76 Md. 423 | Md. | 1892
delivered the opinion of the Court.
In 1814 Thomas J. Flack died intestate leaving a widow, several children and some grandchildren surviving him. Administration upon his estate was granted to James W. Flack, his eldest son. Henry H. Flack and David Hudson Flack, two of his other sons, were indebted to their father in large amounts. These debts remaining unpaid, and Henry H. and David Hudson Flack becoming indebted also unto their brother James W. conveyed to him in 1811, by a deed absolute upon
In March, 1892, James W. Flack, in obedience to the order passed when his letters were revoked, propounded his seventh account in the Orphans’ Court, and in that account he charged the estate of his father with the sum of $13,494.06 for expenses on the Canton property and for excess of interest. This charge was excepted to by one of the distributees of Thomas J. Flack. A hearing was had before the Orphans’ Court, and in April, 1892, the exception was sustained, and the Register of Wills was directed to state another account, omitting that charge altogether. This was done in June following. The new seventh account was sworn to by James W. Flack, and he was shown to stand indebted to the estate in the sum of $13,425.84.
The new administrators had in the mean time stated an account, distributing the proceeds of a sale made by them of certain leasehold property belonging to the estate of Thomas J. Flack, but retained in their Hands the sum of $2,851.79, the amount distributable to James W. Flack. Subsequently they filed a petition and'the Orphans’ Court, passed an order thereon fixing a day for making distribution of this sum, and ordered notice to be given. On the day appointed some of the distributees filed a petition, praying that the above named sum should be distributed to them and insisting that no part of it should be paid over to James W. Flack or to any
It will be seen from this outline of the previous and the pending litigation between these parties that the question now involved and upon which we are required to pass is whether, under the circumstances stated, the distributive share of James W. Flack in his father’s estate and now in the hands of the new administrators of that estate, is liable to be set-off by them against the alleged debt due by him to his father’s estate; or whether Mr. Gosnell as his trustee is entitled to receive that share.
The right of an administrator to retain from the share of a distributee the amount due by the latter to the intestate out of whose estate he is entitled to a share is undeniably clear. Smith & Talbott vs. Donnell, Ex’r, 9 Gill, 84; Manning vs. Thruston, et al., 59 Md., 218. And we think it equally clear that this right exists where the debt has been incurred to the estate itself by the distributee as administrator after the decedent’s death. 2 Woerner on Adm., sec. 564. The first proposition has been the settled law of Maryland for many years; and the second may be said to be a necessary consequence of
The only remaining inquiry is: Was James W. Flack indebted to his father’s estate in an amount equal to his distributive share? This can be briefly answered. When the administrator’s seventh account was excepted to, one of the objections was that he had improperly charged the estate with $13,494.06 for expenses on the Canton property and for excess of interest. This exception was sustained and the charge was disallowed by an order of the Orphans’ Court dated April 7th, 1892, whereby James W. Flack was brought in debt to the estate to that amount; and a new seventh account was directed to be stated upon this basis. No appeal was taken from that order and on the seventh of June following the new seventh account was stated and sworn to by James W. Flack whereby he showed his indebtedness to the estate to be $13,425.84. No appeal, as has just been stated, was ever taken from the order of April the seventh and the adjudication thus made after a full hearing has never been reversed.
But, beyond this, it appears with clearness that the title to the Canton property stood in the name of James W. Flack after the conveyance to him in 1877. He was the ostensible owner, and, so far as the records disclosed, the actual and sole owner of the property. Upon the faith of that apparent ownership he obtained credit and
In the face of these facts and with the decision of the Orphans’ Court on the same subject unappealed from and unreversed, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that he is a debtor to his father’s estate.
Entertaining these views we must affirm the order appealed from.
Order affirmed,, with costs.