The City of Aliquippa (Aliquippa) appeals from two orders of the Court of Common Pleas of Beaver County that compel Aliquippa to produce written summaries of interviews between Aliquippa’s attorney and several witnessеs to the motor vehicle accident giving rise to this litigation. In this interlocutory appeal, Ali-quippa contends that the communications in question are protected by the attorney-client privilege, that the communications are protected by the work product doctrine and that requiring an attorney to write a summary of witness interviews and create work product in a request for production of documents is overreaching.
These cases arise frоm a February 9, 1997 motor vehicle accident on State Route 51 in Aliquippa. James B. Patterson drove an automobile onto Route 51 heading southbound in a northbound lane. He struck head-on an automobile driven by Scott A. Gould and occupied by Margaret *936 H. Jones and Natasha Lee Jones (collectively, Appellees). In their complaints, Appellees contend that Mr. Patterson entered Route 51 through a roadway owned by Aliquippa that permitted him to enter the wrong way because of negligent design or maintenance.
Aliquippa retained Attorney Gary M. Scoulos for its defense in this matter. Attorney Scoulos thereafter interviewed the following people by telephone or in рerson: Phyllis Alston, who was an eyewitness to the accident; William Alston, who is the chief of Aliquippa’s police department; Rebecca Bradley, who is the City Administrator for Aliquippa; Bernard Hall, who is the Street Superintendent for Aliquippа; and Doug Edgell, who is a police officer employed by Aliquippa. Appellees filed a request for production of documents which included a request for summaries of any oral statement taken from any witness relating to the аccident. Aliquippa responded to this request by stating that it had no such statements and by referring to its answers to Appellee’s interrogatories.
Upon learning of Attorney Scoulos’ interviews with the witnesses, Appellees demanded that statements or the substance of any oral statement be provided to them. Aliquippa refused on the basis of the work product doctrine. Appellees then filed a motion to compel discovery and to require Aliquippa tо produce all written statements and notes of any statements or to provide the substance of the statements. On April 22, 1999, the trial court held a hearing on the motion and ordered Ali-quippa to provide the facts secured from аll witnesses to Appellees. Thereafter, Al-iquippa produced a summary of the facts provided by Phyllis Alston but refused to produce summaries of the other witnesses on the basis of the attorney-client privilege. Appellees filеd a motion for sanctions, and on June 10, 1999 the trial court ordered Aliquippa to comply with its April 22 order with respect to all witnesses whether or not employees of Aliquippa. The trial court refused Aliquippa’s motion for reconsideration. Aliquippa’s interlocutory appeal from the court’s orders is permitted under the collateral order doctrine. Pa. R.A.P. 313;
Ben v. Schwartz,
The issues presented by Aliquippa on appeal involve questions of law; therefore, thе Court’s review is limited to determining whether the trial court erred as a matter of law in granting Appellees’ discovery request.
S.M. by R.M. v. Children and Youth Services of Delaware County,
In a civil matter counsel shall not be competent or permitted to testify to confidential communications made to him by his client, nor shall the client be compelled to disclose the same, unless in either case this privilege is waived upon the trial by the client.
The attorney-client privilege performs a vital function in the legal system by fostering a confidence between clients and their advocates that will lead to a trusting and open attorney-client dialogue.
Estate of Kofsky,
The chancellor delayed ruling on the claimant’s assertion of the attorney-client privilеge until the adjudication but heard the testimony and made the attorney’s notes and other related documentary evidence part of the record. In the adjudication, the chancellor ruled that the evidence *937 was protеcted by the attorney-client privilege and stated that it would not be considered in determining the merits of the case. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court held that the chancellor’s admission of the evidence was entirely improper because Section 5928 does not just proscribe giving evidentiary consideration to confidential communications: Section 5928 proscribes their very disclosure. The Court explained that the administration of justice is damaged when the sanctity of the confidence is improvidently violated, regardless of whether the evidence is given substantive consideration.
Because of the importance of the privilege to the administration of justice, the burden of proof is upon the party asserting that the disclosure of information would not violate the attorney-client privilege.
In re: Investigating Grand Jury of Philadelphia County No. 88-00-3503;
In their brief before this Court, Appellees advance two arguments to support their claim that disclosure would not violate the attorney-client privilege. First, Appellees contend that the witnesses in question were not Attorney Scoulos’ clients. This Court has held that government entities qualify for the protection of the attorney-client privilege.
Okum v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review,
As previously noted, Attorney Scoulos interviewed Aliquippa’s chief of police, its city administrator, its street superintendent and a police оfficer employed by it. Appellees contend that these employees are not members of Aliquippa’s governing body. Nevertheless, the privilege applies to them if they are authorized to act on Aliquippa’s behаlf, In re Ford Motor Company, and the titles of each of these employees suggest positions of authority. The trial court prevented Aliquippa from establishing the exact duties and responsibilities assigned to these employees. At the April 22 hearing, the trial judge interrupted Aliquippa’s argument and ruled that he would preclude the city from calling any witnesses at trial from whom facts were gathered but not disclosed to Appel-lees. Ultimately, however, Appellees bore the burden to establish that disclosure would not violate the attorney-client privilege, and they failed to do so. In re: Investigating Grand Jury of Philadelphia County No. 88-00-3503; Estate of Kofsky.
Second, Appellees contend that the interviews were purely investigative in nаture rather than for the purpose of obtaining legal advice. Appellees rely upon
*938
United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Barron Indus., Inc.,
In the present case, the trial court has ordered Aliquippa to produce a summary of the facts from Attorney Scoulos’ interviews with Aliquippa’s chief of police, city administrator, street superintendent and one of its police officers. Attorney Scoulos was unquestionably acting in his capacity as Aliquippa’s attorney when he interviewed the witnessеs in question; the interviews were conducted in preparation for this litigation. The present case is analogous to
Investigating Grand Jury
where the Supreme Court held that the attorney-client privilege attached to handwritten notes of an interviеw between a bank president and his attorney in preparation for a grand jury interview. One page of the notes had been prepared by the attorney, and the rest had been prepared by the bank president. The Supremе Court stated that “[wjhether the note-taking was prompted by a need to organize the events discussed or to aid a less than perfect recollection is of no moment.”
Id.,
As Aliquippa correctly notes, the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure provide ample methods such as depositions and interrogatories by which Appellees may properly discover the facts available from the witnesses in question. In light of the result reached, the Court need not addrеss Aliquippa’s alternative arguments that any summaries created by Attorney Scoulos would be protected by the work product doctrine and that requiring preparation of the summaries was overreaching. Because the trial court erred in requiring Aliquippa to create and to produce summaries of Attorney Scoulos’ interviews which are protected by the attorney-client privilege, the court’s orders are therefore reversed.
ORDER
AND NOW, this 26th day of April, 2000, the orders of the Court of Common Pleas of Beaver County are hereby reversed in accordance with the foregoing opinion.