the (1995) “every (noting that not L.Ed.2d 976 or of shooting incident at the Gould residence by an announce entry preceded must be children, Gould, I criminal record of Sr.’s ment”). result, summary judg As a to avoid of the “officer safe- that the contours believe qualified immunity grounds, Gould ment on ty” exception to the “knock and announce” allege demonstrating that facts had to in requirement were not established “exigent circum contours of the as to make the unlawfulness of these 1992 so sufficiently clear at exception were stances” apparent. v. actions See Anderson officers’ such that the unlaw

the time the incident 635, 640, 3034, Creighton, 483 U.S. I of the officers’ actions was obvious. fulness (1987) (noting that “[t]he 97 L.Ed.2d 523 Gould, simply allege failed submit sufficiently be contours of the must facts. such official would under clear- that doing he that what violates that stand question, failure to knock and Without 111, right”); Layne, v. 141 F.3d Wilson prior entering a home can announce Cir.1998) (en banc) (4th (same), grant cert. See, safety. justified a fear for officer - — ed, -, U.S. 119 S.Ct. Jackson, e.g., F.2d United States v. L.Ed.2d - (1998). majority Although the (4th Cir.1978) (noting that the failure to of the contends that the unlawfulness offi may justified if “knock announce” it was apparent cers’ actions was occupants is a likelihood that the will there year, Supreme Court only last Here, Gould, police). although Jr. resist exception safety would stated that the police custody at the time of the was justify a “at a time “no-knock” search search, the of the exten officers were aware present in a resi only individuals when the Indeed, history siblings. criminal sive the [criminal] no connection with ha[d] dence there is evidence that officers were involved Wisconsin, activity.” 520 U.S. Richards shooting in a incident with one Jr.’s 1416, 1421, 137 L.Ed.2d 615 pre at brothers the Gould’s home within (1997). Thus, although it now es however, year. majority, The mini vious por the officers’ conduct —as tablished that reasonably danger mizes the that the officers trayed by majority the “knock —violated night.* Although it believed faced that requirement, was clear and announce” later sib determined Jr.’s that their conduct violated ly established (on jail lings charges) were also unrelated requirement Octo “knock and announce” search, time the officers acted ber 1992. reasonably upon the evidence available II. the time. “officers on the them at Because luxury acted are not afforded the of armchair I the officers beat Because believe and, reflection,” Leavitt, reasonably circumstances under the 99 F.3d Elliott * Rather, propensities of his children. majority criminal states that the officers believed that Gould’s that one of danger were concerned Sr.’s would be in home weapon. Although might it was use a history of his war- children because criminal children might all of Gould's children determined that later ranted an inference that Sr. search, not, jail the time of were in See ante at 271. officers did violent. at the time argue of that fact majority suggests, primarily were not aware might weapon incident. because of use alternative, a lack of there was safety clarity governing the law the officer grant

exception October I would immunity. officers KONKEL, Plaintiff-Appellee, Carol M. INCORPORATED, BOB FARMS EVANS Defendant-Appellant, Ecolab, Incorporated, Defendant. Konkel, Plaintiff-Appellant, M. Carol Incorporated, Evans Farms Bob Defendant-Appellee, Ecolab, Incorporated, Defendant. 97-1824,

Nos. 97-1867. Appeals, States Court of United Fourth Circuit. Argued Sept. 1998. Decided Jan.

Case Details

Case Name: Gould v. Davis

Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Date Published: Dec 31, 1998

Citation: 165 F.3d 265

Docket Number: 97-1777

Court Abbreviation: 4th Cir.